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Recent events of financial disorder (international debt crisis, junk bond crisis,
stock market crashes, bank failures) have caused renewed interest in the subject
of financial _/rag/7/fj>. Davis (1992) defines financial fragility as a state of
balance sheets offering heightened vw/werafoV/fy to default in a wide variety of
circumstances. Heffernan (1996) notes that this heightened probability of default
implied by the term financial fragility can be used for the fragility of
households, businesses, or banks themselves. However, many authors specifical-
ly use financial fragility focusing their analyses on banks.
Minsky was one of the first authors to introduce the term 'financial fragili-
ty'. Minsky (1977) discusses financial fragility as the opposite of financial
robustness. In a fragile financial system continued normal functioning can be
disrupted by some not unusual event. In this sense such a fragile system is more
susceptible to future outbreaks of financial disorder.
David Mullins, vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in the United
States (U.S.), was quoted in The Economist (1993) in the following way:
"The 1970s was a period of instability which brought down the regulatory
structures of an earlier area; in the 1980s fracftriona/ èa/i&Mg we«/ ow/ o/ //je
WJ/K/OW".
Furthermore, The Economist (1996) states:
"Since the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was abandoned in the
early 1970s, the banking industry seems to have jumped from one drama to
another, including the Latin American debt crisis, the $ 150 billion American
savings and loan fiasco and, more recently, a property-related lending binge that
forced several Scandinavian governments to bail out large chunks of their
banking systems". ,
On top of this, the U.S. was also confronted with failures of its commercial
banks, Japan encountered major banking problems, Britain's Barings Bank
collapsed, Crédit Lyonnais in France was confronted with spectacular losses,2 C/ia/7/er 7
and Banco di Napoli had to be supported by an emergency rescue plan of the
Italian government.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the recent banking problems from a
theoretical (chapter 2), empirical (chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7) and institutional-
regulatory (chapter 6) point of view. The empirical chapters 3, 4, and 7 focus
on the U.S., while chapter 5 deals with Norway, Sweden, and Finland.
In chapter 2 we present an overview of the various theories of financial
fragility and disorder. In the first part of this chapter we will argue that the
crucial difference between these theories lies in the assumed framework on risk
and uncertainty. In the second part of the chapter, and in the other chapters of
this thesis, we will focus our analysis of financial fragility on the fragility of the
banking system, the so-called Aa/ifc/ng yrag/7/fj'.
Chapter 2 starts with an analysis of the use of the concepts of risk and uncer-
tainty in economics. Next, we put the various theories of financial fragility in a
risk/uncertainty framework. The 'pure' case of rational expectations and
efficient markets is only conceivable in a risk framework, i.e. uncertainty can be
reduced to the 'correct and objective' probability distribution. We proceed by
discussing the possibility of rational bubbles and rational runs as a rationaliza-
tion for turbulent periods of financial disorder. The concept of genuine uncer-
tainty is the cornerstone of two other theories of financial disorder, namely
unanticipated credit rationing and irrational bubbles and euphoria. Finally, we
discuss the asymmetric information literature with respect to financial fragility.
This literature focuses on information asymmetries between borrowers and
lenders causing uncertainty about the quality of borrowers.
During the 1980s and first part of the 1990s the banking sector in many
countries experienced a process of rapid deregulation, increased risk taking, and
major banking crises. This banking fragility will be the subject of the second
part of chapter 2. We will discuss private sector (market-based) and regulatory
solutions in order to cope with banking fragility.
Chapter 3 deals with extreme value theory and market assessments of the
m/r/wess of banks in the U.S. Since the 1970s the U.S. banking system has
experienced major changes in terms of new financial products, deregulation,
increasing competition, lower margins and changing risk attitudes. To a large
extent the prevailing banking regulations at the beginning of the 1970s mirrored
the legislation adopted after the banking crisis of 1929-1933. The bankingfailures of 1929-1933 induced the Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933 which
changed fundamentally the parameters of the functioning of the U.S. banking
system. Federal deposit insurance was introduced in order to avoid new bank
runs. The activities of banks were restricted with a view to the perceived exces-
sive competition of the previous period. Commercial and investment banking
were separated, each type of bank was restricted to a specific type of lending
and interstate banking was discouraged. Furthermore, payment of interest on
demand deposits was prohibited and interest rates on time deposits were
restricted to a maximum.
By the late 1970s, the regulations were widely viewed as excessively restric-
tive on the ability of banks to respond to changes in the environment that
showed advances in telecommunications and information processing technology,
financial innovation, increases in interest rates and higher volatility. As a result,
the profitability of banks was reduced and non-bank competitors grew rapidly.
The U.S. Congress reacted by adopting two major deregulation acts.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(DIDMCA) of 1980 and the Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act (DIA)
of 1982 reduced the governmental restrictions on depository institutions. The
Act of 1980 phased out interest rate ceilings and permitted all depository institu-
tions to offer NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts, allowing greater
competition for deposits among banks. Loan rate ceilings were weakened. This
Act, in combination with the Act of 1982, also increased competition between
banks and S&Ls by expanding the realm of the S&L business. Furthermore,
federal deposit insurance was increased from $ 40,000 to $ 100,000 in 1980.
The movement towards a more deregulated and competitive equilibrium
increased the efficiency of the U.S. banking system: it expanded the choices for
savers and investors, reduced the cost of financial transactions, and improved
the allocation of saving and investment nationally and internationally (Corrigan
1990). On the other hand, however, deregulation could be responsible for the
deterioration of bank asset quality during the 1980s and the substantial increase
in bank failures.
We contribute to the empirical literature by assessing the degree of riskiness
of the twenty largest U.S. bank holding companies between 1973 and 1993.
More specifically, we investigate the extent to which developments in the
1980s, in particular deregulation, have led to significantly higher risk for U.S.
banks. Since the efficient market hypothesis indicates that there is a direct and
continuous relationship between information on the fundamental value of finan-
cial assets and their market price, we will use stock returns of the twenty largestU.S. bank holding companies as our information variable. Most studies on risk
measurement of banks have used average properties like expected return or
volatility (see for instance Bruni and Paternö 1995), while relatively little atten-
tion has been paid to the use of extreme movements. Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970) underline the importance of the tails of the statistical distribution for
asset prices. They stress that the weights in the tails of random variables give a
better definition of increasing risk than a standard one, like for instance the
usual variance. In this chapter we will concentrate on the tail of the distribution
as our measure of risk. In order to get accurate measures of the tails of distribu-
tion we will make use of extreme value theory. This provides us with an effec-
tive measure of the degree of riskiness of the underlying stock.
The organizing principle of extreme value theory is the fatness in the tails of
the distribution. Extremal analysis investigates the distribution of the maximum
(minimum) in large samples, thereby determining the shape of the tails of a
distribution. In fact, the limit law for the maximum is characterized by the so-
called tail index a, which happens to be equal to the number of moments that
exists. Thus, the tail index is a good indicator for the thickness of the tails. The
important point to note is that alternatives like the stable and student f distribu-
tion are nested within the limit law for extremes. The idea then is to estimate
this tail index directly and use the known distribution of the tail estimator to test
for possible regime switches affecting the type of distribution, i.e. as a result of
the deregulation measures in the 1980s. The loss of this procedure consists of
information about the center characteristics of the distribution. Given the predo-
minance of outliers in asset return series, one may benefit from this trade-off.
Moreover, given an estimate for the tail index, one can establish the sizes of the
extremely low or high returns that would be rarely exceeded.
In chapter 4 we analyze banking crises in the U.S. during the period 1946-1992.
Starting point for our analysis is Wolfson (1990) who presents an empirical
analyis aimed at explaining so-called 'financial instability' in the U.S. banking
sector during the period 1946-1987. Wolfson's approach is an aggregate
analysis of all U.S. commercial banks and savings & loan associations (S&Ls).
Using the standard OLS regression technique Wolfson estimates a regression
equation in which 'financial instability' is regressed as a dependent variable
upon four independent variables. These four independent variables are indicators
of financial fragility in the commercial banking or S&L sector. 'Financial
instability' is taken to be the actual outbreak of problems in the financial system
whereas the term 'financial fragility' is designed to measure the vulnerability ofthe system to the future outbreak of these problems.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, since Wolfson provides an
aggregate analysis for the commercial banks and savings & loan associations
together, we disaggregate the analysis in order to look for differences among the
two sectors. Second, we present an update of Wolfson's analysis including the
turbulent period 1988-1992 during which the U.S. experienced a lot of banking
problems.
In chapter 5 we present an empirical analysis of the Scandinavian banking crisis
at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Up to the early 1980s
the banking system in the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, and Finland) can
be characterized as a highly regulated regime consisting of controls on interest
rates, credit controls and capital controls. The rapid process of financial liberali-
zation and deregulation intensified dramatically competition between financial
institutions. This led to an unprecedented growth in bank lending. Although in
the early phase of the expansion banking appeared to be very profitable,
developments towards the end of the decade indicated that profitability had been
over-estimated and risks under-rated. Massive rescue and support operations
(state ownership, capital injections, guarantees etc.) were mounted in Norway,
Sweden and Finland. Atle-Berg (1993) calculates that the volume of official
support operations by 1992 amounted to 2.8 per cent, 3.1 per cent and 7.2 per
cent of GNP in Norway, Sweden and Finland respectively. The interesting point
about Norway, Sweden and Finland is that the transition from a regulated and
uncompetitive banking sector to a less regulated and more competitive regime
went together with a banking crisis of unprecendented scale. This could suggest,
that at least during the transitional phase, risk awareness and risk pricing were
not adequate.
In this chapter we present maximum likelihood estimates for pooled banking
data of Norway, Sweden and Finland during the period 1980-1992. Our main
focus is upon the question whether the failures and solvencies of commercial
and savings banks in the Nordic countries were significantly related to mounting
credit losses or to a deterioration of net interest margins. If the empirical
analysis shows that /wow«/;>7g cratf/ /asses played a significant role in the
banking crises of Norway, Sweden and Finland and that, at the same time, the
bank failures and insolvencies were not caused by a significant deterioration of
net interest margins, then a logical interpretation could be that banks have not
been able to charge adequate risk premia in order to be compensated for the
higher lending risks after deregulation had taken effect. This would result inbuilt-up capital reserves being too small in order to be able to bear the credit
losses and, consequently, in massive bank failures and insolvencies.
In chapter 6 we analyze systemic stability and competitive neutrality issues in
the international regulation of banks. The increasing globalization of banking
and finance means that autarky (self-sufficiency at the national level) is no
longer a feasible strategy in financial regulation: there is the potential for
regulation determined at the national level to be undermined by developments in
other regulatory jurisdictions, and regulatory requirements in one country have
impacts in others. This creates a standard case for international regulatory co-
operation as, given the externalities involved, co-operative strategies have the
potential to increase the effectiveness of regulation, and limit the scope for
regulatory arbitrage. . •>•
The focus of this chapter is upon the international dimension to regulation in
two areas (banking and securities business) which, while they have common
considerations, also raise different issues. The focus is upon two issues in inter-
nationally co-operative regulatory strategies: sys/e/w/c staè/7/Yy and
Chapter 7 presents an empirical analysis of the interest rate sensitivity of U.S.
bank stock returns. The interest rate sensitivity of U.S. bank stock returns has
been the research topic of many academic papers. Most papers start from the
two-index model developed by Stone (1974). This asset pricing model expands
the standard market model of asset returns by adding an interest-rate index. The
function of this interest rate factor is to account for the influence of ««expected
interest rate changes on the stock returns of banks. Empirical research by,
among others, Fama and Schwert (1977) and Folger, Kose and Tipton (1981)
has shown that the inclusion of an interest-rate factor adds substantial explana-
tory power to the single-factor market model.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold. First, using
weekly data for the period 1974-1993 and using the forecast errors of
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) processes in order to model
the unexpected interest rate, we provide empirical evidence on the interest rate
sensitivity of the stock returns of the twenty largest U.S. bank holding com-
panies during a long period of twenty years incorporating recent data.
The second contribution of this chapter is to use survey data in order to
model the unexpected interest rate variable. This is an alternative approach
compared to the existing literature. Flannery and James (1984) and Robinson(1995) use the forecast errors of an autoregressive (AR) model as a proxy for
unexpected interest rate movements. Scott and Peterson (1986), Sweeney and
Warga (1986) and Kane and Unal (1988) use changes in the yield on a given
maturity of long-term government bonds to capture unanticipated changes in
interest rates. Finally, Mishkin (1982) and Brewer and Lee (1985) proxy unan-
ticipated changes in interest rates by the difference between the spot three-
month Treasury bill rate at time / and the forward three-month Treasury bill rate
imbedded in the yield curve at time /-I. In this chapter we use weekly survey
data on the U.S. federal funds rate for the period April 29, 1980 until December
22, 1993. The survey was conducted by Money Market Services (MMS) Inter-
national (part of Standard & Poor's) in Belmont, California. The weekly surveys
generate a market expectation for the federal funds rate for a certain survey
period which is then confronted with the realized value of the federal funds rate
during the same survey period. This enables us to calculate an unexpected
change in the federal funds rate for the relevant survey period which is then
used for estimating the interest rate sensitivity in the two-index model.
Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes this thesis.r 2
Theories of Financial Fragility
Recent events of financial disorder (international debt crisis, junk bond crisis,
stock market crashes, bank failures) have caused renewed interest in the subject
of financial /rag;7z'z)>. Davis (1992) defines financial fragility as a state of
balance sheets offering heightened vw/«eraè/7zYv to default in a wide variety of
circumstances. Heffernan (1996) notes that this heightened probability of default
implied by the term financial fragility can be used for the fragility of
households, businesses, or banks themselves. However, many authors specifical-
ly use financial fragility focusing their analyses on banks.
Minsky was one of the first authors to introduce the term 'financial fragili-
ty'. Minsky (1977) discusses financial fragility as the opposite of financial
robustness. In a fragile financial system continued normal functioning can be
disrupted by some not unusual event. In this sense such a fragile system is more
susceptible to future outbreaks of financial disorder.
In the first part of this chapter we will present an overview of the various theo-
ries of financial fragility and disorder. We will argue that the crucial difference
between these theories lies in the assumed framework on risk and uncertainty.
In the second part of this chapter, and in the other chapters of this thesis, we
will focus our analysis of financial fragility on the fragility of the banking
system, the so-called 6a«&z>7g yragz/zYy.
Section 2.1 presents an analysis of the use of the concepts of risk and uncer-
tainty in economics. In section 2.2 we put the various theories of financial
fragility in a risk/uncertainty framework. We first present theories of financial
fragility characterized by a full understanding of risk, i.e. uncertainty can be
reduced to the 'correct and objective' probability distribution. These theories,
being the rational expectations and efficient markets literature (subsection 2.2.1)
and the literature on rational bubbles and runs (subsection 2.2.2), contain a
postive view on periods of financial disorder. Basically, these periods of finan-
cial disruption are not causing serious damage to financial markets and the
economy since agents are fully risk aware. In this context such periods are non-
events. Section 2.2 continues by discussing other theories of financial fragility,
comprised of the literature on unanticipated credit rationing (subsection 2.2.3),10 C/iap/er 2
irrational bubbles and euphoria (subsection 2.2.4), and asymmetric information
(subsection 2.2.5). The common element of these theories is that they all
analyze a financial system characterized by an incomplete understanding of risk,
thereby leaving room for uncertainty. However, they differ from each other in
the way they model uncertainty. The irrational bubbles and euphoria literature is
extreme in the sense that uncertainty is completely untractable and invincible.
The other theories take positions somewhere in between the polar cases of
uncertainty and risk.
During the 1980s and first part of the 1990s the banking sector in many
countries experienced a process of rapid deregulation, increased risk taking, and
major banking crises. This banking fragility will be the subject of section 2.3. In
section 2.4 we will discuss private sector (market-based) solutions in order to
cope with banking fragility. In section 2.5 we focus on regw/arory solutions.
Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.1 Risk and Uncertainty in Economics
With respect to the measurability of probability Knight (1921) distinguishes
three types of probability:
* A priori probability.
This probability is derived mathematically. An example is the probability
that a coin toss will produce a particular value.
* Statistical probability.
This probability rests on an empirical classification of instances and can not
be derived from mathematical laws or principles.
* Estimates or judgements.
The distinguishing characteristic is that there is no valid basis of any kind
for classifying instances. The essential and outstanding fact is that the
instance in question is so entirely unique that there are no others or not a
sufficient number to make it possible to tabulate enough like it to form a
basis for any inference of value about any real probability.
The first two cases of probability are called 'risk' by Knight. The third case
embodies non-measurable probability and is referred to as '(true) uncertainty'./a/ Fragf/ify 11
Forty years later, in 1961, Muth presented the concept of rational expectations.
He postulates that economic agents form their expectations on the basis of the
'true' structural model of the economy: "Expectations, since they are informed
predictions of future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of the
relevant economic theory". The hypothesis of rational expectations asserts that
the subjective expectations of individuals are exactly the true mathematical
conditional expectations implied by the model itself.
In a rational expectations world economic agents make optimal forecasts, i.e.
no systematic predictions or expectations errors. Put more technically: the
expectations errors conditional on the available information set have zero means
and the expectations errors are uncorrelated with the values of all the variables
in the information set and therefore with their own past values (Pesaran 1987).
The notion of optimal forecasts crucially depends on knowledge of the objective
distribution implied by the true model, i.e. uncertainty is reduced to objective
risk. The optimality properties of rational expectations will follow only if agents
know, or are capable of learning, the true model of the economy. Meltzer
(1982) observes that the stochastic process used in standard rational expec-
tations models misses some of the principal uncertainties that most of us face as
consumers and producers.
2.2 Financial Fragility in a Risk/Uncertainty Framework
In this section we put the various theories of financial fragility in a
risk/uncertainty framework. Attention will be paid to rational expectations and
efficient markets (subsection 2.2.1), rational bubbles and rational runs
(subsection 2.2.2), unanticipated credit rationing (subsection 2.2.3), irrational
bubbles and euphoria (subsection 2.2.4), and to asymmetric information
(subsection 2.2.5).
2.2.1 Rational Expectations and Efficient Markets
In a rational expectations world economic agents know the correct and objective
probability distribution, which enables them to price correctly financial assets
(efficient market hypothesis). In such a world defaults represent bad outcomes
ex post, rather than systematic misperception of the true ex ante odds. Applying
this reasoning to the market for junk bonds, Miller (1991) argues:12
"The yields expected (in the Markowitz sense of yield outcomes weighted by
probability of occurrence) on junk bonds, were below the nominal or promised
yields. The high promised yields that might be earned during the good years
were understood as compensation for the possible bad years in time and bad
bonds in the total junk bond portfolio. The high nominal yields, in short, were
essentially risk premiums. And in 1989, for many of the junk bonds issued
earlier, the risk happened".
The above world can be characterized by the existence of a stable, competitive
equilibrium in which financial firms make normal profits, risks are adequately
covered in loan pricing, underwriting margins and capitalization. Although the
system may be subject to shocks, these do not generate systemic crises. In such
an equilibrium, risk premia are sufficient to cover losses over the economic
cycle. The shift to such an equilibrium from an imperfectly competitive or
oligopolistic market (where insufficient credit was advanced and intermediaries
gained monopoly profits) should not be a cause for vigilance, but instead a pure
welfare gain (Davis 1990). The financial innovation process of the 1970s and
1980s is viewed as very positive, since as a result of this process financial
markets have become more competitive, complete, and operationally efficient
(Van Home 1985). Miller (1986) reasons:
"By the middle and late 1960s, the recovery in world wealth (and trade) had
proceeded so far that the taxes, interest rate ceilings, foreign exchange restric-
tions, security sales regulations, and other competitive controls slapped on in the
1930s and 1940s were becoming increasingly onerous. It was not so much that
new tax and regulatory burdens were being imposed, but more that the existing
burdens were increasingly binding, particularly so given the surges in the level
and volatility of prices, interest rates, and exchange rates that were erupting in
those years. Many of the inefficient tax and regulatory structures inherited from
the 1930s and 1940s will have been driven at last from the scene along with so
many of the obsolete economic and political doctrines that gave rise to them".
Although the financial innovation and deregulation process went together with a
rise in debt ratios during the 1980s (see section 2.3), this does not necessarily
imply overleveraging. The increase in the aggregate debt/equity ratio reflects,
seen from a macroeconomic perspective, changing preferences of households for
holding wealth (Miller 1988). Higher debt ratios and increased financial fragility
can be considered as a rational choice of risk aware agents on financial markets.77?eor/es o/F/mwic/a/ Frag/V/Ty 13
The increased financial fragility may increase the likelihood of periods of finan-
cial disorder, but it should not be considered automatically as an undesirable
thing and as a rationale for increased regulation by international supervisory
authorities. If risks are known and correctly priced by market participants, then
these periods of financial disorder are w«/wcA>>, AM/ ca/cw/a/ec/ events. . r
2.2.2 Rational Bubbles and Rational Runs
In a world of rational expectations and efficient markets one would expect asset
prices to reflect market fundamentals. However, there can be rational deviations
of the price from this value. These deviations are called rational speculative
bubbles (Blanchard and Watson 1982).
Standard rational expectations models relate the price variable p(t) to fun-
damentals f(t), which are determined by a linear combination of exogenous
variables (intrinsic information, i.e. information incorporated in the fundamen-
tals). The possibility of a rational bubble arises by adding the bubble term b(t)
to the above equation, so that p(t) = f(t) + b(t). This bubble term b(t) follows a
stochastic time path imposed on the system. Crucial is that this bubble term is
determined arbitrarily by extrinsic information (not incorporated in the market
fundamentals) and refers neither directly nor indirectly to any observable pheno-
mena (Mullineux 1990).
According to Flood and Garber (1982) a bubble can arise when the actual
market price depends positively on its own expected rate of change, as normally
occurs in asset markets. Since agents forming rational expectations do not make
systematic prediction errors, the positive relationship between price and its
expected rate of change implies a similar relationship between price and its
actual rate of change. In such conditions, the arbitrary, self-fulfilling expec-
tations of price changes may drive actual price changes independently of market
fundamentals. This movement away from market fundamentals is caused by
rational speculation.
The concept of arbitrary, self-fulfilling expectations can be metaphorized by
the 'beauty contest' described by Keynes in his Genera/ T/zeory (1936):
"Professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in
which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most
nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so14
that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds pret-
tiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other com-
petitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It
is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's judgement, are really
the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the pret-
tiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to
anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there
are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees".
An often cited example of a bubble is the appreciation of the U.S. dollar in the
1980s (see for instance Krugman 1985). At a certain moment many people
argued that the dollar was overvalued and should decrease in value back to
market fundamentals. However, the dollar appreciated even further before
finally falling down. Apparently, if market participants have the arbitrary, i.e.
not based on market fundamentals, expectation that the dollar will further ap-
preciate, then a rational speculator will buy dollars. Since many speculators are
doing so, the arbritrary expectation will become self-fulfilling with the result of
an appreciating dollar. Our rational speculator has made a profit, which he
would not have made with a strategy of selling dollars based on the perception
of market fundamentals. Naturally, at a certain moment in time the bubble may
burst. The essential difference between a rational and an irrational speculator is
that the former is living in a world of risk and is capable of calculating this
probability of a bursting bubble, while the latter is not because of uncertainty.
Not only bubbles, but also runs may be seen in a rational context (Flood and
Garber 1982). A run is an event that terminates a price-fixing scheme. Some
economic agents (perhaps the government) may stand ready to buy or sell a
particular item at a fixed price. The viability of such a price-fixing scheme
depends on the agent's maintaining a stock of the item. If other agents perceive
that the price-fixing regime is temporary, that is, that the price will rise even-
tually, then anticipating capital gains, these agents draw down the stock that
back the price-fixing scheme. If the stock is depleted entirely in one final
discrete withdrawal, this event is categorized as a run.
Bank collapses can be caused by a run. A bank fixes the price of its deposits
in terms of government currency. If the depositors fear a capital loss on their
deposits, then they will deplete bank reserves of government currency, possibly
with one final massive withdrawal, forcing the bank to cease fixing the price of
its deposits.15
Another example of a rational run indicated by Flood and Garber (1982) may be
the currency crisis prevalent in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the case of fixed
exchange rates a government announces a fixed price for its currency in terms
of the currency of another country and holds foreign currency reserves of this
other country. However, the government's stock of foreign currency reserves
may be depleted through balance-of-payments deficits. If rational speculators
can see no end to the deficits, then they anticipate the eventual demise of the
fixed rate regime and may draw down government foreign exchange reserves in
one final massive withdrawal - a rational run.
Reasoning from the rational framework, periods of financial disorder associated
with rational (bursting) bubbles and rational runs are not undesirable events.
Moreover, these so-called 'finance-driven' events cannot be blamed for causing
depressions.
On the subject of the Great Depression in the early 1930s Miller (1991)
remarks:
"Contrary to wide-held folk beliefs, bankruptcies did not bring on the Great
Depression. The direction of causation runs from depression to bankruptcies, not
the other way around. The collapse of the stock market in 1929 and of the U.S.
banking system during 1931-1932 may well have created the appearance of a
finance-driven disaster. But that disaster was not just the inevitable bursting of
another overleveraged tulip bubble as some have suggested. Responsibility for
turning an ordinary downturn into a depression of unprecedented severity lies
primarily with the managers of the Federal Reserve System".
Hamilton (1987) presents evidence for this view that the Great Depression was
caused by monetary factors. At the beginning of 1928 the Federal Reserve
embarked on a highly contractionary monetary policy. Two reasons motivated
this policy:
"While one factor in the initial decision may well have been a desire to stem
the gold outflows, this cannot explain why the U.S. continued with this tight
monetary policy even after higher interest rates were generating significant gold
inflows by 1929. Instead, the major factor influencing monetary policy during
1928-1929 was surely the stock market. Despite repeated public assertions by
Fed officials that the System did not regard itself as an arbiter of security prices,
the consensus of most researchers who have studied Fed policy during this era16
is that the primary purpose of the monetary contraction was to curb the stock
market boom".
In the monetary view the Fed succeeded in bringing the stock market down: in
October 1929 the New York Stock Exchange collapsed. The crash was followed
up by banking panics beginning in 1930. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue
in their Monetary History that the banking panics led to a frightening away of
the public from checking accounts, just as banks felt forced to increase their
holdings of reserves relative to deposits. These increases in the currency-deposit
ratio and reserve-deposit ratio account for the simultaneous rise in the monetary
base and drop in the money supply (Ml and M2) during 1931-1933. The
inability of the Federal Reserve to avert these banking panics and runs and the
related drop in the money supply led to an even more severe contractionary
regime compared with the period 1928-1930.
Summarizing, one could say that the monetary view of the Great Depression
blames the Federal Reserve for two reasons. In the first place the monetary
contraction of 1928-1929 to bring the stock market down, and in the second
place the failure to prevent the banking panics and the drop in the money
supply as from 1930. Miller (1991) notes that the U.S. money supply imploded
by 30 percent between 1930 and 1932, dragging the economy and the price
level down with it (deflation process).
Furthermore, as Bernanke (1983) argues, the deflation process may be rein-
forced by the fact that the banking failures undermined the ability of the finan-
cial sector to perform its intermediation services of evaluating and providing
loans. More and more borrowers found credit to be expensive and difficult to
obtain. The resulting credit squeeze had a negative influence on aggregate
demand.
Miller (1991) sees as further confirmation of the monetary view that,
because of the prompt action by the Federal Reserve to support the liquidity of
the banking system after the stock market crash of October 19, 1987 (and again
after the mini-crash of October 13, 1989), these crashes did not have a real
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2.2.3 Unanticipated Credit Rationing
Guttentag and Herring (1984) develop a hybrid model of financial fragility and
financial disorder, applying both the concepts of risk and uncertainty.
Bankers lend money to borrowers undertaking real investment projects with
some probability distribution. Concerning the probability of an unfavourable
outcome from this project-specific distribution, Guttentag and Herring assume
that the subjective probabilities of market participants converge to the objective
probabilities (rational expectations and risk in the sense of Knight). The reason
for this convergence is that unfavourable outcomes are sufficiently frequent, so
that participants who stubbornly cling to subjective probability distributions
which differ from the objective distribution, will suffer losses and be forced to
withdraw from the market.
However, 'nature' may draw from a disastrous distribution causing an un-
favourable shift in the project-specific distribution of investment returns. Gutten-
tag and Herring refer to infrequent shocks that have less-than-catastrophic direct
consequences on real economic activity, but which, if not anticipated by lenders,
may have serious financial consequences that substantially exacerbate the im-
pact of the shock on real economic activity. The state of knowledge surrounding
this disastrous distribution is less complete than in the case of the project-
specific distribution. There is a small but finite probability that disasters can
happen. Market participants do not have a priori knowledge of the parameters of
the distribution that governs whether nature draws from the disastrous
distribution, nor do they have sufficient evidence to infer the parameters of the
distribution from the historical record. This limited knowledge or ignorance can
be qualified as true uncertainty in the sense of Knight.
Since the rational expectations and efficient market axioms do not apply in
situations of uncertainty, Guttentag and Herring use the work of cognitive
psychologists and decision scientists in order to formulate a hypothesis regar-
ding the subjective probability of a disaster. This hypothesis is the 'disaster
myopia' hypothesis. It consists of two components, namely the 'availability
heuristic' and the 'threshold heuristic'. The availability heuristic implies that
estimates of frequency or probability are influenced by the ease with which
instances or associations can be brought to mind. Frequent events are usually
easier to recall than infrequent events. The probability of an infrequent event is
likely to be underestimated, particularly as time elapses since the last occurrence18 Chapter 2
of the infrequent, disastrous event. The availability heuristic argues that, with
the passage of time, the subjective probability of a disaster falls until it reaches
a certain threshold where it drops to zero (threshold heuristic).
The disaster myopia hypothesis predicts a tendency for subjective probabilities
to fall below actual probabilities of disaster during periods in which no major
shocks occur. In an expanding economy with the absence of major shocks such
a process may develop. Bankers will lend to borrowers against interest rates
incorporating risk premia based on the subjective probabilities being lower than
the objective, but unknown probabilities of disaster. Furthermore, bankers will
decline their capital positions because of the lower perceived probabilities. This
process of qualitative decline in credit and capital positions makes the financial
system more fragile and increases the magnitude of periods of financial disor-
der.
When a shock occurs, the perceived probability will jump very quickly in
the direction of the objective probability. The result will be bankers recon-
sidering their lending portfolios: prime borrowers start paying risk premia, risky
borrowers will have to pay extra risk premia or get rationed, and borrowers
already rationed before the shock will be rationed extra or cut off completely
from bank credit. This adaptation process towards more market-conform risk
premia and a higher level of credit rationing will enable lenders to improve their
capital positions. Guttentag and Herring see as relevant examples of such shocks
leading to financial disorder the failure of the Herstart Bank and the collapse of
the Franklin National Bank in 1974, and the Mexican debt crisis in 1982. -h
2.2.4 Irrational Bubbles and Euphoria
The 'irrational bubbles and euphoria' approach to financial disorder covers all
the subjects of the previous subparagraphs, but interprets most of them in a
different way. The heart of the argument lies in a different perception of the
world: uncertainty instead of risk, which precludes the framework of rational
expectations and efficient markets.
According to Minsky (1980) an economic theory that is relevant to a capita-
list economy cannot evade the issues involved in unidirectional historical time
by assuming recontracting and the existence of universal systems of future, or
contingent, contracts. The essence of capitalism is that units have to take
positions in an uncertain world.ies o/ Fwancio/ /•Vag/7/fy 19
Minsky's so-called 'financial instability hypothesis' is grounded in an alter-
native interpretation of Keynes' Genera/ 77?eory (see Minsky 1975). The essen-
tial element of this interpretation, which is an alternative to the standard Hicks-
Hansen and Klein-Patinkin view, is untractable uncertainty: agents base their
portfolio decisions on a very imprecise and shaky foresight of future develop-
ments, so that unexpected behavior of the economy can lead to a large change
in the relative prices of assets, which is the root of a financial crisis (Delli Gatti
and Gallegati 1995).
In the theories of Fisher and Minsky periods of financial disorder are an essen-
tial component of the turning point of the business cycle - a response to
finance-driven excesses.
Fisher (1933) argues that during the upswing investment increases as well as
speculation in asset markets for capital gain. The process is debt-financed,
mainly by bank loans, increasing deposits, the money supply and the price level.
Rising prices during the upswing reduce the real value of outstanding debt,
offsetting the increase in nominal debt and encouraging further borrowing. The
indebtedness of economic agents increases, and hence their chances of
becoming insolvent (in modern terms we would say that financial fragility
increases). However, essential is that Fisher perceives this indebtedness as an
'overindebtedness'. Apparently, increased indebtedness is not the outcome of a
rational choice reflected in risk premia. If this is the case, a financial crisis can
easily develop: debtors unable to pay debts and refinance positions can be
forced by creditors to liquidate assets ('distress selling'). If this is widespread,
and in the absence of lender-of-last-resort interventions by the monetary authori-
ties, it can trigger further crises and a deep depression (debt-deflation process).
Deflation increases the real value of outstanding debt. At the same time credi-
tors see the nominal value of collateral declining with prices. The consequence
of the two phenomena is that banks start calling loans, which reinforces the
process of liquidating assets. Output and employment fall until bankruptcy has
eliminated overindebtedness.
Minsky (1982 and 1986) further develops the concept of financial fragility in
order to clarify the problem of overindebtedness. An important factor deter-
mining the degree of fragility is the changing mix of hedge, speculative and
Ponzi finance during the upswing. In the case of hedge finance expected cash
flows are sufficient to meet contractual payment commitments now and in the
future. Speculative finance involves expected cash flows being lower than the20 Owp/er 2
cash payment commitments in some, typically near-term, periods. Cash flow
deficiencies arise because there are commitments to pay cash on the account of
principal that are greater than the receipts on principal account during these
periods. Speculative financing involves the rolling over of maturing debt. Ponzi
finance goes further: the amount of outstanding debt increases in some, near-
term, periods in order to be able to meet cash payment commitments. Minsky's
point is that during the upswing there is a shift from hedge to speculative and
Ponzi finance caused by an excess demand for finance and an insufficient
perception of the risks involved ('euphoric expectations'). As the proportion of
hedge units in the population of borrowers decreases, financial fragility
increases. When it becomes clear that the aggregate cash flows do not validate
debt any more (for instance a stream of overextended borrowers goes bankrupt),
the network of financial relations collapses and a financial crisis sets in. This is
the moment that fragility translates into financial instability and that, as in
Fisher's analysis, a debt-deflation process starts'.
Carter (1989) notes that the volatility in this boom-bust cycle depends
critically on the assumption that for quite some time during the upswing lenders
(and borrowers too) systematically underestimate the increase in risk as bor-
rowers' leverage rises and as near-term debt payments balloon in relation to
near-term expected income flows. If lenders smoothly raised their lending rates
to compensate for increased risk because of higher corporate leverage and lower
balance sheet liquidity, and if borrowers smoothly raised the risk premia they
added on to borrowing rates when discounting expected cash flows from highly
leveraged investment, then the growth of investment and speculative credit
arrangements would be slowed.
According to Minsky modern capitalism is prone to the recurrence of y?na«-
c/a//_v determ/we^ booms and busts: the financial instability hypothesis implies
that instability is a systemic property of economies with complex financial
structures. This instability of the financial system is caused by the fact that
Minsky rejects the representative agent paradigm, in which no meaningful
distinction can be drawn between banks and firms and where homogeneous
agents are utility or profit maximizers in a world of certainty or certainty
equivalence. Both firms and banks are conceptualized by Minsky as profit
seeking agents trying to do their best in a world of untractable uncertainty (Delli
Gatti and Gallegati 1995).
' Sijben (1993 and 1994) discusses in detail the macroeconomic effects of financial
fragility.21
2.2.5 Asymmetrie Information
The theories discussed in the last two subparagraphs dealt with genuine uncer-
tainty. This uncertainty is caused by incomplete information as a result of an
inability to know all of the possible states of nature or the probabilities of their
occurrence. However, information can also be incomplete in the sense that it is
distributed asymmetrically so that some people know more than others and can
exploit this informational advantage (Hester 1994). In this way a special type of
uncertainty is created.
Akerlof (1970) argued that if one side of the market knows the quality of the
good better than the other, then the number of exchanges is much lower than in
a context of perfect information. Under certain circumstances there will not be
a market at all. Akerlof illustrates his ideas with the market for used cars where
asymmetric information exists between buyers and sellers in the sense that the
seller has more information about the quality of the cars than the buyer.
However, good cars and bad cars ('lemons') must still sell at the same price
since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good and a
bad car. Because of the uniform price for all qualities, the owners of low quality
cars receive a 'lemon premium' at the cost of those who supply high quality
cars at the same price. The result is that the owners of good cars will prefer not
to sell and that the market for used cars is reduced to a market on which only
low quality cars are traded. Moreover, it is quite conceivable that the market for
used cars ceases to exist.
The aymmetric information framwork has been extended to capital markets
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Information asymmetries exist between borrowers
and lenders (banks) causing uncertainty about the quality of borrowers. Bor-
rowers are better informed about their own credit risk than lenders. Conse-
quently, lenders cannot differentiate between high-risk and low-risk borrowers
causing them to charge an interest rate incorporating a lemon premium: high-
risk borrowers are subsidized by low-risk borrowers. This creates an incentive
for low-risk borrowers to leave the market and look for alternative sources of
finance such as direct external financing on the capital market. The high-risk
borrowers will stay. Because of this adverse selection effect the average quality
of bank loans will deteriorate, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the
banking system (Sijben 1993).22 C/iap/er 2
2.3 Banking Fragility
In a number of recent publications the International Monetary Fund (IMF
1992a, 1992b, 1993a, and 1993b) analyzes the phenomenon that during the
1980s and first part of the 1990s the banking sector in many countries ex-
perienced a process of rapid deregulation, increased risk taking, and major
banking crises. The crucial question is why after a long postwar period of
stability banking problems became so widespread.
Before the financial liberalization and deregulation of the 1980s cartelized
banking markets, in concert with a host of regulations, served to restrict com-
petition in the financial services industry. Banks and other financial institutions
thus enjoyed a financial cushion in the form of excess profits. Government-led
deregulation and liberalization, with the related market-driven financial in-
novation process, lowered barriers to new domestic and foreign entrants,
eliminated interest rate regulations, and weakened restrictions on bank activities.
The resulting new financial environment can be characterized as a process of
competition-driven disintermediation from banking systems - particularly from
wholesale banking systems - into securitized money and capital markets. The
securitization process implies a decline in the special role of banking: the need
for customers to have direct access to bank-provided liquidity has diminished
because many of the larger customers now have direct access to the money and
capital markets. Increased competition led both to a weakening of the
profitability of banks' traditional activities (price effect) and to a shift of many
of the larger clients to direct finance on the money and capital markets (quantity
effect). Both effects weakened the traditional sources of banks' income.
Faced with a potential downsizing of their operations, many banks responded
to this new, less friendly environment by increasing the riskiness of their portfo-
lios. This behavioral response of increased risk taking has been modelled in the
theoretical literature. Park (1994), analyzing how deregulation increased the
riskiness of U.S. banks in the 1980s, divides the literature into two main parts:
the literature emphasizing the moral hazard of bank stockholders and the litera-
ture focusing on the incentives of bank managers. Both explanations are
probably relevant and mutually reinforcing.
Proponents of the wora/ Aaza/-*/ view (Marcus 1984 and Keeley 1990) argue
that banks had increased incentives to take risk in the 1980s for two main
reasons: losses that impaired capital and reduced charter values due to greater
competition. Lower capital reduces the exposure of stockholders and, thereby,7%«w/es o/Fmanc/a/ Frag/Ï/Yy 23
their concern about probable losses resulting from increased risk taking. In
addition to tangible capital, firms have charter values, which may be defined as
the economic value deriving from the opportunity to do business in the future.
Keeley (1990) analyzes under a yked-rate deposit insurance system the
influence of increased competition on bank charter values, risk taking and
capital ratios. Following Merton (1977) he views deposit insurance as a put
option on the value of a bank's assets at a strike price equal to the promised
maturity value of its debt. In the case of no banking regulation, banks seeking
to maximize the value of their equity will maximize the value of the put by
increasing asset risk and/or minimizing invested capital relative to assets. At the
same time, however, regulation limits competition which endowes banks with
market power and makes bank charters valuable. In this way the potential loss
of a charter in the event of bankruptcy can counterbalance the incentive for
excessive risk taking due to fixed-rate deposit insurance. Deregulation changes
the subtle balance between these two effects. Because deregulation increases
competition, bank charter values will decline and, consequently, banks reach
earlier the point that increased risk taking becomes attractive: the expected gain
to bank stockholders of the enhanced value of the deposit insurance put option
exceeds the expected loss of the charter value.
Keeley's argument starts from the assumption of a fixed-rate deposit in-
surance which implies that increased risk taking does not lead to higher deposit
insurance premiums that banks have to pay to the deposit insurance fund. In the
case of risk-based deposit insurance premiums the incentive effect for increased
risk taking would be mitigated because of the fact that higher expected returns
in that case would have to be adjusted for the higher deposit insurance
premiums.
The literature on the /«ce/j/ives o/managers focuses on the possibility that bank
managers have an incentive to take excessive risk when they are incompetent
and profits are declining (Gorton and Rosen 1992). Until the early 1980s
banking was a tightly regulated industry in which incompetent managers were
able to make sufficient profits without taking excessive risk. Deregulation
increased competition and decreased profitability in the 1980s. This made mana-
gerial ability more important. For incompetent managers not being able to prove
their ability in the new competitive environment, taking excessive risk may have
been a rational strategy for the sake of survival.24 Oiapfór 2
The IMF mentions several dimensions in which the increased tolerance for risk
showed up. The first dimension is the rapid expansion of bank balance sheets in
many countries, particularly in the countries that were highly regulated until the
first part of the 1980s. Bank lending as a percentage of GDP expanded in Japan
from 61 to 94 percent between 1980 and 1990; in Norway from 64 to 85 per-
cent between 1983 and 1986; in Sweden from 43 to 68 percent from 1986 to
1990; in Finland from 55 to 76 percent between 1986 and 1990; and in the U.S.
from 30 to 34 percent between 1984 and 1986. The expansion in credit was
generally accommodated during the 1980s by the monetary authorities. The
huge credit expansion led to an acceleration of prices in asset markets, con-
centrated in the residential and commercial real estate markets. The result was a
growing concentration of bank lending in the real estate sector. Another dimen-
sion of increased risk taking is that, because of the decline of their traditional
business, banks increased the share of their assets held in highly leveraged
transactions, leveraged buyouts, developing country debt, and off-balance-sheet
derivative products.
The higher risk business made banks more vulnerable to cyclical develop-
ments, particularly asset price adjustments. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the
increased risks were exposed and turned into bank losses by a significant shift
in economic conditions - whether a tightening of monetary policy, a large
sectoral shock, a decline in asset prices, a prolonged period of slow economic
activity, or a combination of these factors. Major banking crises of unpreceden-
ted scale since the Great Depression of the 1930s took place in the U.S., Nor-
way, Sweden, Finland, and Japan^.
In its 1991/1992 annual report the Bank for International Settlements (BIS
1992) evaluates deregulation and financial innovation. The BIS notes that there
is a widespread perception that deregulation and financial innovation have gone
hand in hand with greater financial instability, be it in the form of 'excessive'
fluctuations in asset prices or distress among financial institutions. According to
the BIS, with hindsight, it is clear that the observed instability has involved an
element of co//ec//ve 6ad yWgeme/?/. For instance, the real estate lending crisis
resulted from "misplaced optimism regarding property values and hence the
soundness of collateral". Furthermore, the BIS states:
* In chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis we present an empirical analysis of increased risk
taking and the banking crisis in the United States. Chapter 5 contains an empirical study
of the banking crises in Norway, Sweden, and Finland.25
"Moreover, the general euphoria which underlay many of these excesses was in
part a by-product of the vigorous and long-lasting economic expansion of the
1980s. At the same time, the changes in the financial environment helped to
make such collective errors of judgement more likely and their implications
more serious and widespread internationally".
With its view that the banking crises involved an e/e/wew/ of collective bad
judgement, the BIS takes the position that financial markets cannot be charac-
terized by fully risk aware agents. Bringing back into mind our discussion in
section 2.2 of the various theories of financial fragility in a risk/uncertainty
framework, this implies that the BIS identifies itself with the theories analyzing
a financial system characterized by an incomplete understanding of risk, thereby
leaving room for uncertainty^.
2.4 Banking Fragility: Private Sector Solutions
In the previous section we discussed recent episodes of banking fragility. In
order to cope with this banking fragility, we can distinguish between pr/vate
sec/or (market-based) solutions and /-egw/a/ory solutions. This section focuses
on private sector solutions and section 2.5 on regulatory solutions.
Horvitz (1995) notes that "the invisible hand that most economists believe in is
not inconsistent with financial fragility". Most economists do have a strong
preference for market solutions, though attitudes differ. The extreme view
would be a belief in market efficiency and stability to the extent that we need to
do nothing more to deal with the potential problem of financial fragility than
rely on market forces (see also our discussion in section 2.2 on risk and uncer-
tainty). A notable proponent of such a view is Schwartz (1995) by making the
following statement:
' From our empirical analysis of the U.S. and Scandinavian banking crises in chapters 4
and 5, it follows that a logical interpretation of the occurrence of these crises is that
banks' risk awareness and risk pricing were not taking account of the increased riskiness
of banking.26 C/iap/er 2
"I believe instability of the financial services industry is attributable to
destabilizing actions of monetary authorities and regulators; that the financial
services industry is not inherently unstable; that the distress and failure of
individual financial firms, whether owing to poor management or bad luck, is
no threat to the system as a whole; that declines in asset prices indicate wealth
losses, not financial crises; that a genuine financial crisis occurs only when the
payments system is impaired".
Moreover, Schwartz states that //rare Aas 6ee« no gewM/'we y?na«c/'a/ craw during
the past 15 years in the U.S. or globally despite stock market crashes, wide
swings in prices of real estate, distress affecting individual commercial banks or
banking systems, collapse of the U.S. savings and loans, failure of BCCI and
the Maxwell conglomerate, and distressed insurance companies.
Horvitz (1995) notes that, even if the extreme view is rejected, the preference
among most economists is for private sector solutions that minimize regulatory
interference with the market and maximize so-called 'market discipline'.
Bruni and Paternö (1995) hold the view that private sector and regulatory
solutions to the problem of financial fragility are deeply connected. To some
extent market discipline can replace government supervision and regulation but,
according to Bruni and Paternö, the main influence of market forces is to
complement the efforts of supervisors and regulators: an adequate regulatory
setting is needed for market disciplining mechanisms to be effective.
Market discipline means that financial markets provide signals that lead
borrowers to behave in a manner consistent with their solvency. It implies that
borrowers are led to pursue sustainable policies. Effective market discipline
requires that capital markets be open, that information on the borrowers' exis-
ting liabilities be readily available, that no bailout be anticipated, and that the
borrowers respond to market signals (Lane 1993).
In a situation of enhanced market discipline as a device for coping with
banking fragility, banks will be under pressure to provide appropriate external
disclosure on their various risk exposures and on the way they handle these
risks. A professionalization of banks' internal risk management and control
systems will be the result (Taylor 1995).
Referring to Citibank's internal risk management and control systems with
respect to derivatives trading, Ruding (1995) remarks that these systems include
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derivatives portfolio to market on a daily basis; placing strict potential loss
limitations on derivatives business relative to forecasted revenues; employing
independent audit and operational control units; utilizing rigorous qualification
standards with potential derivatives customers; and putting into place
comprehensive tracking and record-keeping functions.
2.5 Banking Fragility: Regulatory Solutions
Financial markets are characterized by informational asymmetries and frictions,
thereby creating a role for financial intermediaries such as banks. At the same
time, however, these informational uncertainties also generate potential
instability in the form of unanticipated deposit withdrawals and premature asset
liquidations. Therefore, deposit-funded banks are vulnerable to runs, and the
entire banking system may be vulnerable to panics. Many banking regulations,
such as a lender of last resort facility and/or deposit insurance, can then be
understood as measures to reduce this form of instability (Bhattacharya and
Thakor 1993).
However, these regulatory interventions create problems of their own. In
section 2.3, following the argument made by Merton (1977), we observed that
fixed-rate deposit insurance is a put option which encourages excessive risk
taking. This then necessitates a regulatory response. As Merton and Bodie
(1992) note, this response may include monitoring, risk-based deposit insurance
premiums, cash/asset reserve and capital requirements, portfolio restrictions, and
limits on discount window borrowing.
Government regulation with respect to banking fragility aims at preventing
two types of bank failures. First, the failures of individual banks, especially
when these banks are large and perceived to be 'too big to fail'. Second, and
more importantly, the focus is on the prevention of individual bank failures
causing other banks to fail, thereby creating a collapse of the banking and
financial system ('systemic failure') that spreads to the real sector of the
economy (Horvitz 1995). This aspect of regulation pursues the achievement of
system/c y'
* In chapter 6 we will make the point that, while in some cases there is a potential case
for international co-ordination to increase the effectiveness of regulation for systemic
stability reasons, issues of competitive neutrality might be dominant, and at times, in
conflict with the requirements of prudential regulation for systemic stability.28
Most of the banking crises during the 1980s and first part of the 1990s were
related to cra#/ ra)fc, being the risk that a counterparty defaults on its position.
One of the ways international regulators try to prevent new credit risk related
banking problems is by strengthening credit risk solvency requirements. Within
the context of the Bank for International Settlements the Basle Committee on
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices reached in December 1987 an
agreement which was published in its final form in July 1988. The agreement
implies a strengthening and harmonization of solveny requirements for most
banks in the industrialized countries. The harmonization comes down to the
relating of uniformly defined own funds through uniform solvency ratios, to the
uniformly defined risk-weighted value of assets and off-balance-sheet activities.
The 1988 Basle Accord was implemented at the end of 1992.
Another way of preventing new banking problems is to set up a clear regula-
tory rule for closing an institution whose problems cannot be resolved before it
becomes insolvent. If it is decided to let a bank with insufficient capital con-
tinue to operate in the hope that it may earn its way out of predicament, then
regulatory scrutiny of its activities should be increased (IMF 1995a). In the U.S.
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991
puts into place a system of 'prompt corrective action' and is based, among
others, on what Benston and Kaufman call 'structured early intervention and
resolution'. FDICIA strengthens the ability of regulatory agencies to take early
action with respect to banks whose capital ratios are declining.
During the 1980s, with the rapid development of securities and derivative
markets as well as foreign exchange contracts, banks have become much more
exposed to mar/rer ra£ (IMF 1995b). Market risk can be defined as the potential
loss due to unexpected general market price and interest rate changes*. In order
to introduce capital requirements for market risk, in April 1995 the Basle Com-
mittee announced a new proposal. The proposal allows banks to use their own
internal risk management models to estimate the so-called 'value-at-risk' which
is at the heart of determining the market risk capital requirements. Value-at-risk
is an estimate of the maximum loss that a portfolio could generate with a given
level of confidence and during a given period into the future. After finalizing
the consultative phase with the international banking community, the proposal is
due to be implemented at the end of December 1997.
* In chapter 7 we present an empirical study on the sensitivity of the stock returns of the
twenty largest U.S. bank holding companies to unexpected interest rate changes.7%eor/'e5 o/F/wawc/a/ Fragi/j/y 29
2.6 Conclusion
Corrigan (1990) summarizes the trade-off between efficiency and stability as
follows:
"The globalization, innovativeness, and deregulation of financial markets have
proven to be very much a two-edged sword. On the one hand, there is little
doubt that these developments have expanded the choices for savers and inves-
tors, reduced the cost of financial transactions, and improved the allocation of
saving and investment nationally and internationally. But, and this is a very
large but, there is also no doubt - at least in my mind - that these same forces
have also increased volatility in financial markets and introduced new and
highly complex elements of risk - possibly even increasing systemic risk".
The central argument of this chapter is that globalization of financial markets,
financial innovation and financial deregulation can work out in three ways (see
also Sijben 1995):
* Imperfectly competitive or oligopolistic financial markets are opened to the
forces of national and international competition and are becoming more
operationally efficient, thereby generating welfare gains.
* The innovation process may increase debt ratios and volatility in asset prices
and as a result financial fragility in the sense of vulnerability of the financial
system to future outbreaks of financial disorder. If, however, the risks in-
volved are known and correctly priced by market participants, then these
periods of financial disorder are unlucky, but calculated events. Increased
financial fragility may lead to more frequent periods of financial disorder
without causing serious damage to the functioning of financial markets and
the economy.
* If increased financial innovation and financial fragility go together with a
lack of understanding of the risks involved, then underpricing and lack of
risk awareness by financial agents will aggravate the consequences of a
period of financial disorder: not fully calculated events may trigger shifts in
confidence, affecting markets more than appears warranted by their sig-
nificance and leading to a financial crisis.30
This chapter first presented theories of financial fragility characterized by a full
understanding of risk, i.e. uncertainty can be reduced to the 'correct and objec-
tive' probability distribution. These theories, being the rational expectations and
efficient markets literature and the literature on rational bubbles and runs, con-
tain a postive view on periods of financial disorder. Basically, these periods of
financial disruption are not causing serious damage to financial markets and the
economy since agents are fully risk aware. In this context such periods are non-
events. The chapter continued by discussing other theories of financial fragility,
comprised of the literature on unanticipated credit rationing, irrational bubbles
and euphoria, and asymmetric information. The common element of these
theories is that they all analyze a financial system characterized by an in-
complete understanding of risk, thereby leaving room for uncertainty. However,
they differ from each other in the way they model uncertainty. The irrational
bubbles and euphoria literature is extreme in the sense that uncertainty is
completely untractable and invincible. The other theories take positions
somewhere in between the polar cases of uncertainty and risk.
Taking into account the remarks made above, the financial fragility debate boils
down to the debate on risk and uncertainty. Based upon their subjective percep-
tion of the applicability of risk, uncertainty, or something in between,
academics, regulators, and practitioners will come to different conclusions with
respect to the functioning of financial markets and the desirability of regulation.
Recently, two well known regulators delivering speeches at the same con-
ference, reached different conclusions with respect to the potential dangers of
derivatives. Jordan (1995), president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
and member of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee, stated:
"The point is that there seems to be no reason to believe that the potential
externality of increasingly complex financial relationships has outdistanced an
increasingly powerful ability to //7ter«a//ze that potential externality. As long as
economic agents are able to estimate compound probabilities of failures,
systemic risk is indistinguishable from normal credit risk. Knowing your
counterparty and your counterparty's counterparties, and even your counterpar-
ty's counterparties' counterparties, should lead to quality spreads in market
prices, to prudent loan loss reserves and capital from which to absorb losses,
and to equality of the private and social cost of risk".ies q/" F/na/ic/a/ Frag/7/fy 31
During the same conference Crockett (1995), general manager of the Bank for
International Settlements, came to the following conclusion:
"The ability of some derivative products to significantly increase the leverage of
market participants may increase aggregate uncertainty. I would also conjecture
that because of the fundamental lack of transparency of some financial products
and the difficulty of evaluating risk associated with them, the resulting con-
centration in some derivatives markets creates wwcerta/wfy exte77ia/;//e.s in other
closely related markets. As a result of the close cross-market linkages, the
uncertainty externalities cannot easily be segmented in periods of market
volatility and stress. As participants seek to shield themselves against the impact
of an event whose timing or probability of occurrence cannot be estimated,
markets may at times experience an erosion of liquidity possibly leading to
difficulties in other markets".
Davis (1989) calls for a synthesis of the different theories of financial fragility.
Financial markets are probably more rational than they sometimes appear.
However, a fundamental uncertainty will always be prevalent, casting doubts on
"the indiscriminate use of superrationality as the foundation for models of
financial behavior" (Modigliani 1988). This spirit is well expressed by Corrigan
(1990):
"The first lesson of the 1980s could probably apply to almost any decade but
may be especially relevant for the 1980s and that is the utmost need to be
cautious about the extremes of economic doctrine and theory. Indeed, whether
we are speaking of the Keynesian, the monetarist, the supply sider, the rational
expectationalist, or any other school of thought, single-minded approaches to
public policy can be very misleading, if not dangerous".3
Extreme Value Theory and Market Assessments of
the Riskiness of U.S. Banks
In the 1980s the U.S. banking sector experienced a period of great turmoil.
During the past decade the number of bank failures increased sharply and banks
in general had to cope with an increasing number of problem loans. In the
literature several theoretical reasons, ranging from increased incentives for risk-
taking behavior to unexpected economic shocks, have been put forward for the
deterioration of the bank asset quality. Empirically, however, the evidence is
scarce.
In this chapter we contribute to the empirical literature by assessing the
degree of riskiness of the twenty largest U.S. bank holding companies between
1973 and 1993. More specifically, we investigate the extent to which develop-
ments in the 1980s have led to significantly higher risk for U.S. banks. Since
the efficient market hypothesis indicates that there is a direct and continuous
relationship between information on the fundamental value of financial assets
and their market price, we will use stock returns of the twenty largest U.S. bank
holding companies as our information variable. Most studies on risk
measurement of banks have used average properties like expected return or
volatility (see for instance Bruni and Paternö 1995), while relatively little atten-
tion has been paid to the use of extreme movements. Exceptions are Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970), Parkinson (1980), Friedman and Laibson (1989), and
Longin (1996) who recognize that extremes contain useful information.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) particularly underline the importance of the tails
of the statistical distribution for asset prices. They stress that the weights in the
tails of random variables give a better definition of increasing risk than a stan-
dard one, like for instance the usual variance. In this study we will concentrate
on the tail of the distribution as our measure of risk. In order to get accurate
measures of the tails of distribution we will make use of extreme value theory.
This provides us with an effective measure of the degree of riskiness of the
underlying stock.
The organizing principle of extreme value theory is the fatness in the tails of
the distribution. Extremal analysis investigates the distribution of the maximum
(minimum) in large samples, thereby determining the shape of the tails of a34
distribution. In fact, the limit law for the maximum is characterized by the so-
called tail index a, which happens to be equal to the number of moments that
exists. Thus, the tail index is a good indicator for the thickness of the tails. The
important point to note is that alternatives like the stable and student f distribu-
tion are nested within the limit law for extremes. The idea then is to estimate
this tail index directly and use the known distribution of the tail estimator to test
for possible regime switches affecting the type of distribution, i.e. as a result of
the deregulation measures in the 1980s. The loss of this procedure consists of
information about the center characteristics of the distribution. Given the predo-
minance of outliers in asset return series, one may benefit from this trade-off.
Moreover, given an estimate for the tail index, one can establish the sizes of the
extremely low or high returns that would be rarely exceeded'.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. In section 3.1 we discuss the deregula-
tion process of the 1980s and its likely effects on the riskiness of the U.S.
banking sector. In section 3.2 we introduce the tail index estimator, based on
extreme value theory. In section 3.3 we present the data description and em-
pirical results on the riskiness of the U.S. banking sector. The conclusion is in
section 3.4.
3.1 Deregulation and the U.S. Banking Sector
Since the 1970s the U.S. banking system has experienced major changes in
terms of new financial products, deregulation, increasing competition, lower
margins and changing risk attitudes. To a large extent the prevailing banking
regulations at the beginning of the 1970s mirrored the legislation adopted after
the banking crisis of 1929-1933. The banking failures of 1929-1933 induced the
Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933 which changed fundamentally the parame-
ters of the functioning of the U.S. banking system. Federal deposit insurance
was introduced in order to avoid new bank runs. The activities of banks were
restricted with a view to the perceived excessive competition of the previous
period. Commercial and investment banking were separated, each type of bank
was restricted to a specific type of lending and interstate banking was dis-
couraged. Furthermore, payment of interest on demand deposits was prohibited
and interest rates on time deposits were restricted to a maximum.
' McCulloch (1981) calculates bankruptcy probabilities for banks. However, these probabi-
lities are based on a specific distribution model.Fa/we 7"/jeory *»•</ l/.S. Ba«fe 35
By the late 1970s, the regulations were widely viewed as excessively restrictive
on the ability of banks to respond to changes in the environment that showed
advances in telecommunications and information processing technology, finan-
cial innovation, increases in interest rates and higher volatility*. As a result, the
profitability of banks was reduced and non-bank competitors grew rapidly. The
U.S. Congress reacted by adopting two major deregulation acts.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(DIDMCA) of 1980 and the Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act (DIA)
of 1982 reduced the governmental restrictions on depository institutions. The
Act of 1980 phased out interest rate ceilings and permitted all depository institu-
tions to offer NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts, allowing greater
competition for deposits among banks. Loan rate ceilings were weakened. This
Act, in combination with the Act of 1982, also increased competition between
banks and S&Ls by expanding the realm of the S&L business. Furthermore,
federal deposit insurance was increased from $ 40,000 to $ 100,000 in 1980.
The movement towards a more deregulated and competitive equilibrium
increased the efficiency of the U.S. banking system: it expanded the choices for
savers and investors, reduced the cost of financial transactions, and improved
the allocation of saving and investment nationally and internationally (Corrigan
1990). On the other hand, however, deregulation could be responsible for the
deterioration of bank asset quality during the 1980s and the substantial increase
in bank failures. In chapter 2 we discussed a recent contribution by Park (1994)
in which he analyzes how deregulation increased the riskiness of U.S. banks in
the 1980s. Two explanations were offered: moral hazard of bank stockholders
and incentives of bank managers.
In section 3.3 we will present empirical evidence on the increased riskiness of
U.S. banks using a tail index estimator which will be introduced in the next
section.
See for an overview of the literature Kaufman (1992).36
3.2 Extreme Value Theory and the Tail Index Estimator
Consider A",, A^, .., A"„ to be a random stationary sequence of independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) stock returns with distribution function fl(). De-
fine A/„ as the maximum of this sequence of returns:
M: = max(A",^,...^) (3.1)
It may then be shown that the distribution function F"(x) of M„ for large «
converges towards the same limiting distribution G(JC), independent of whether
the stock returns were generated by a student / or sum-stable distribution. As
the competing distributions are thus nested within the same limit law G(x), no
maintained hypothesis about the correct F(x) is required.
The limiting distribution G(x) is of the following form, with y>0 and the tail
index a equal to 1/y:
G(*)= 0 *<0 (32)
= exp(-*)-"> x > 0
Relevant references on this result are Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974), and
Leadbetter, Lindgren and Rootzen (1983). Leadbetter, et al. (1983) have shown
that the theory also holds in case the assumption of independence for the stock
returns is inappropriate, provided the dependency is not too strong.
For the family of symmetric stable Paretian distributions the tail index a in
(3.2) may be interpreted as the characteristic exponent of the stable distribution,
which ranges between 0 and 2. For the class of student / distributions the tail
index a in (3.2) equals the number of degrees of freedom of the distribution,
ranging from zero to infinity. Roughly speaking, the lower the value of a the
thicker are the tails of the distribution, all other things equal.
Recently, the following simple and efficient estimator of the tail index has
been proposed:
y = I/a = ±£>g <j>^-log VJ <")
Here, w represents the total number of return observations, m the number of tail
observations used to estimate a, and <(>,,...,<))„ represents the sample ordered from
lowest to highest value. The statistic y first appears in Hill (1975). Mason
(1982) proves that under some regularity conditions y is a consistent estimatorEx/re/we Ka/we 77ieory aw«/ (7.5. Sanfc 37
for y. Goldie and Smith (1987) show that (y-y)m'^ is asymptotically normal
with mean zero and variance y\ An empirical application of this estimator may
be found in Koedijk, Schafgans and De Vries (1990).
As is clear from (3.3), the above estimator only uses the positive (right) tail
of stock returns to estimate a and neglects the information content of the large
negative observations in the other tail. Conditional on the right and left tail
having the same tail index, for which we test explicitly, we combine the infor-
mation in the right and left tail by taking absolute values of the stock returns <j>
before ordering them and applying (3.3). In this way the precision of our tail
index estimates may be significantly improved. The number of tail observations
/w to be used is determined through Monte Carlo simulations.
3.3 Data Description and Empirical Results
In our empirical analysis we use continuously compounded weekly stock returns
for the twenty largest U.S. bank holding companies. The sample period stretches
from January 1973 to December 1993, and the ranking is based on total stock
market capitalization as of December 1993. The data have been corrected for
stock-splits, quite a common phenomenon for bank shares. Furthermore, for
comparison reasons, we have included weekly returns on the S&P 500.
Since deregulation started in 1980, we have divided the sample period into
two subperiods with January 1980 as the breakpoint. Tables 3.1a to 3.1c contain
the summary statistics for our whole sample and subsamples. We present the
first four central moments plus two distributional tests. One can see that the
sample moments of the empirical return distributions do not support normality.
In all periods the data are characterized by excess kurtosis and moderate
skewness, and precisely this excess kurtosis is an indicator of tail fatness.
Furthermore, we can observe that the majority of banks saw their share prices
fall during the 1970s followed by a recovery in the 1980s. The standard
deviations of returns for all bank shares are considerably larger than the stan-
dard deviation of the S&P 500. Moreover, 13 out of 20 banks experienced an
increase in volatility (as measured by the standard deviation) from the first to
the second subperiod. Finally, the S-test, which is a symmetry test, and the BJ
(Bera-Jarque) test on overall normality, indicate that normality is dismissed.38





















































































































































SAP 500 0.0013 0.0220 -0.59 6.86 -1.84 745.2
' S-test: 2 • (# observations below mean - n/2) /\/n ~ N (0,1) for «
' BJ-test: n • ((skewness*)/6 + (kurtosis - 3)V24) ~ x' (2)£/.S. öanfa 39





















































































































































S&P 500 -0.0003 0.0225 -0.20 3.61 -0.73 8.1
' S-test: 2 • (# observations below mean - n/2) /•/« - N (0,1) for «
* BJ-test: n • ((skewness')/6 + (kurtosis - 3)V24) ~ x' (2)40





















































































































































S&P 500 0.0020 0.0216 -0.81 8.86 -1.22 1124.5
' S-test: 2 • (# observations below mean - n/2) / V'n ~ N (0,1) for
' BJ-test: n • ((skewness')/6 + (kurtosis - 3)'/24) ~ x' (2)41
Given the observed excess kurtosis, and given the notion that this kurtosis value
increases from the first to the second subperiod in half of the cases, a natural
question to ask is whether the tail behavior of bank shares is fundamentally
different from a normal tail, and whether the degree of fat-tailedness increases
over time. One caveat applies here. The calculated kurtosis values we obtain are
only meaningful statistics when the fourth moment is indeed defined, which is
the case when the value of the tail index is larger than 4. When the tail index
has a value of 4 or below 4, then these statistics are meaningless, and conse-
quently are misleading with respect to tail behavior. Therefore, hereafter we will
apply a more direct approach by estimating a values and analyzing whether
they have changed significantly from the first to the second subperiod.
One can translate the questions about tail behavior into questions about the
probabilities of unusually large outcomes, the so-called 'exceedence
probabilities'. What are these exceedence probabilities, have they changed over
time, and can we discern differences in probabilities between banks. In the
following we intend to provide answers to these questions. But, first, we will
determine the optimal number of order statistics using Monte Carlo experiments.
Mwi/e Ca/7o
First of all, we have to determine the optimal number of order statistics, /n, to
take into account when estimating the tail index. In general this number is
unknown. Minimal requirements are that m(«) goes to infinity with «, and that
m//j remains finite. In order to determine m, we employ Monte Carlo ex-
periments. We use the minimum mean-squared error (MSE) as a selection
criterion, which is appropriate given the asymptotic normality of the estimator.
Each Monte Carlo experiment consists of 1000 replications of n draws from 6
student f distributions with degrees of freedom (a) ranging from 2 to 7. Sepa-
rate experiments are conducted for using one or both tails and for 364, 731 and
1095 observations («). Optimal m levels are reported in Table 3.2.
As expected, the optimal number of tail observations to be used for es-
timation, m, varies inversely with a, the tail index. Since a lower tail index
means fatter tails, and more observations in the tails, more observations should
be used. Furthermore, both the theoretical and the empirical minimum MSE are
smaller when using both tails instead of only one tail. This characterizes the
greater precision in using both tails.42
Table 3.2: Optimal Choices of m through Monte-Carlo Simulations by Minimizing MSE

































































































































where yVm is the theoretical MSE value in the i.i.d. case£xfre/ne Fa/wc 77»eory a/w/ 43
For one of the experiments we have plotted in Figure 3.1 the MSE split up into
a bias part and a variance part, as a function of m. One can observe that
including too few tail observations causes the variance part of the MSE to
dominate the bias part. However, including too many observations (those that
actually belong to the center of the distribution) leads to the bias part domina-
ting the variance part. The number of observations corresponding with the
minimum MSE (at the crossing of the two lines) represents the optimal trade-off








Figure 3.1: MSE, bias and variance part as functions of
(a = 5, Ai = 1095, two tails, 1000 repetitions)44 C/iopfer i
Now we are able to estimate tail indices, using the Hill estimator, for 6 different
hypothesized a values, for three different time periods, using the left, right or
both tails, and for 21 samples of returns (including the S&P 500), yielding a
total of 21*6*3*3 = 1134 estimates. Given this huge amount of information
some restriction and selection is in order'. We choose to present the results for
HQ : a = 5, using the information contained in both tails. We have several
reasons for this. First of all, it is the lowest value of the tail index such that the
first four moments exist. A second reason, related to the first one, is that a
student / distribution with 5 degrees of freedom, implies a kurtosis value of 9
which accords reasonably well with the sample evidence. The tail index es-
timates, in each period based upon the optimal number of order statistics as
shown in Table 3.2, are presented in Table 3.3.
In the first column for each of the periods the a estimates (under HQ : a = 5)
are listed. For 14 of the 20 bank holding companies we find a decline of the
estimated a values when we compare the second subperiod (1980-1993) with
the first subperiod (1973-1979). The second column for each of the periods
provides / statistics for the hypothesis that the estimated lower tail index (a)
equals the estimated upper tail index (a*). These / statistics are constructed as:
0.4)
using the fact that:
(Y - Y) - JV(O,YV»O
In 15% of the 63 cases we have to reject the equality of the left and right tail at
the 5% level. We tentatively conclude that it is allowed to use the information
in both tails for the estimation of the tail indices, which procedure we followed
while estimating the a values presented in the first column.
' All estimation results are available upon request.Ka/ue 77/eory ara/ C/.S. Baw&s 45








































































































































































































































The third column provides / statistics for the hypothesis that a = 5 (again based
on (3.5)). In the first subperiod this hypothesis is only rejected three times at the
10% level and twice at the 5% level. In the second subperiod, however, these
rejection frequencies are 11 at the 10% level and 7 at the 5% level. For these
seven bank holding companies (Bank of Boston, Chemical Bank, Citicorp, First
Fidelity, First Interstate, Republic New York, and Wells Fargo) the hypothesis
of a = 5 is not rejected in the first subperiod at the 5% level. This suggests a
significant decline of a (given the a estimates) from the first to the second
subperiod, implying a significant increased tail fatness and riskiness. So based
on the criterion of the tail index, we find that the riskiness of seven of the
twenty bank holding companies has increased significantly after 1979.
JP Morgan also shows a large a drop but in neither period could we, even at
the 10% level, reject the hypothesis that a is actually 5. The Bank of New York
and First Union exhibit significant a surges at the 5% level, indicating
decreased riskiness.
The larger risks of the seven banks listed above have been highlighted in the
international press. For instance, on May 23, 1990 the Financial Times reported
that the leading U.S. credit rating agencies (Moody's and Standard & Poor's)
had already downgraded more than two dozen U.S. banks since the start of
1990. Among these banks are Bank of Boston, Chemical Bank and Citicorp.
The problem loans are concentrated in three areas: commercial real estate,
highly leveraged takeovers and LDC loans. The Economist of October 10, 1992
discussed the real estate crisis in California where house prices more than
doubled during the 1980s. California's big banks, such as First Interstate and
Wells Fargo, were heavily involved in property lending and related losses.
We have also conducted stability'* tests, which are based on the so called (?
statistic which is defined as (see Jansen and De Vries 1991):
C - X*(2) (3.6)
The results from the stability tests and the range of a values that cannot be
rejected in each period, are presented in Table 3.4.
* Whereas many other applications of extreme value theory to financial data use this test
to confirm stability over subperiods, which is usually accomplished due to the large
standard errors of the estimates, we try to reject stability in order to substantiate our claim
of significantly increased (or decreased) riskiness.Et/re/ne JTieory f/.S. 5a/i/fcs 47








































































































































* a p value of 0.00 means that the actual p value is below 0.00548
The range of possible a values is calculated by using the same methodology as
in Table 3.3, but this time a is estimated for a spectrum of null hypotheses with
a ranging from 2 to 7. The / statistics for the hypotheses that a = 2,...,7 have
been calculated at the 5% level again. One can observe that, in general, a shift
to lower acceptable a values has occurred from the first to the second sub-
period. Striking examples are Bank of Boston, Chemical Bank and Republic
New York. This general shift to lower a values is indicative of increased ris-
kiness in the second as opposed to the first subperiod. One could argue that
these results are only caused by the larger number of tail observations in the
second subperiod. The larger the number of tail observations, the lower the
standard deviation of the tail index estimator will be (ceteris paribus). Conse-
quently, estimates are more precise and more a values should be rejected in the
second subperiod. This reasoning, however, is contradicted by the results for
First Union, Nationsbank and PNC Financial, where more a values are accep-
table in the second subperiod than in the first subperiod.
The Ö statistic tests whether the estimated values of a in the two subperiods
are jointly plausible under the null hypothesis that a = 5 in both subperiods. In
the case that an a value of 5 is not realistic in either one of the subperiods (see
the listing of possible a values in Table 3.4), it is very likely that the £? test will
reject stability. We find that the 0 statistics, calculated under the null hypothesis
of a = 5, are significant at the 5% level for 5 and at the 10% level for 8 out of
20 bank holding companies, which means that stability has to be rejected for the
a values of these banks in the two subperiods. This group of eight banks con-
sists of exactly the same group of banks for which we found a significant a
change in Table 3.3 (based on the / test for change of a). The only difference is
that in Table 3.3 we found a significant change for Wells Fargo as well, while
in the case of the (? test stability cannot be rejected, although it is not a very
strong result given the p value of 0.11 being just above the marginal sig-
nificance level of 10%. This difference between the Ö and / test can be
explained by the fact that the £? statistic does not test whether the estimated
i/uftv/c/ua/ values of a in the two subperiods are plausible in each subperiod
given the null hypothesis that a = 5, but that it tests whether the estimated a
values are yomZ/y plausible under the null hypothesis that a = 5 in both sub-
periods.
For six of the eight banks (Bank of Boston, Chemical Bank, Citicorp, First
Fidelity, First Interstate, and Republic New York) the rejection of stability
implies a significant a drop (given the a estimates in Table 3.3) and hence an
increase in riskiness. The two remaining banks (Bank of New York and FirstKa/we 77jeory a«^ £/£ Uan/ts 49
Union) witness a significant a surge and decreased riskiness.
The results reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 reveal that in a substantial number of
cases there is a significant increase in the degree of fat-tailedness and hence
riskiness of U.S. banks. One could argue that our findings are related to the
1987 stock market crash. The crash of 1987 generated a large one week return,
one that is obviously present in the left tail of the distribution. This could have
caused increased tail fatness and, consequently, lower a estimates. This claim is
contradicted by the facts: several banks that did not experience an a shift were
hit as severely by the crash than the banks that did experience an a shift.
Furthermore, there is no evidence of an a shift for the S&P 500: in Table 3.3
we obtain a estimates of 3.42 and 3.65 in the two subperiods and, moreover,
conducting the £? test under the null hypothesis that a = 4 results in a very high
p value of 0.98 with a £? statistic of 0.05. Furthermore, one could argue that the
multitude of stock splits caused extreme negative returns, to be found in the left
tail. Since our data have been corrected for all stock splits, this is not a valid
critique. Thirdly, high dividends could cause subsequent stock prices to drop
considerably, thereby generating negative returns. As it happens, however, bank
dividend yields have dropped from the first to the second subperiod, so this
explanation too has to be dismissed.
An important application of extreme value theory is that it allows for the
calculation of probabilities of extremely high or low returns, even returns which
have not been observed historically. In the next subsection we calculate these
so-called 'exceedence probabilities'.
Given the evidence presented in the previous part, we can observe that stock
returns from the twenty largest U.S. bank holding companies are characterized
by distributions with much thicker tails than the normal. As a consequence, the
frequency of extreme returns (observations in the tails) is much higher than one
would expect under the normal distribution. The obvious question to ask is: how
large are these frequencies? We can employ the a estimates to answer this
question, and calculate the frequencies. Moreover, since we know how the limit
law extends in the tails, we have sufficient information to determine the
probability of the occurrence of extreme returns that are rarely exceeded, and
we can even determine probabilities for extreme returns that did not emerge in50 C/rapter 5
sample.
The exceedence probabilities, p, are related to the exceedence levels, x^, which
are return levels that are rarely exceeded, or exceeded with probability p. We
can determine the extreme return levels by extrapolating the empirical distribu-
tion beyond the sample domain. The procedure only requires regular variation at
infinity, which means that the distribution should have fat tails (see Jansen and
De Vries 1991). More specifically, we are looking for exceedence levels x^ such
that :
where £, the time period, and p, the exceedence probability are given.
A consistent estimator for the exceedence levels (see Jansen and De Vries 1991
and Dekkers and De Haan 1989) is given by:
x, = —- f *(X(„_,) - X<„_2,,) + X<„_„ (3.8)
In this formula « is the number of observations, & is the time period considered,
r = w/2 and p is the exceedence probability.
One could give the following interpretation to this estimator. The pattern of the
empirical distribution as given by the order statistic Jf,„.,, and the step-size (^„.,)
- A^,,) is extrapolated beyond its domain, using the multiplication factor at-
tached to the step-size. This factor represents the fashion by which the limit law
extends. From given exceedence levels one can also determine exceedence
probabilities. We have chosen exceedence levels (weekly returns) of 20% and
30%. In Table 3.5a, using information contained in both tails, we present proba-
bilities that the stock price of a bank experiences a one-week return of 20% or
30% (both positive and negative) within a given year (& = 52). Stated dif-
ferently, on average every 1//? years the stock price of a given bank will
increase/decrease by 20% or 30% in one week.£xfre/we 77jeory t/.5. 51

































































































































































* a probability of 0.000 means that the measured probability is below 0.000552
The results are quite revealing. For fourteen out of twenty bank holding com-
panies we find large increases in probabilities from the first to the second sub-
period. For example, in the case of Bank of Boston the exceedence frequency
for a 20% weekly return increases from 1/0.022, or once every 45 years, to
1/0.332, or once every 3 years. On the other hand, for the S&P 500 the excess
frequency for a 20% weekly return has decreased from once every 33 years to
once every 333 years, in spite of the 1987 crash. Striking is the large difference
in probability levels across banks. JP Morgan, for instance, is very rarely hit by
extreme returns, whereas Barnett Bank frequently exhibits extreme returns,
although substantially less in the second subperiod.
It is also interesting to focus on either only extreme «egar/ve returns (left tails)
or only extreme paszï/ve returns (right tails). In this way we can decompose the
exceedence probabilities for individual banks. Barnett Bank will prove to be an
interesting example.
In Table 3.5b we present exceedence probabilities associated with weekly
returns of -20% and -30% (the so-called 'crash probabilities'), based upon
information in the left tails. For thirteen out of twenty banks we find large to
extremely large increases in crash probabilities from the first to the second
subperiod. For example, for Chase Manhattan the excess frequency of a -20%
weekly return is once every 104 years in the first subperiod and once every 9.5
years in the second subperiod, which is a considerable increase. However, there
are also banks that show a large drop in crash probabilities (e.g. Nationsbank
and to a lesser extent Barnett Bank). Apparently, there is considerable difference
in the level of crash probability across banks.
In Table 3.5c we present the exceedence probabilities for extreme /ww/f/ve
returns. For eighteen out of twenty banks we observe an increase in the
probability of extreme positive returns. Barnett Bank exhibits a substantial
/«crease of the probability of a weekly return of +20% (from 0.026 to 0.187),
whereas the probability of a weekly return of -20%, as we saw in Table 3.5b,
has üfecrease^ from 0.408 to 0.092.£r/re/ne 1/.5. S3































































































































































* a probability of 0.000 means that the measured probability is below 0.000554
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3.4 Conclusion
In the literature a consensus exists that distributions of asset returns are fat-
tailed. We use a non-parametric tail index estimator based on extreme value
theory to shed light on the empirical distributions of stock returns for the twenty
largest U.S. bank holding companies between January 1973 and December
1993. Since the tail index is a good indicator of thickness of the tails, it
provides an accurate measure of the degree of riskiness of the underlying bank
stocks. Based on this criterion, we find that the riskiness of seven of the twenty
bank holding companies has increased significantly after 1979. Moreover, for
fourteen out of twenty bank holding companies we find large increases in the
probabilities that the stock prices of these banks experience a one-week return
of 20% or 30% (both positive and negative).
The 1980s witnessed the greatest crisis in U.S. commercial banking since the
Great Depression. Boyd and Gertler (1994) show that banks with the largest
total assets contributed in a significantly disproportionate way to aggregate loan
losses. The intuition is that, while deregulation and financial innovation led to
increased overa// competition for the banking industry, the existing regulatory
environment tended to subsidize risk taking by forge banks more than that by
small banks (too-big-to-fail policy). The study by Boyd and Gertler corresponds
with our empirical findings of increased riskiness of several of the twenty
largest U.S. bank holding companies.The U.S. Banking Crisis
During the period 1946-1992 the U.S. financial system has experienced major
changes in terms of new financial products, deregulation, increasing com-
petition, lower margins and changing risk attitudes. To a large extent the prevai-
ling banking regulations at the beginning of the 1970s mirrored the legislation
adopted after the banking crisis of 1929-1933. The banking failures of 1929-
1933 induced the Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933 which changed fun-
damentally the parameters of the functioning of the U.S. financial system.
Federal deposit insurance was introduced in order to avoid new bank runs. The
activities of banks were restricted with a view to the perceived excessive com-
petition of the previous period. Commercial and investment banking were
separated, each type of bank was restricted to a specific type of lending and
interstate banking was discouraged. Furthermore, payment of interest on demand
deposits was prohibited and interest rates on time deposits were restricted to a
maximum. In this way a new regulatory framework was created which can be
characterized as a regulated, non-competitive equilibrium.
These conditions of a protected financial system resulted in a period of
financial tranquility during the first twenty years after World War II (1946-
1965). No serious threat of a financial crisis or a debt-deflation process took
place (Minsky 1982 and 1986). However, the price to be paid for this period of
financial tranquility was an inefficient financial system creating incentives to
circumvent the restricting regulations.
The gradual movement since the 1970s towards a more deregulated and
competitive equilibrium has increased the efficiency of the U.S. financial
system. At the same time, however, one could argue that the lower bank mar-
gins, higher corporate debt ratios and the relative decline in low risk in-
vestments by banks have increased financial fragility in the sense of vul-
nerability of the financial system to future outbreaks of financial disorder. In
this view increasing efficiency and increasing fragility are two sides of the same
coin. However, increasing fragility is not necessarily a bad thing: as long as
risks are known and correctly priced by market participants, then these periods
of financial disorder are unlucky, but calculated events. As we discussed in
chapter 2, increased financial fragility may lead to more frequent periods of58 C/iapfer 4
financial disorder without causing serious damage to the functioning of financial
markets and the economy.
Wolfson (1990) presented an empirical analysis of indicators of financial
fragility in the U.S. banking sector (commercial banks and savings & loan
associations) in order to explain U.S. bank failures and insolvencies (so-called
'financial instability') during the period 1946-1987. The aim of this chapter is
twofold. First, since Wolfson provides an aggregate analysis for the commercial
banks and savings & loan associations together, we disaggregate the analysis in
order to look for differences among the two sectors. Second, we present an
update of Wolfson's analysis including the turbulent period 1988-1992 during
which the U.S. experienced a lot of banking problems.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.1 we summarize Wolfson's
empirical analysis (including a data correction to one variable). Wolfson kindly
provided me with the data. Section 4.2 contains our sectoral analysis of
Wolfson's data for the same period 1946-1987 and includes a split up of the
data into two subperiods, namely 1946-1965 and 1966-1987. In section 4.3 the
data set is updated so that it includes the period 1988-1992, which will enable
us to implement a sectoral analysis for the period 1966-1992. The conclusion of
the chapter is in section 4.4.
4.1 Wolfson's Empirical Analysis
Wolfson (1990) presents an empirical analyis aimed at explaining so-called
'financial instability' in the U.S. banking sector during the period 1946-1987.
Wolfson's approach is an aggregate analysis of all U.S. commercial banks and
savings & loan associations (S&Ls).
Using the standard OLS regression technique Wolfson estimates a regression
equation in which 'financial instability' is regressed as a dependent variable
upon four independent variables. These four independent variables are indicators
of financial fragility in the commercial banking or S&L sector. 'Financial
instability' is taken to be the actual outbreak of problems in the financial system
whereas the term 'financial fragility' is designed to measure the vulnerability of
the system to the future outbreak of these problems.77ie {/.& flanfa/ig Crai* 59
As cfepemfeAtf variable in his analysis Wolfson uses a 'financial instability'
variable indicating periods of financial disorder or turmoil. This variable is
formed as the principal component of four different variables expressing in
some way the overall concept of 'financial instability'. If we create a set of
mutually orthogonal (uncorrelated) linear combinations of these four variables
that account for the total variance of the four variables, the principal component
is the one that accounts for the maximum percentage of the total variance. Thus
it is best able to represent the variation of the original four variables'.
The four variables are:
1. Assets of failed commercial banks as a percentage of total commercial bank
assets.
2. Assets of failed savings & loan associations (S&Ls) as a percentage of total
S&L assets.
3. Assets of insolvent S&Ls as a percentage of total S&L assets.
Many insolvent S&Ls have been allowed to remain open and have not failed
due to the bankrupt condition of the thrift insurer, the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). These institutions had negative net
worth and would probably have failed if the FSLIC had not been bankrupt.
4. Dummy variable for financial crises.
It has the value of one in those years in which financial crises took place,
and zero otherwise. For the postwar period Wolfson identifies the following
events as financial crises: the credit crunch of 1966 which centered around a
run on bank-negotiable certificates of deposit, the Perm Central bankruptcy
in 1970, the failure of Franklin National Bank in 1974, the Hunt Brothers
episode in 1980, the failures of Drysdale and Perm Square and the threatened
default of Mexico in 1982, the troubles of Continental Illinois and the Finan-
cial Corporation of America (the holding company for American Savings
' In matrix notation, if X is an « by £ matrix of the « observations on * variables, and z,
= Xa, is a linear combination of the original variables, the principal component is formed
by maximizing z',z, = a',X'Xa, subject to the normalization constraint a',a, = 1. The
solution to the Lagrangian <|> = a ,X'Xa, - X,(a',a, - 1) is (X'X)a, = A.,a,, so that the
principal component a, is the eigenvector of XX corresponding to A.,, which is chosen to
be the largest eigenvalue of XX (see Johnston 1984).60
and Loan Association, at the time the largest thrift in the nation) in 1984, the
runs on state-insured thrifts in Ohio and Maryland in 1985, and the stock
market crash of 1987.
Wolfson uses four /wcfepe/Kfe/tf variables. These variables are:
1. Financial fragility variable for the commercial banking sector.
It is the principal component of two variables, namely the ratio of corporate
interest payments to gross capital income and net bank loan losses as a
percentage of average bank loans. An increase in the first variable will mean
that corporations have more difficulty in meeting debt payment commit-
ments. This fragility will then be transmitted to the banking sector by means
of increased defaults on bank loans. Both variables are expected to have a
positive relationship with the dependent variable because they increase the
likelihood of bank failures. The consequence is that the principal component
also has a positive relationship with the dependent variable.
2. Purchased funds as a percentage of total commercial bank liabilities.
Purchased funds are the sum of large time deposits, Eurodollar borrowing,
net Fed funds purchased, and commercial paper borrowing. Better access to
the market for purchased funds enables banks to meet in a more flexible way
the borrowing needs of corporations. In this way banks can, especially in
periods of tight money, still accomodate loan demand and stave off large
business failures and potential financial crises (purchasing liabilities in the
market to fund new loans rather than liquidating existing assets). The forego-
ing implies from a theoretical point of view a negative relationship between
the purchased funds variable and the dependent variable 'financial instabili-
ty'.
3. Dummy variable for purchased funds of commercial banks.
Wolfson introduces this variable in order to capture the effects of the
introduction of money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) in 1982 and 1983.
The dummy variable for purchased funds consists of a dummy variable (with
a value of one in 1982 and 1983 and with a value of zero in other years)
multiplied by the purchased funds variable. The growth of MMDAs came to
a significant degree at the expense of the growth of large time deposits held
at commercial banks ('banks' hereafter). Thus for 1982 and 1983 a decline
in purchased funds was due not to investor runs (associated with 'financial77»e (7.5. öawfang Craw 61
instability') but to an increase in insured bank deposits (assumed to be as-
sociated with a decrease in 'financial instability'). Implication of the
preceding argument is that one would expect a positive relationship between
the dummy variable and the dependent variable 'financial instability'.
4. Financial fragility variable for S&Ls.
This variable aims at measuring changes in the regulatory structure and
financial fragility of the S&Ls. It is the principal component of the following
three variables: the percentage increase of S&L deposits, the S&L interest
margin, and the ratio of home mortgages to total financial S&L assets. All
three variables are expected to have a negative relationship with 'financial
instability'.
A smaller percentage increase of S&L deposits is a measure of disinter-
mediation of the S&Ls and is a sign of potential S&L insolvencies and
failures. The S&L interest margin is defined as the mortgage interest income
on both mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities as a percentage of
average mortgage-related loans and securities minus deposit interest expense
as a percentage of average deposits. A smaller interest margin enhances the
danger of problems in the S&L sector. A lower ratio of home mortgages to
total financial S&L assets is a sign of riskier S&L investments and increased
risk of credit quality problems.
Since all three variables have a negative relationship with 'financial
instability', the principal component of these three variables also shows in
theory such a negative relationship.
Except for the crisis and purchased funds dummy variables Wolfson uses annual
data provided by official U.S. institutions: Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, and Department of Commerce. Wolfson's OLS estimation
results for the period 1946-1987 are presented in Table 4.1.
The statistical results are highly satisfactory. All independent variables have
high / statistics. The signs of the estimated regression coefficients correspond to
our expectations formulated above. The explanatory power of the regression is
relatively high with an adjusted R* of 0.84. The Durbin-Watson statistic is close
enough to the value of 2 so that residual first-order autocorrelation does not
seem to pose a problem.62 C/jap/er
Table 4.1
Wolfson's OLS estimation 1946-1987
The dependent variable 'financial instability' is regressed upon a constant and four
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4.2 Sectoral Analysis for 1946-1987
7ejf /or s/rwc/Mra/ c/ia/Jge
Wolfson's OLS estimation is based upon the entire dataset covering the period
1946-1987. At the same time, however, he suggests that there are two distinct
subperiods in the postwar period. There was the period of financial tranquility
(1946-1965) followed by the period of more or less frequent financial disorder
or 'instability'. The preceding justifies the question whether it is a sound proce-
dure to base the OLS estimation upon the entire period 1946-1987. Wolfson's
remark suggests a structural change in the data.
One way of testing for structural change in the model is making use of
recursive residuals. In recursive least squares the equation is estimated repeated-
ly, using ever larger subsets of the sample data. The one-step forecast error is
defined to be a recursive residual. Figure 4.1 pictures the recursive residuals for
the entire period 1946-1987.
In Figure 4.1 we present a plot of the recursive residuals about the zero line.
Plus and minus two standard errors (SE) are also shown at each point. The plot
was generated using Wolfson's dataset for the period 1946-1987. All variables
included in Wolfson's regression presented in section 4.1 were used except for
the dummy variable for the purchased funds of banks. The dummy variable is
almost always zero, only in the years 1982 and 1983 it has a non-zero value.
Including the dummy in the recursive residuals procedure would just generate a
plot starting in 1983.
From the plot we can easily observe that 1966 (the first year of financial tur-
moil) is the first year that the recursive residual lies outside the standard error
bands. But also in later years this happens frequently suggesting instability in
the parameters of the equation due to a structural change in the model. We also
see the increased variance of the residuals since the recursive residuals lie
further outside the standard error bands as time elapses.64
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Figure 4.1: Recursive residuals77»e f/.S. flan/rmg Craw 65
An alternative way of testing for structural change in the model is using a F test
(see Johnston 1984). The null hypothesis of no structural change is the restricted
form of the model. In the unrestricted form of the model intercepts and slopes
can be different in the two subperiods 1946-1965 and 1966-1987. The F statistic
for testing the restricted versus the unrestricted form was computed on the basis
of q=4 (number of restrictions embodied in the null hypothesis), n=42 (sample
size), and k=9 (number of regression coefficients estimated in the unrestricted
regression). The resulting F(q,n-k) statistic equals 4.84, which is significant at
the 1% level.
The conclusion of the statistical analysis is that even at the 1% level of
significance the null hypothesis of no structural change has to be rejected. We
can improve the quality of the regression for the period 1966-1987 by omitting
the period of financial tranquility 1946-1965 and by just using the data for the
period 1966-1987.
vanaWe as a
In section 4.1 it was stated that Wolfson uses as dependent variable a 'financial
instability' variable which is the principal component of four different variables
expressing in some way the overall concept of 'financial instability'. The fol-
lowing four variables are the components of the principal component:
* Assets of failed banks as a percentage of total bank assets;
* Assets of failed S&Ls as a percentage of total S&L assets;
* Assets of insolvent S&Ls as a percentage of total S&L assets;
* Dummy variable for financial crises.
The question arises whether it is useful to put all 'instability' in one principal
component variable. One could imagine that bank failures are strongly related to
the financial fragility variable for the banking sector and the purchased funds as
a percentage of total bank liabilities variable and to a lesser extent related to the
independent variable measuring changes in the regulatory structure and financial
fragility of the S&Ls. In the same way one could argue that S&L failures and
insolvencies are particularly related to the S&L independent variable and not so
much to banking independent variables. Because of this the four dependent
variables could behave quite differently: problems in the banking sector do not
need to be accompanied by problems in the S&L sector.66
In order to test the usefulness of the principal component approach we run the
same type of regression as Wolfon (for the period 1946-1987 and including the
dummy variable), the only difference being that we run four separate regres-
sions with the four variables listed above as dependent variables instead of
Wolfson's single regression with the principal component of the four variables
as dependent variable.
The principal component approach is only useful if the estimated regression
coefficients for a particular independent variable do not differ significantly from
a statistical point of view in the four different regressions. Only then we can
conclude that the four dependent variables forming the principal component
dependent variable show the same pattern in time and embody the same infor-
mational content so that the reduction of the four dependent variables to one
principal component dependent variable is a valid approach.
In Table 4.2 we test for each independent variable the null hypothesis that
the estimated regression coefficients do not differ significantly in the four dif-
ferent regressions.
Except for the financial fragility S&Ls variable (whose test statistic has a
marginal significance level of 0.19) we find that the test statistics of all other
independent variables have marginal significance levels of almost zero (because
of these strong results we do not correct for the slight residual autocorrelation in
two of the four regressions). From this observation we can conclude that in
general the estimated regression coefficients do differ significantly in the four
different regressions so that the principal component approach for the dependent
variable ignores too much sectoral differences.
as prmc/pa/
In the previous subsection we concluded that there are sectoral differences
between the four dependent variables that might be worth exploring. In the
present subsection we want to analyze whether the use of principal components
for the independent variables is significant from a statistical point of view.
As we observed in section 4.1, Wolfson uses four independent variables of
which two are the principal components of other independent variables:77K? t/.S. Ztonfawg Cra/j 67
Table 4.2
Testing for the dependent variable as a principal component
For each independent variable the x* test statistic and corresponding probability value
indicate whether the estimated regression coefficients differ significantly in the four
different regressions making use of four different dependent variables instead of one































* Financial fragility variable for the banking sector being the principal com-
ponent of two explanatory variables, namely the ratio of corporate interest
payments to gross capital income and net bank loan losses as a percentage of
average bank loans;
* Financial fragility variable for the S&L sector being the principal component
of three explanatory variables, namely the percentage increase of S&L depo-
sits, the S&L interest margin, and the ratio of home mortgages to total finan-
cial S&L assets.
The two other independent variables are the purchased funds as a percentage of
total bank liabilities variable and the dummy variable for purchased funds.
However, these are not principal components.
In the following we will test for the appropriateness of using principal com-
ponents as independent variables. This means that we test whether it is more
appropriate to use principal components as independent variables or to use the
imftv/fifaa/ explanatory variables as independent variables.
The null hypothesis that the use of principal components is a valid approach
will be the restricted form of the model. In the unrestricted form of the model
the individual explanatory variables will be allowed to replace the principal
component independent variables. Since we concluded in the previous subsec-
tion not to use a dependent variable principal component for the four dependent
variables, we run here the pair of restricted/unrestricted regressions for each
dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 4.3.
The F statistics for testing the restricted versus the unrestricted form were
computed on the basis of residual sum of squares in the restricted model (first
column), in the unrestricted model (second column), q=3, n=42, and k=8. In the
cases of 'assets of insolvent S&Ls' and 'financial crises' as dependent variables
the regressions include a first-order autoregressive AR(1) independent variable
since the original regressions are distorted by residual first-order serial cor-
relation.
Only in the case of the 'assets of failed S&Ls' as dependent variable we
find a F statistic which is significant at the 5% level. This implies that the
variability in the failed S&Ls dependent variable is better explained by using
the individual explanatory variables rather than the principal component in-
dependent variables. However, in the case of the other three dependent variables
the F statistics are not significant at the 5% level. For these variables the null
hypothesis of the use of principal components cannot be rejected.7Vje t/.5. Crisis
Table 4.3
Testing for the independent variables as principal components
The dependent variable is 'assets of failed banks' in column I, 'assets of failed S&Ls' in column II, 'assets






























































































































































The preceding is mirrored in the adjusted R*. In the case of the financial crises
dependent variable the adjusted R* is even lower in the unrestricted model. In
the two other cases it is slightly higher, but apparently not in a statistically
significant way.
In the first subsection we found a structural change in the dataset: the subperiod
1946-1965 is substantially different from the subperiod 1966-1987. From the
second subsection we concluded that the principal component approach for the
dependent variable eliminates too much the informational content of sectoral
differences. The third subsection showed mixed evidence concerning the use of
principal components for the independent variables. Therefore, from now on we
will base our analysis on the following principles: annual data for the period
1966-1987 and no application of principal component analysis for the dependent
variables nor for the independent variables. Moreover, we do not employ the
dummy variable for financial crises as a dependent variable since this variable
might be arbitrary to some extent and would also require a different econome-
tric technique (probit). Hence, we limit ourselves to three dependent variables:
assets of failed banks as a percentage of total bank assets, assets of failed S&Ls
as a percentage of total S&L assets, and assets of insolvent S&Ls as a per-
centage of total S&L assets.
In this subsection we will analyze the potential dynamics of the model by re-
estimating Wolfson's OLS regression equation which now includes a one-period
lag. Table 4.4 contains the statistical results.
From Table 4.4 we can conclude that in the case of 'assets of failed banks'
(column I) and 'assets of insolvent S&Ls' (column III) the inclusion of a one-
period lag is not statistically significant. The estimated coefficients of the lagged
dependent variables have low / statistics (0.71 and -1.64 respectively).
Moreover, the null hypothesis of deleting all lagged explanatory variables can in
both cases not be rejected as is mirrored in the marginal significance levels
(probability values) of 0.45 and 0.10 respectively.77ie f/. 5. Craw 71
Table 4.4
Testing for dynamics of the model
The dependent variable is 'assets of failed banks' in column I, 'assets of failed S&Ls' in column II
and 'assets of insolvent S&Ls' in column III (f statistics are in parentheses).
A one-period lag is indicated by (-1). The F statistic and probability value at the bottom of the table




Net bank loan losses
Net bank loan losses (-1)
Corporate interest payments




S&L interest margin (-1)
S&L home mortgages
S&L home mortgages (-1)
Purchased funds banks
Purchased funds banks (-1)
Dummy purchased funds banks

















































































































The case of 'assets of failed S&Ls' is more complicated. The estimated coef-
ficient of the lagged dependent variable has a high / statistic (-3.37) and the null
hypothesis of deleting all lagged explanatory variables is rejected (probability
value of 0.01). The question arises why one would find dynamic properties of
the model for the assets of failed S&Ls but not for the assets of insolvent S&Ls
and the assets of failed banks. We believe that this phenomenon is caused
coincidentally by the fact that the dummy variable for the purchased funds of
banks (which is always zero except during 1982 and 1983) is the only variable
moving together with the peak values of the assets of failed S&Ls during 1981-
1983. In Figure 4.2 the two variables are plotted in one diagram. However,
since the dummy variable for purchased funds is related to banks and not to
S&Ls, one could argue that this correlation is just coincidental. Apparently there
are no other, theoretically more convincing, explanatory variables in the data set
which are able to explain the sudden peaking of the S&L failed assets variable
during 1981-1983. A reason might be that the S&L yb/Vec/ assets variable is a
rather strange variable since, as was noted in section 4.1, many //uo/ve«/ thrifts
have been allowed to remain open and have not failed due to the bankrupt
condition of the thrift insurer, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC).
Re-estimating the regression equation of column II in Table 4.4 while exclu-
ding the dummy variable for purchased funds of banks (both the lagged and
non-lagged variables) fundamentally changes the statistical results. The es-
timated coefficient of the lagged S&L failed assets variable now has a low /
statistic of-1.58 (coming down from -3.37). Moreover, the null hypothesis of
deleting all lagged explanatory variables can not be rejected any more
(probability value of 0.26). A dynamic specification of the model is no longer
necessary.
In this subsection we analyze the extent to which we can come to a reduction in
the number of explanatory variables. Following our analysis in section 4.1 of
the expected relationships between the various independent (explanatory) and
dependent variables, the assumption is that the variability in the banking depen-
dent variable (failed assets of banks) can better be explained by the independent
variables linked to the banking sector rather than those linked to the S&L sec-
tor. Applying the same intuition to the S&L sector one would expect the varia-77ie t/S. Crisis 73
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Figure 4.2: S&L failed assets ratio and dummy variable for purchased funds of banks74 C7»ap/er 4
bility in the S&L dependent variables (failed and insolvent assets of S&Ls) to
be strongly related to independent variables linked to the S&L sector. Therefore,
we test in this subsection for each of the three dependent variables the null
hypothesis of deleting the explanatory variables linked to the other sector.
The procedure is first to run a regression on all eight explanatory variables
(seven explanatory variables in the case of the failed assets of S&Ls since we
have already excluded in the previous subsection the dummy for purchased
funds in this particular case) after which we will test for deleting the indepen-
dent variables linked to the other sector. The eight independent variables are: a
constant, three banking variables (net bank loan losses as a percentage of
average bank loans, ratio of corporate interest payments to gross capital income,
purchased funds as a percentage of total bank liabilities), a dummy for the
purchased funds of banks, and three S&L variables (percentage increase of S&L
deposits, S&L interest margin, and ratio of home mortages to total financial
S&L assets).
In the case of the failed assets of banks as a percentage of total bank assets we
test the null hypothesis of deleting the three S&L variables plus the dummy
variable for the purchased funds of banks as explanatory variables. The F statis-
tic has a value of 2.97 and is insignificant at the 5% level. A test for deleting
the three banking variables as explanatory variables in the case of the failed
assets of S&Ls as a percentage of total S&L assets results in a F statistic of
0.35, which is insignificant at the 5% level. In the case of the insolvent assets of
S&Ls as percentage of total S&L assets we test for deleting the three banking
variables plus the dummy for the purchased funds of banks as explanatory
variables. The F statistic has a value of 1.84 which is, again, insignificant at the
5% level.
Our conclusion is that we can run the regressions in all three cases making
use of a reduced number of explanatory variables.77K? f/. 5. SanAmg Craw 75
4.3 Update for the Period 1988-1992
The analysis of section 4.2 made it clear that the use of lags in general does not
contribute in a statistically significant way to the explanatory power of the
regressions. This is unfortunate since it means that the outbreak of banking and
S&L crises can not be foreseen. Furthermore, it was shown that the variability
in the banking dependent variable (failed assets of banks) can better be
explained by the independent variables linked to the banking sector rather than
those linked to the S&L sector. Applying the same intuition to the S&L sector
it was demonstrated that the variability in the S&L dependent variables (failed
and insolvent assets of S&Ls) can adequately be described by independent
variables related to the S&L sector.
Therefore, in this section we present some regressions using no lags and
explaining variability in the banking dependent variable by banking independent
variables just as explaining variability in the S&L dependent variables by S&L
independent variables. Moreover, the sample period is now 1966-1992 so that it
includes the turbulent period 1988-1992 in which the U.S. experienced a lot of
problems both in the banking and S&L sector.
For the variability in the assets of failed banks as a percentage of total bank
assets (BKFA) regressed upon a constant, the net bank loan losses as a per-
centage of average bank loans (BKLOSS), the ratio of corporate interest
payments to gross capital income (CORPINT), and the purchased funds as a
percentage of total bank liabilities (PUR) we obtain the following result (/
statistics are in parentheses):
BKFA = -0.17 + 0.71 x BKLOSS + 1.64 x CORPINT - 0.02 x PUR
(-0.68) (2.39) (0.74) (-0.79)
Adjusted R* = 0.62
Durbin- Watson = 1.95
The signs of the estimated regression coefficients for BKLOSS, CORPINT and
PUR are as expected (see section 4.1). A Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.95 in-
dicates absence of residual first-order autocorrelation.
The only significant independent variable is BKLOSS with a / statistic of
2.39. A test for deleting CORPINT and PUR confirms this result (F statistic
value of 0.32 and probability value of 0.73). The new regression equation is:76 CAopfór 4
BKFA = -0.23 + 0.89 x BKLOSS
(-2.42) (6.95)
Adjusted R* = 0.65
Durbin-Watson = 1.88
The increase in the net bank loan losses as a percentage of average bank loans
has played a major role in causing bank failures. In Figure 4.3 we illustrate this
relationship between the bank failed assets ratio and the bank loan losses ratio.
It is this deterioration in the loan performance of the commercial banking sector
(third world loans, junk bonds, real estate loans) that led to the largest U.S.
bank failures since the banking crisis of 1929-1933. This could suggest that
banks' risk awareness and risk pricing were not taking account of the increased
riskiness of U.S. commercial banking. Evidence of this increased riskiness was
presented in chapter 3.
The variability in the assets of failed S&Ls as a percentage of total S&L assets
(SLFA) is regressed upon a constant, the percentage increase of S&L deposits
(SLDEP), the S&L interest margin (SLMARG), and the ratio of home mortga-
ges to total financial S&L assets (SLMORTG) delivering as result (f statistics
are in parentheses):
SLFA = 14.17 - 0.19 x SLDEP - 0.66 x SLMARG - 0.15 x SLMORTG
(2.50) (-3.32) (-1.06) (-1.83)
Adjusted R* = 0.37
Durbin-Watson = 2.22
All signs of the estimated regression coefficients are negative, as was expected
(see section 4.1). Residual first-order autocorrelation does not seem to pose a
problem. However, the adjusted R* is relatively low. The reason might be, as
was previously noted, that the S&L /a/7ec/ assets variable is a rather strange
variable since many /'/wo/venf thrifts have been allowed to remain open and
have not failed due to the bankrupt condition of the thrift insurer, the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Therefore, it might be better
to look at the assets of insolvent S&Ls as a measure of 'instability' in the S&L
sector. This is what is done in the next regression.77ie £/.£ Crów
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Figure 4.3: Bank failed assets ratio and loan losses ratio •*78
The variability in the assets of insolvent S&Ls as a percentage of total S&L
assets is indicated by the SLIA variable. Since 1980 is the first year that the
SLIA variable has a non-zero value, we compute the regression for the period
1980-1992. The independent variables are the same as in the previous regression
and f statistics are again in parentheses:
SLIA = 79.28 - 0.15 x SLDEP - 2.03 x SLMARG - 1.11 x SLMORTG
(5.81) (-1.50) (-1.95) (-5.38)
Adjusted R* = 0.72
Durbin-Watson = 2.45
Just as in the case of the SLFA regression all signs of the estimated regression
coefficients are negative, as was expected. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.45
does not imply residual first-order autocorrelation. Only the S&L independent
variable indicating the ratio of home mortgages to total financial S&L assets is
significant. A test for deleting SLDEP and SLMARG confirms this observation
(F statistic value of 1.54 and probability value of 0.27). The new regression
estimation now becomes (/ statistics are in parentheses):
SLIA = 59.78 - 0.84 x SLMORTG
(5.93) (-5.10)
Adjusted R* = 0.68
Durbin-Watson = 1.79
During the 1980s the gradual decline of home mortgages in the total financial
assets of S&Ls has caused a substantial increase in S&L insolvencies. This
relationship is summarized in Figure 4.4. The decrease of the home mortgages
share in total financial S&L assets indicates riskier investment policies of S&Ls.
Starting at the beginning of the 1980s when a lot of S&Ls found themselves
locked into negative interest margins (low fixed rates at the assets side and high
floating rates at the liabilities side because of a restrictive monetary policy),
they decided to take a bet on the deposit insurance system in order to try to
save their heads. This was done by investing in riskier products like options,
futures and junk bonds (White 1991). Deregulation enabled S&Ls to do this.
Especially in the second half of the 1980s the effects of the risk taking became
visible in the form of S&L insolvencies and failures.77JC f/.S. Crisis 79
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Figure 4.4: S&L insolvent assets ratio and home mortgages share80
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, extending the analysis of Wolfson (1990), we have presented an
empirical analysis of indicators of financial fragility in the U.S. banking sector
(commercial banks and S&Ls).
For the co/wmerc/a/ Z>a/7£;«g sector our main conclusion is that the increased
variability in the assets of failed banks as a percentage of total bank assets can
be explained for a substantial part by the increase of the net bank losses as a
percentage of average bank loans. It is this deterioration in the loan performance
of the commercial banking sector (third world loans, junk bonds, real estate
loans) that led to the largest U.S. bank failures since the banking crisis of 1929-
1933. This could suggest that banks' risk awareness and risk pricing were not
taking account of the increased riskiness of U.S. commercial banking. Evidence
of this increased riskiness was presented in chapter 3.
For the S(£L sector we can conclude that the main factors accounting for the
'instability' in the S&L sector are the decrease in the S&L interest margin and,
in particular, the decrease of the home mortgages share in total financial S&L
assets. The last variable indicates riskier investment policies of S&Ls. Starting
at the beginning of the 1980s when a lot of S&Ls found themselves locked into
negative interest margins (low fixed rates on the assets side and high floating
rates on the liabilities side because of a restrictive monetary policy), they deci-
ded to take a bet on the deposit insurance system in order to try to save their
heads. This was done by investing in riskier products like options, futures and
junk bonds. Deregulation enabled S&Ls to do this. Especially in the second half
of the 1980s the effects of the risk taking became visible in the form of S&L
insolvencies and failures.r 5
The Scandinavian Banking Crisis
Up to the early 1980s the banking system in the Nordic countries (Norway,
Sweden and Finland) can be characterized as a highly regulated regime consis-
ting of controls on interest rates, credit controls and capital controls. The rapid
process of financial liberalization and deregulation intensified dramatically
competition between financial institutions (IMF 1993a). This led to an unprece-
dented growth in bank lending. Although in the early phase of the expansion
banking appeared to be very profitable, developments towards the end of the
decade indicated that profitability had been over-estimated and risks under-rated.
Massive rescue and support operations (state ownership, capital injections,
guarantees etc.) were mounted in Norway, Sweden and Finland. Atle-Berg
(1993) calculates that the volume of official support operations by 1992 amoun-
ted to 2.8 per cent, 3.1 per cent and 7.2 per cent of GNP in Norway, Sweden
and Finland respectively.
Until the early 1980s the banking system in the Nordic countries was highly
regulated and protected by explicit and implicit government guarantees. In
chapter 2 we discussed a paper by Keeley (1990) in which he analyzes under a
/ixe</-rate deposit insurance system the influence of increased competition on
bank charter values, risk taking and captital ratios. Following Keeley's analysis
the rapid pace of deregulation and competition in the Nordic countries led to an
increased willingness for risk taking. In itself such a process of increased com-
petition, lower margins and greater risk taking should not necessarily be seen as
an undesirable phenomenon. For one thing it enhances the efficiency of the
financial system with all the welfare benefits for demanders of financial ser-
vices. At the same time lower margins and increased risk taking make the
banking system more fragile in the sense of vulnerability of the system to future
outbreaks of financial disorder. If, however, the risks involved are known and
correctly priced, then these periods of financial disorder are unlucky, but cal-
culated events (see chapter 2). Increased financial fragility may lead to a sig-
nificant increase in the net loan losses as a percentage of total bank loans with-
out causing bank failures and insolvencies.82 C/7ap/er 5
As long as banks are compensated for increased risk taking by higher, correctly
priced risk premia, they will be able to build up sufficient reserves in order to
bear larger credit losses without reaching the brink of failure or insolvency.
The interesting point about Norway, Sweden and Finland is that the tran-
sition from a regulated and uncompetitive banking sector to a less regulated and
more competitive regime went together with a banking crisis of unprecendented
scale. This could suggest, that at least during the transitional phase, risk
awareness and risk pricing were not adequate.
In this chapter we present maximum likelihood estimates for pooled banking
data of Norway, Sweden and Finland during the period 1980-1992. Our em-
pirical analysis shows strong evidence that mounting credit losses played a
significant role in the banking crises of Norway, Sweden and Finland. At the
same time we observe that the bank failures and insolvencies were not caused
by a significant deterioration of net interest margins. A logical interpretation
could be that banks have not been able to charge adequate risk premia in order
to be compensated for the higher lending risks after deregulation had taken
effect. This resulted in built-up capital reserves being too small in order to be
able to bear the credit losses and, consequently, in massive bank failures and
insolvencies.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.1 we give a descriptive over-
view of the financial deregulation process in the Nordic countries during the
1980s. Moreover, we analyze common features in the deregulation process and
the later banking crisis. While special factors apply in each country, there is a
remarkable parallel between the three countries in the origin and nature of the
decline in financial performance of banks. In section 5.2 we give an overview
of the data and methodology of our empirical analysis. Section 5.3 presents the
empirical results. In section 5.4 we give our interpretation of the Nordic banking
crisis. Section 5.5 contains the conclusion of the chapter.77ie Scam/z'Mav/'an öa/7&/>jg Cra/s 83
5.1 Financial Deregulation
While special factors apply in each of the three Nordic countries, such as a
sharp fall in oil prices in Norway in 1986 and the initial low profitability and
capitalisation of Norwegian banks (Skanland 1992) and the collapse of trade
with the former Soviet Union for Finland, there is a remarkable parallel between
the three countries in the origin and nature of the decline in financial perfor-
mance of banks. The parallel arises in five areas (Benink and Llewellyn 1994a):
the regulatory regime; the banks' responses to changes in regulation and the
competitive environment; debt trends of the corporate and personal sectors; the
business cycle, and in macroeconomic policy responses.
In each of the case-study countries there were major changes in the regulatory
regime. Substantial measures of deregulation were made. In Norway, monetary
policy was conducted via direct regulations and the administered setting of
interest rates below equilibrium levels until the middle of the 1980s; direct
lending restrictions were abolished in 1984 (Solheim 1994). In Sweden, all
credit ceilings were removed in 1985 (Englund 1990, Barr and Gustavsson
1991). Deregulation started in Finland in the early 1980s with the deregulation
of interest rates and the abolition of direct lending guidelines (Nyberg and
Virhriala 1993). At the same time regulations were eased to allow some subor-
dinated debt to be included in the banks' capital base which raised the banks'
lending capacity. The Norwegian official report on the banking crisis (1992)
argues that the rise in subordinated debt capital was inappropriate.
The common features were that banks' regulatory balance sheet constraints
were removed, interest rates became more market-determined and less ad-
ministered, and banks' lending capacity was increased. Such deregulation in-
duced a more competitive market environment in banking which was one of the
policy objectives (OECD 1989). A new priority was given to enhancing the
efficiency of financial systems through creating a more competitive market
environment.84
Banks responded in a remarkably similar way by substantially increasing the
volume of lending in a short period (see Figure 5.1). Bank lending as a propor-
tion of GDP rose from 64 per cent to 85 per cent (1983-1986) in Norway, from
43 per cent to 68 per cent (1986-1990) in Sweden, and from 55 per cent to 76








Figure 5.1: Nordic banks' nominal growth of lending 1980-1992
(Source: IMF International Financial Statistics)85
As a result of increased competitive pressures banks lowered credit rationing
and risk thresholds (Llewellyn and Holmes 1992). Bank profitability at first rose
due to this expansion but later deteriorated sharply due to massive provisions
for bad debt. Banks developed more concentrated portfolios as lending to
property and property companies expanded particularly rapidly and increased
their share in loan portfolios. Property was also used as collateral for a high
proportion of loans. In Sweden, loans against real estate made in 1989 and 1990
accounted for around 80 per cent of subsequent loan losses (Dalheim et al
1992). It is also evident that in each of the countries there was an aura of op-
timism most especially given the sharp rise in asset prices which eroded both
risk aversion and perception of risk by banks. At the same time, balance sheet
growth and market share considerations dominated bank business strategies.
o/ è
Borrowers also substantially increased their debt in each of the countries with
debt-income and gearing ratios rising substantially. For instance, the debt-
disposable income ratio of the household sector in Sweden rose from 100 per
cent in 1985 to a peak of 130 per cent in 1988 (Barr and Gustavsson 1991).
Corporate sector gearing ratios also rose sharply.
cyc/e
A common feature of the case-study countries was a sharp cyclical upswing at
the time of the acceleration in bank lending, but most especially a very sharp
rise in asset and property prices. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b show the trend of stock
market and real estate prices during the 1980s. The rise in asset vales induced
both borrowers to incur more debt (on the assumption that their debt-servicing
capacity had increased) and banks to increase their lending and acquiesce in
higher gearing ratios. The rise in asset prices made banks less risk-averse,
generally more optimistic, more confident of borrowers' ability to service debt,
and more confident about the value of collateral. In addition, much of the bor-
rowing was speculative in nature, most especially with respect to borrowing to
finance the acquisition of property and real estate.
However, in each of the countries the economy moved into recession in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, and asset prices (most especially real estate) fell86
precipitously. Combined with the sharp rise in gearing ratios, a tightening of
monetary policy, and resultant rise in interest rates on floating-rate debt, this
created debt-servicing problems for personal and corporate sector borrowers,
and default rates rose sharply in each country precipitating the deterioration in
the financial performance of banks. The fall in property prices in particular
undermined the assumptions upon which many loans had been made and eroded
the value of loan collateral held by banks. Vikkula (1992) notes that in Finland
lending on the bases of real asset values rather than cash flows made banks
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Figure 5.2a: Nordic countries stock market prices 1980-1992
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Figure 5.2b: Nordic countries real estate prices 1980-1992
(Sources: Central Bureaus of Statistics of Norway, Sweden and Finland;
Bank of Norway; Enskilda Research, Sweden)
/7o//cy response
In several countries, the post-deregulation period was accompanied by an exces-
sively expansionary monetary policy. Monetary policy was particularly expan-
sionary in the late 1980s: the impact of deregulation on bank lending was ac-
centuated by a simultaneous expansionary monetary policy. In Norway and
Sweden the impact was also enhanced by the effect of tax relief on loan interest
payments.88 C/iop/er 5
5.2 Data and Methodology
Using OECD data and using data which were kindly provided to us by the
central banks of Norway, Sweden and Finland, we have constructed a data set
for commercial and savings banks in the three countries during the period 1980-
1992 (annual data). The following variables are distinguished:
CBFIA: Assets of failed/insolvent commercial banks as a percentage of
assets of all commercial banks
SBFIA: Assets of failed/insolvent savings banks as a percentage of assets
of all savings banks
CBLOSS: Commercial banks' net loan losses as a percentage of total loans
made by commercial banks
SBLOSS: Savings banks' net loan losses as a percentage of total loans made
by savings banks
CBDEP: Commercial banks' deposits growth
SBDEP: Savings banks' deposits growth
CBINT: Commercial banks' net interest margin as a percentage of average
balance sheet total
SBINT: Savings banks' net interest margin as a percentage of average
balance sheet total
In the case of Norway we use loan provisions as a proxy for net loan losses.
In our model the CBFIA and SBFIA variables are considered as dependent
variables. We want to determine to what extent the failures and insolvencies of
banks can be explained by changes in the net loan loss ratio, deposits growth
and the net interest margin.
The net loan loss ratio variable is expected to have a positive relationship
with the dependent variable because credit losses increase the likelihood of bank
failures and insolvencies. We would expect for the deposits growth variable that
it shows a negative relationship with failures and insolvencies: a smaller per-
centage increase of deposits is a measure of disintermediation and is a sign of
potential failures and insolvencies. For the net interest margin we would also
expect a negative correlation since a smaller interest margin enhances the
danger of problems in the banking sector.77ie Scartt/mav/aw /to/jfo'/jg Cra/s 89
In order to separate developments in the commercial banking sector from those
in the savings banking sector we run separate regressions for commercial banks
and savings banks.
Because of the fact that the CBFIA and SBFIA dependent variables have a
positive, non-zero value in a relatively limited number of years (in most years
they have a value of zero), we are not dealing with the standard regression
model but with the so-called 'Tobit model' or 'censored regression model'. The
consequence is that we can not use the standard least squares estimation
technique, since this procedure will «o/ lead to a consistent estimator of the
population regression function. However, a maximum likelihood estimation of
the Tobit model does generate consisent results (see Judge, Hill, Griffiths,
Lütkepohl and Lee 1988).
The general form of the model is:
To estimate the parameter p consistently, we can apply maximum likelihood
procedures. The likelihood of the sample has a component for the observations
that are positive and one for those that are zero. Define ƒ and F, to be the
probability density function and cumulative probability density function, respec-
tively, of a standard normal random variable evaluated at z, = jc,p/a. Denoting
the product over the zero observations by FIQ and the product over positive
observations by fl,, the likelihood function is given by:
(5.2)
The log-likelihood function is:
2-E,ty-jE,p)2/2o* (5.3)
Maximization of this log-likelihood function generates the estimates of the Tobit
model.90
In our regressions we will be using a poo/e^ data set of the three countries
together which consists of 39 observations and three independent variables. The
estimation requires that the number of independent variables is smaller than the
number of non-zero observations of the dependent variable; in the case of
running regressions for each individual country this prerequisite is not always
met. We believe that pooling the data of the three countries can be justified by
referring to our discussion in section 5.1 on the common features of the banking
crises in the Nordic countries.
5.3 Empirical Results
For the commercial banking sector we estimate the following regression
equation (f statistics are in parentheses):
CBFIA = -11.95 + 8.80 x CBLOSS - 3.67 x CBDEP
(-1.09) (3.12) (-2.92)
The CBLOSS and CBDEP variables are both significant and the signs of the
estimated coefficients are as expected. In an earlier regression we also included
the CBFNT variable, but this variable is not statistically significant.
The estimation for the savings banking sector generates the following result:
SBFIA = -33.53 + 10.33 x SBLOSS
(-3.42) (4.58)
Only the SBLOSS variable turns out to be significant and has the expected
positive sign. In the earlier regression including the SBDEP and SBINT
variables, these two variables appeared to be statistically insignificant.
The results are plotted in Figure 5.3a for the commercial banking sector and in
Figure 5.3b for the savings banking sector.Oirii 91
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5.4 Interpretation
Our empirical analysis shows strong evidence that mounting credit losses played
a significant role in the banking crises of Norway, Sweden and Finland. At the
same time we observe that the bank failures and insolvencies were not caused
by a significant deterioration of net interest margins. A logical interpretation
could be that banks have not been able to charge adequate risk premia in order
to be compensated for the higher lending risks after deregulation had taken
effect. This resulted in built-up capital reserves being too small in order to be
able to bear the credit losses and, consequently, in massive bank failures and
insolvencies.
In interpreting the conditions behind the emergence of financial fragility and
the banking crisis in the Nordic countries, two separate pressures should be
distinguished (Benink and Llewellyn 1994): cyclical and structural.
The proximate and cyc/zca/ cause of the banking crisis was the move into
recession in the domestic economy. Given that debt is a non-contingent liability,
recessions are always hazardous for banks as they lead to increased insolvencies
among borrowers, asset prices tend to fall, the value of banks' collateral on
loans declines, and risks in bank lending tend to rise. The recession of the early
1990s was particularly serious for banks partly because of the substantial rise in
bank lending that preceded it, the fact that credit rationing had been eroded
during the period of expansion which raised the probability of defaults, asset
prices fell particularly sharply, and the rise in bank lending led to a significant
increase in the gearing of bank borrowers. In effect, banks entered the recession
in a potentially more vulnerable position than in previous recessions. The high
income- and capital-gearing positions made borrowers (and hence banks)
especially vulnerable at a time of high interest rates, a sharp fall in property
prices, and an unprecedentedly high level of real interest rates at the time of
recession. Overall, the asset-price cycle contributed to financial fragility both
because the sharp rise in asset prices during the 1980s contributed to increased
borrowing and lending and high gearing ratios, and the subsequent fall in asset
prices aggravated the normal effect of a recession.
The s/ruc/wra/ component of the banking crisis relates to the fact that
deregulation and increased competition structurally change the market environ-
ment in which banks operate. Before deregulation had come into effect, regula-
tion acted as a protection to banks. The key elements to the underlying banking
structure were: low degrees of competition, the existence of restrictive practices,
cartels and anti-competitive mechanisms, high entry barriers into banking, and94 Orap/er 5
limited growth of bank assets and size of balance sheets. Restrictive regulation
almost invariably creates economic rents which have the effect of enhancing the
value of the banking franchise. It is also the case that non-price competition
created a degree of excess capacity that would not be sustainable in a more
competitive market environment. Overall, therefore, the impact of the regulatory
environment was to create excess capacity, monopolistic profits and economic
rents in the banking industry.
The immediate impact of deregulation is likely to be an initial stock ad-
justment response by banks towards new steady state sustainable balance sheet
positions. Financial institutions have a desired portfolio structure for a given set
of market and regulatory conditions, and if any of these conditions change, the
desired portfolio changes and stock adjustments are made to achieve them.
While the new portfolio equilibrium is being achieved through a finite once-for-
all stock adjustment, the volume of credit is substantially increased. The IMF
(1993a) argues: "The increase in borrowing was broadly based, suggesting that
the debt accumulation reflected a backlog of unsatisfied demand for credit
unleashed after financial liberalization". During such a transitional period of
adjustment from a credit-constrained to a credit-liberalized market regime
economic agents have to learn the new structural equilibrium relations. As long
as learning is still taking place expectations errors need not satisfy any of the
optimality properties usually assumed in the rational expectations literature
(Pesaran 1987). This implies that in such a transitional phase of learning sys-
tematic estimations errors by bankers can be made resulting in inadequate risk
premia, huge credit losses and substantial bank failures and insolvencies.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we observe that the transition from a regulated and uncom-
petitive banking sector to a less regulated and more competitive regime went
together with a banking crisis of unprecendented scale in Norway, Sweden and
Finland. This could suggest, that at least during the transitional phase, risk
awareness and risk pricing were not adequate. We present maximum likelihood
estimates for pooled banking data of Norway, Sweden and Finland during the
period 1980-1992. We find strong evidence that mounting credit losses played a
significant role in the banking crises of Norway, Sweden and Finland. At the
same time we observe that the bank failures and insolvencies were not caused
by a significant deterioration of net interest margins. A logical interpretation777e Scam//wav/a/7 Banfawg Oms 95
could be that banks have not been able to charge adequate risk premia in order
to be compensated for the higher lending risks after deregulation had taken
effect. This resulted in built-up capital reserves being too small in order to be
able to bear the credit losses and, consequently, in massive bank failures and
insolvencies.
The movement from the regulated to the deregulated regime does not neces-
sarily imply that, once the deregulated and new competitive steady-state
equilibrium has been reached, the errors will be repeated. What remains to be
determined in each of the case study countries is whether the precarious position
of banks is transitory in nature (associated with the once-for-all shock of
deregulation and increased competition) and whether, once the impact of stock
adjustment effects has been unwound, banks will learn from past mistakes.
What can safely be concluded from the experience in the Nordic countries is
that big shocks to banking systems (such as sharp changes in regulation) can
easily produce severe reactions. However, it cannot be concluded that the after-
math of such shocks indicates the characteristics of the new deregulated en-
vironment itself once the adjustment has been made and the lessons learned.
Nevertheless, the deregulated banking environment may have made banking
potentially more fragile. The erosion of the economic rents induced by previous
regulation is likely to have made banking a more vulnerable industry than in the
past.Systemic Stability and Competitive Neutrality Issues
in the International Regulation of Banks
The increasing globalization of banking and finance means that autarky (self-
sufficiency at the national level) is no longer a feasible strategy in financial
regulation: there is the potential for regulation determined at the national level
to be undermined by developments in other regulatory jurisdictions, and regula-
tory requirements in one country have impacts in others. This creates a standard
case for international regulatory co-operation as, given the externalities in-
volved, co-operative strategies have the potential to increase the effectiveness of
regulation, and limit the scope for regulatory arbitrage.
The focus of this chapter is upon the international dimension to regulation in
two areas (banking and securities business) which, while they have common
considerations, also raise different issues. The focus is upon two issues in inter-
nationally co-operative regulatory strategies: sys/e/n/c s/aft/V/Yy and compe/;7/ve
«e«/ra///y. Two central themes emerge. Firstly, while in some areas there is a
potential case for international co-ordination to increase the effectiveness of
regulation for systemic stability reasons, issues of competitive neutrality might
be dominant and, at times, in conflict with the requirements of prudential
regulation for systemic stability. Secondly, specific examples of international
co-ordination (the examples chosen are the 1988 Basle Capital Convergence
Arrangements with respect to banking and the 1993 European Union's Capital
Adequacy Directive with respect to securities business) demonstrate that the
approaches adopted may be inefficient in two respects: they do not achieve their
systemic stability or competitive neutrality objectives, and the two objectives
may be in conflict with the resultant compromise, being sub-optimum for both.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.1 considers the regulatory
implications of the increasing globalization of banking and financial markets.
Section 6.2 considers the potential conflicts between systemic stability and
competitive neutrality. Section 6.3 discusses the systemic stability and com-
petitive neutrality dimensions of the 1988 Basle Capital Convergence Arran-
gements with respect to banking and the 1993 European Union's Capital Ade-
quacy Directive with respect to securities business. Section 6.4 concludes.98
6.1 International Dimension to Regulation
The internationalization of finance has accelerated as both suppliers and users of
financial services increasingly have global options and are less restricted to
purely domestic facilities. The international dimension of finance means that
competitive pressures in banking, securities trading and other financial services
have become increasingly international. For these reasons national financial
systems have become sub-sets of a global system. In the process, something of
a two-tier structure of banking and financial services has emerged in which the
corporate sector increasingly has global options while financial services at the
retail level is still more limited to within national financial systems. Never-
theless, as noted by Grundfest (1990): "In today's internationalized securities
market, even the smallest investor can treat national regulatory regimes as
partially discretionary constraints on investment activity".
These trends imply that effective and efficient regulation in one country can
no longer be applied independently of regulatory levels in other major systems.
The international dimension to regulation has both competitive neutrality and
systemic stability implications. Firstly, given that financial institutions and
markets compete globally, regulation in national systems has the capacity to
confer competitive subsidies or disadvantages. Secondly, this can have the effect
of inducing regulatory arbitrage. This in turn creates a third potential hazard:
international competition in laxity. The po/en/za/ danger is that the stability of
the financial system (systemic stability) can be threatened because of a failure in
a poorly regulated jurisdiction. Thus, partly through the international inter-bank
market, risks can be spread and the failure of an institution can have repercus-
sions in other countries. The risk of widespread contagion or spillover effects is
often referred to as ^yj/em/c ra/fc.
The word 'potential' should be emphazised. Although international super-
visors and regulators, such as the Basle Committee and the European Union,
acknowledge explicitly the stability of the international financial system as one
of the main reasons for international regulatory co-operation, this issue is not
unresolved. Corrigan (1992) argues: "The speed, volume, value and complexity
of international banking transactions have introduced new linkages and inter-
dependencies between markets and institutions that have the pote/rt/a/ to trans-
mit problems and disruptions from place to place and institution to institution at
almost breakneck speed" (italics added). Similarly, Steil (1992) asserts: "Since
any systemic effects of inadequate or misguided regulation in one jurisdiction
cannot be contained within that single jurisdiction, the imposition of universalSys/e/m'c S/aM/Yy a/w/ Co/wpe//7/'ve jVeu/ra/i/y /roue? 99
standards or modes of operation is likely to be the only effective response".
Against these positions, Benston (1994) sees no link between individual
bank failures and the stability of a financial system in either a national or inter-
national context as /o«g as central banks offset the reduction in total bank
reserves associated with individual bank failures. The failure of an individual
bank does not threaten the stability of the financial system if a liquidity crisis in
the whole system is prevented by timely liquidity assistance from central banks.
Moreover, according to Kaufman (1994) and Benston and Kaufman (1995) there
is no historical evidence to support the widely held belief that, even in the
absence of deposit insurance, bank contagion is a holocaust that can jeopardize
solvent banks, the financial system, and even the macroeconomy in domino
fashion. It is also evident that two recent major bank failures (BCCI and
Barings) did not produce either domestic or international systemic problems
even though both were involved in international business.
In this chapter we will not deal with this unresolved issue. Starting from the
premise that international regulators perceive the preservation of systemic
stability as a rationale for international regulatory co-operation, we analyze to
what extent regulation with systemic stability objectives can be effective and
consistent with competitive neutrality objectives of regulation in an international
context.
The general problem in banking and securities regulation is that the jurisdiction
of national regulators is smaller than the geographical area of regulated financial
institutions and markets. There is no overriding international regulatory autho-
rity as supervision and prudential regulation is conducted at the national level,
while the issues have an international dimension. Different legal systems are
involved, the powers and authority of individual central banks and bank super-
visors vary considerably as do institutional structures in different countries. Steil
(1992) puts it as follows: "The global integration process in capital markets
means that the system with which policymakers are concerned extends over a
multitude of regulatory jurisdictions".
The central issues are the extent to which international factors undermine the
power of exclusively national regulation, and whether, in an increasingly in-
tegrated global financial system, some or all of the objectives of regulation can
only be achieved by abandoning the autarky of exclusively national legislation,
implying that the design of effective regulatory structures can be met more
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The collapse of BCCI in the summer of 1991 revealed several problems and
weaknesses in the international dimension to banking regulation: uncertainty
over the division of responsibility between different national regulators; doubt
about the quality of supervision in some jurisdictions; inadequate means of
verifying the supervisory practices, effectiveness and standards of regulatory
authorities; the fact that complex company structures may make effective super-
vision more complicated; the importance, but absence of, consolidated super-
vision under a clear lead regulator; fraudulent exploitation of offshore banking
centres with strict secrecy laws, and inadequate co-operation on the exchange of
information among national supervisors. For a full description of the BCCI
collapse, see Dale (1993), Hall (1991a, b, c, 1992 and 1993) and Herring
(1993).
The Basle Committee (with the endorsement of the central bank governors
of the Group of Ten countries) subsequently responded with a series of propo-
sals to reinforce the 1983 Concordat which governs the division of supervisory
responsibility between parent and host supervisors of international banks. The
objective is designed to "provide greater assurances that in the future no inter-
national bank can operate without being subject to effective consolidated super-
vision" (Basle Committee 1992). In particular, the Basle Committee recom-
mended that: (1) all international banking groups and international banks should
have a home country authority that capably performs consolidated supervision,
(2) the creation of cross-border banking establishments should receive the prior
consent of both the host country supervisor and their home country supervisor,
(3) supervisory authorities should possess the right to gather information from
the cross-border establishments of banks for which they are the home country
supervisor, and (4) if a host country authority determines that any of the above
minimum standards is not met to its own satisfaction, that authority could im-
pose restrictive measures necessary to satisfy its prudential concerns consistent
with the minimum standards. This last-mentioned would include the prohibition
of the creation of banking establishments. The key is that all international banks
should be supervised by a home country supervisor "that capably performs
consolidated supervision". This presupposes that national supervisory authorities
are able in practice to monitor the quality of each other's supervision. Measures
were also incorporated into the European Union's Second Consolidated Super-
vision Directive, including an extension to the information exchange re-
quirement between supervisory agencies (see Benink 1993a and Hall 1993).101
6.2 Systemic Stability and Competitive Neutrality
vs.
The specific rationale of international collaboration in regulation may focus
upon one or more of three broad objectives: (1) to increase the efficiency of
regulation in achieving its objectives of systemic stability and consumer protec-
tion /o //ie extenf /Aa/ the international dimension to finance has the potential to
undermine the effectiveness of nationally determined regulation, (2) to equalize
competitive conditions between suppliers of financial services in different
countries, or (3) to contribute towards the creation of a single market in finan-
cial services. The last mentioned is particularly relevant for the European Union
and this may require a greater degree of harmonization than would otherwise be
the case. The type of collaboration will depend largely upon which of the three
objectives is dominant. A central issue is the extent to which collaboration,
including harmonization, is to extend beyond the requirements of systemic
stability.
We focus on the two key issues of systemic stability and competitive neutrality
which are considered in two areas: banking and securities business. The
syjfe/H/c staè/7/Yy objective relates to internationally co-operative mechanisms to
ensure the effectiveness of regulation to reduce the probability of default, and
the potential for default of an institution in one country to threaten the stability
of the financial system in others. This requirement arises to the extent that
systemic stability considerations cannot be confined to individual countries and
hence countries have a mutual interest in each others' regulatory arrangements.
However, international co-operation need not cover areas wider than those
necessary to ensure the solvency of institutions. In particular, it does not in
itself require harmonization of conduct of business rules. Thus, systemic
stability need not be compromised if other countries have different conduct of
business rules providing that those regulations which relate specifically to
systemic stability are effective. Conversely, systemic stability is potentially
compromised if, for instance, a country has capital adequacy rules for banks
which are less than those necessary for prudential reasons as the lax regime may
impose costs on other countries (e.g. because of the failure of banks in these
countries). Thus competition in regulation (while it has merits in some areas)
should not apply to those regulatory requirements which specifically impinge on102
systemic stability. While the ultimate objective of international co-operation is
to make such regulation effective, it does not have to extend to all aspects of
regulation as different countries may choose regulatory arrangements for a
wider set of objectives than systemic stability. The question is how far, and in
what areas, international corroboration is to extend.
The focus of the co/wpe/z7/ve Hew/ra///)' objective is different. It implies
international collaboration in those aspects of regulation (e.g. conduct of
business rules) that have the potential to affect the competitive position of
suppliers of financial services in different countries. The premise is that all
forms of regulation have a potential impact on the cost of providing services.
The issue arises as to whether competitive neutrality should relate to
institutions (similar institutions in different countries operate under a similar
regulatory regime) or functions, irrespective of which institutions provide those
functions. The distinction between institutional and functional regulation arises
because institutions may not be specialised, and institutional structures vary
between countries. The obvious example is with respect to securities business,
which is conducted both by banks and specialist securities firms. This aspect is
discussed below.
A central issue relates to which areas of regulation are to be undertaken at the
national level and which need overt international collaboration. In general,
because of potential links between financial systems, regulation for systemic
stability requires a higher degree of international collaboration in order to make
it effective than does regulation with respect to conduct of business. While it is
potentially hazardous to leave systemic stability issues strictly within the juris-
diction of national authorities there may be considerable merit in allowing
national differences in other areas where systemic stability considerations do not
arise. Following the general principle of subsidiarity, regulation which does not
have a systemic stability dimension is best left to the choices of individual
countries.
Even so, there may be a case for extending international collaboration to
wider aspects of regulation than purely systemic stability considerations. Two
areas in particular arise: (1) where the objective is to create a single market in
financial services across several countries, and (2) where cross-border transac-
tions are undertaken and a judgement is made that consumers may be unaware
of differences in regulation and may assume that the same regulation applies as
in their home country. The latter consideration is easier to handle when finan-
cial firms supply services to consumers by locating in the latter's home country.103
The generally accepted principle is that host country regulation applies with
respect to conduct of business rules even though it is home countries that are
responsible for prudential regulation.
Regulation for systemic stability relates to the probability of default and the
social costs associated with it (disruption of the financial and economic system).
Such regulation is not appropriate when, because of the nature of a firm's
business, there is a low probability of failure or where, if failure does occur, the
social costs are zero or are less than the costs of preventing the failure (costs
associated with lower bank efficiency because of regulation). This raises the
issue of the uniqueness of banks compared to securities firms. If the social costs
of bank failure are positive or significantly higher than those associated with the
failure of a securities firm, then it is appropriate, for instance, for capital ade-
quacy requirements to be greater for banks than securities firms. In other words,
if the probability of failure and the social costs of failure are different, capital
requirements also should be different. However, this may conflict with objec-
tives related to competitive neutrality. In this case, while applying the same
capital adequacy requirements for different firms (functional regulation) may
satisfy the competitive neutrality objective, it would be sub-optimum with
respect to the systemic stability objective. In this case competitive neutrality and
systemic stability objectives are in conflict. Also, Mayer (1993) finds that
systemic risks associated with securities activities are different in different
countries, which implies that harmonized capital requirements are not ap-
propriate. If, in general, capital requirements should be greater for banks, then
meeting the competitive neutrality argument by applying the same capital ratio
implies either that they are set too low for banks or too high for securities firms.
In the first case, there is a potentially greater danger of incurring social costs
through bank failure, whereas in the latter case consumer welfare is impaired
because the costs of securities firms (in terms of the costs of required capital)
are higher than are necessary to avoid the social costs of failure.
If, because of the unique position of banks and the higher social cost of
failure, capital adequacy requirements are set higher for banks' securities
business than are set for specialist securities firms, banks may be placed at a
competitive disadvantage in this type of business. This is not necessarily an
issue for regulatory authorities to the extent that they are concerned about
systemic stability rather than industrial structure. If, by setting optimum capital
requirements, business migrates to particular types of firms, then this may be
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quirements. Indeed, if higher capital requirements for banks were justified
because bank failures were more likely to impose systemic negative exter-
nalities, it would be socially desirable that they lose securities business unless
they can offset capital costs with savings from economies of scope.
/4/fór/ja/z've yö/ras q/^ interna/zona/
As international financial integration erodes the viability of autarky there is a
prima yóc/e case for at least a limited form of international collaboration. In
highly interdependent systems, co-operative strategies can yield welfare benefits
in terms of enhancing the effectiveness of regulation. In those cases where
autarky is either not viable or less efficient than international collaboration,
there is a spectrum of alternative forms of international collaboration, in which
harmonisation and competition represent two polar cases. The full spectrum of
international regulatory collaboration encompasses what might be termed:
systemic harmonization; economic harmonization; international co-ordination;
co-operation; extra-territorial enforcement; and international competition.
Sys/e/n/c Aarmomzafrow implies a high degree of harmonization of regulation
for systemic stability reasons in order to make common regulatory objectives
effective. It reflects the weakness of autarky in achieving regulatory objectives
because of externalities at the international level.
The case for eco«om/c /7armo«/za//o« arises when there are differences in
regulation which, while serving no regulatory or other objective and may simply
be a product of history, impose unnecessary costs and inconvenience. The
regulation of securities markets, for instance, is based on arrangements which
vary considerably between countries (OECD 1993). Harmonization in these
cases, while not impairing any country's regulatory objectives or detracting
from consumer welfare, could reduce costs and inconvenience involved when
suppliers and consumers operate under different regulatory regimes. Examples
include arrangements with respect to information disclosure, registration
procedures, accounting conventions etc. While the case for reducing unneces-
sary or unchosen differences in regulation is strong, if the benefits of standar-
dization are significant, the market should be able to devise its own mechanisms
for securing regulatory convergence without the intervention of official regula-
tory authorities. Self-regulatory agencies are in a position to respond to market
pressures if there are mutual advantages in standardisation and no regulatory
objectives are involved. This is one of the roles of IOSCO in the securitiesSyj/e/wzc 5/a6i/i'0' ««</ Co/wpenY/ve Ateufra/jïy /roues 105
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aims not at harmonization but at establishing a common set of
mimmuw regulatory standards above which individual countries can make
choices, and the removal of evident inconsistencies and conflicts in regulation
between jurisdictions.
Co-opera/ive szrafeg/es relate to enforcement procedures and information-
sharing. With institutions conducting business in several regulatory jurisdictions,
there can be advantages in sharing information between host and home
countries. However, problems can be encountered, such as confidentiality and
legal power to divulge information to foreign agencies. Such co-operative
arrangements are well established in the banking sector through the Basle Com-
mittee but fairy rudimentary in the securities industry, though IOSCO has made
some contributions (e.g. establishment of a common code of conduct record).
Co-operative strategies are also beneficial in enforcement where the co-opera-
tion of foreign regulatory authorities may be essential for the enforcement of
home regulation and the prosecution of infringements. Regulatory authorities
have a mutual interest in co-operation to secure enforcement and, where neces-
sary, prosecution. This has been well-developed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the United States which has successfully negotiated a network of
treaties, communiqués and accords with regulatory authorities outside the US.
A further option to address problems encountered with the international
dimension to regulation is the application of ex/ra-fó/r/ïorza/ y"Mritt/ic//oH. In
some cases, though this may require the consent of host country authorities, a
home regulator may require certain regulatory standards to be met by
institutions under its jurisdiction even when the operations are being conducted
by a foreign subsidiary of that institution which is formally under the jurisdic-
tion of a host regulator. A host country would not normally allow a more
lenient regulatory arrangement to apply, but in practice has no choice other than
to acquiesce in more demanding standards being set.
In the absence of harmonized arrangements, /n/erna/z'ona/ co/wpe/j'f/on in
regulation enables transactors to choose markets and institutions regulated under
different regulatory regimes. This in particular applies to conduct of business
rules where the case for harmonization is limited. Providing systemic stability is
not put in jeopardy through non-harmonized regulation, diversity can enhance
welfare and yield potentially valuable information. The counter-argument, even
when systemic dangers do not arise, is that consumers may not have access to
the necessary information about different regulatory regimes, may assume that
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ments, and may become confused. Furthermore, the institutions may be unwil-
ling or unable to inform consumers of the differences.
In selecting the form of international collaboration, the ultimate focus needs
to be on the objectives of regulation (systemic stability and consumer protec-
tion) and the extent to which they can be secured more efficiently through
international collaborative strategies. There is a danger that, once the principle
of collaboration is accepted, harmonization in particular is pursued for its own
sake and questions related to competitive neutrality come to dominate prudential
requirements and systemic stability. Such 'international escalation' may take
harmonization beyond the point where benefits (in terms of increased effec-
tiveness in regulation) exceed costs. The original motive for the Basle Capital
Convergence Arrangements for banks was related both to questions of safety
and soundness of banks and systemic stability. Over time, however, the em-
phasis has shifted decisively towards requirements of competitive neutrality with
more emphasis on harmonization. In section 4 we will elaborate on this issue.
There are many reasons why, in some areas at least, differences in regulation
between countries are both viable and desirable. They allow for different social
choices to be made with respect to objectives, for different institutional struc-
tures and potential for systemic hazard, and for differences in externalities and
the social cost of institutional failure. Competition in regulation can be benefi-
cial providing systemic stability is not impaired; the externalities of one regime
do not impose costs on others; that consumers have sufficient information about
differences in regulatory regimes, or when the costs do not exceed the benefits
of competition.
The principle of subsidiarity, which surfaced in the Delors Report on
European Monetary Union (1989) and is related to the level at which general
policy decisions are to be made in a monetary union, can equally be applied to
regulation. For the reasons just outlined, the benefits that can be derived from
competition, and questions of accountability of regulatory authorities, there is a
strong case for regulation being framed at a local level except when its effec-
tiveness is significantly impaired for systemic stability reasons, and where clear
economic gains can be made by international collaboration which exceed the
benefits to be derived from local regulation. The position has been highlighted
by Grundfest (1990): "The major challenge for regulators will, however, be to
distinguish situations in which co-ordination is desirable from those in which
diversity yields greater benefits". We add that decisions also relate to the par-
ticular form of collaboration of which the fashion for harmonization is at one/c Stoi/YiTy awrf Compel/five //ewrraZ/Ty /ssuej 107
end of a spectrum.
6.3 Banking and Securities Business
vs. systems
The principal objective of regulation in banking and securities business relates
to safety and soundness of institutions and systemic stability. Capital is the main
focus of bank regulation for this objective and is the dominant aspect of inter-
national collaboration in regulation. The key issue is whether regulation for
capital requirements for safety and soundness reasons is more efficiently based
upon prescribed and internationally agreed rwtes, or banks' risk management
systems coupled with use of market indicators.
Both nationally and internationally the rules approach dominates. Although
such rules have the advantage of being quantifiable and internationally agreed,
in a later section we argue that precision may be a substitute for accuracy, and
the capital requirements for banks based upon the 1988 Basle Capital Conver-
gence (BCC) rules bear little resemblance to what would be derived from risk
and portfolio analysis models. The BCC regime, and the 1993 European
Union's Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) with respect to securities business,
hardly offer any advantage to banks with superior systems (Taylor 1994).
An alternative approach is to abandon fixed rules and focus on banks' sys-
tems and efficiency with respect to: identification and measurement of risks,
banks' management of risks, the extent to which risks are hedged or exter-
nalized, and the way risks are combined and managed within the overall portfo-
lio. The focus would be on whether banks have satisfactory risk management
systems with imposed capital requirements being set in relation to the efficiency
of systems. Thus, banks which demonstrate superior risk management systems
would be subject to lower capital requirements. This could act as an incentive
for banks to develop superior risk management systems which is likely to
contribute more to system/c sta6/7/rj> than formal capital adequacy rules. It is
pertinent to note that the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995 was a product of
inadequate risk management systems rather than a failure to adhere to capital
adequacy requirements.
An advantage of a rules system (even though the rules may, to some extent,
be arbitrary and not based upon actuarial assessment or risk) is that rules can be108
precisely quantified and internationally agreed. In this respect they may serve
the com/?e/;7/ve wew/ra//fy objective of international collaboration. However,
providing that systems effectively and efficiently contribute to systemic stability,
competitive neutrality is of second-order importance. A focus on systems could
alleviate a potential dual moral hazard of rules to the extent that rules reduce
the incentive both for banks to create effective risk management systems, and
for private monitoring of banks' behaviour and balance sheet positions.
At the international level, the focus of a systems approach would be inter-
national agreement on the assessment and monitoring of systems rather than
specific rules. This could create a new role for the Basle Committee: monitoring
the approach of national regulatory authorities with respect to risk management
systems of banks under their jurisdiction. International agreement would centre
on the methodology and systems of risk analysis and management rather than
precise rules, as at present.
Ccrp/7a/ ƒ>
The 1988 Basle Capital Convergence (BCC) arrangements, which established a
common framework for capital regulation of banks, were designed to satisfy
both systemic stability and competitive neutrality objectives. The primary objec-
tive was, as stated in the original document, "to strengthen the soundness and
stability of the international banking system" (Basle Committee 1988). Com-
petitive neutrality was addressed as follows: "The framework should be fair and
have a high degree of consistency in its application to banks in different
countries". The approach is highly prescriptive and capital adequacy is
measured in terms of capital ratios against risk-adjusted assets. The approach
generally can be criticised on the grounds that the 'safety and soundness' of
banks is determined not by fine capital calculations but by the quality of the
asset book, the structure of the loan and asset portfolio, the banks' risk analysis
and management systems, and internal control arrangements. The experience of
Scandinavian banks in the early 1990s demonstrates that these were the reasons
for bank failures rather than failure to meet prescribed capital ratios (Benink and
Llewellyn 1994).
More specific weaknesses relate to the risk weight methodology applied.
Firstly, it cannot realistically be claimed that the risk weights applied to each
category of assets are based upon actuarial assessments of true, absolute or
relative risk. Secondly, the largest category of most banks assets is the portfolio109
of loans to the private sector and yet all these loans are assigned a risk weight
of unity. In practice, the differences in risk characteristics w/V/j/w the loan
portfolio far exceed the differences between loans on average and other com-
ponents of the asset portfolio. The largest single component of a bank's assets is
not a homogeneous category. Thirdly, no allowance is made for the degree of
diversification in the asset structure or for the way assets are combined in the
total loan portfolio. Risks in a balance sheet are not additive, though this is the
procedure adopted in the BCC methodology. Even accepting the validity of the
basic methodology, if risk weights do not accurately reflect 'true' risk, sub-
optimum business structures and pricing strategies may emerge. There is a
danger that, through the objective of seeking competitive neutrality, banks'
pricing and other business decisions will come to be based upon a set of
dubious and spuriously precise risk weights and conversion factors for off-
balance sheet business. This can have the effect of creating arbitrary and unwar-
ranted distortions in business structures between different nationalities of banks,
between banks and other institutions supplying 'banking' services, within the
asset portfolio, and between on- and off-balance sheet business.
Because of the weaknesses embodied in the BCC risk weight methodology,
it is questionable whether BCC makes a significant contribution to systemic
stability. At the same time competitive neutrality seems to be important, since
the Basle capital arrangements allegedly create competitively neutral capital
positions through common capital adequacy requirements, definitions of al-
lowable capital, risk weights attached to different assets, and conversion factors
for off-balance-sheet items. Although competitive neutrality has been a
dominant principle in the arrangements, they do not in practice create com-
petitively neutral conditions. In a detailed comparison of U.S. and Japanese
banks, Scott and Iwahara (1994) enumerate several examples of where different
regulatory requirements are imposed on US and Japanese banks and which
undermine the competitive neutrality of BCC: the different role of the safety net
and other non-BCC policies; imposed regulatory ratios in addition to those
contained in BCC; differences in the scope of BCC requirements; differences in
the definition of qualifying capital; differences in the risk weighting of some
assets, and the manner in which BCC is enforced in the two countries.
Differences in accounting procedures, the cost of capital and in taxation also
impinge on competitiveness in the two countries. In general, applying the prin-
ciple of the second-best, harmonizing one aspect of regulation when other
aspects are not equalized does not produce overall competitive neutrality.110
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The 1993 Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) of the European Union seeks to
apply common capital standards on banks (which conduct securities business)
and specialist securities firms. The CAD seeks to harmonize regulation in four
dimensions: by placing banks and securities firms under the same capital ade-
quacy regime; by prescribing specific capital requirements with respect to mar-
ket risk; defining the form of regulatory capital for both, and by applying broad-
ly similar consolidated supervision rules to both banking and investment groups.
Three alternative approaches are applied by different regulators with respect
to capital requirements against position risks: (1) the comprehensive approach
applied by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States;
(2) the building block approach which is incorporated within the CAD, and (3)
the portfolio approach which, in a simplified form, is used in the United King-
dom by the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA). With the compre/re/w/ve
approach, the capital requirement of a securities firm is set on the basis of a
specified proportion of the value of its long positions plus a proportion of the
value of its short positions. This has been the traditional method of setting
capital requirements on securities firms both in the United States and elsewhere
(though not in the United Kingdom). The èu/W/ng £/oc£ approac/j sets capital
requirements partly on the net value (i.e., the extent of any net long or short
position) of the trading book (representing market risk) and partly on the gross
value of the book (representing specific risks). By distinguishing net and gross
positions, this method at least recognizes that balanced books (i.e., where there
is no net long or short position) provide partial hedging and therefore justify
lower capital requirements. Under the theoretically superior por(/o//o approac/j
the setting of capital requirements is based upon a specific portfolio model
which reflects the risk (volatility) of a firm's trading book which in turn is
influenced by the extent to which the portfolio is diversified. In other words, it
sets capital requirements by reference to an explicit estimate of overall portfolio
variability. The SFA in the United Kingdom applies a simplified version in that
the model is based on a set of strong simplifying assumptions (Dimson and
Marsh 1995).
The Capital Adequacy Directive's approach to capital adequacy requirements
for securities business and interest rate risk favours the building block approach,
although there is little theoretical justification for it. With the building block
approach, only a partial offset is allowed for balanced trading books. For/'c S/aè/7/ry ara/ Co/wpefrf/ve AteM/ra/»Yy toei 111
instance, the overall capital requirement is set equal to X per cent of the gross
position plus Y per cent of the net position. These percentages are largely
arbitrary and ad /JOC, although some allowance is given for a balanced book.
With respect to the CAD, the original idea was that X would be equal to 4 per
cent and Y equal to 8 per cent. Eventually it was agreed to impose arbitrary
values of 2 per cent and 8 per cent respectively for large diversified portfolios.
Dimson and Marsh (1995) have tested the three alternative approaches based on
the books of 58 U.K.-based securities firms. The overall conclusion is that the
simplified portfolio approach applied in the United Kingdom is superior to the
comprehensive approach and the building block approach in terms of economic
efficiency and consumer protection. The others were rated poorly on these
criteria. The authors conclude: "The portfolio approach should be the preferred
methodology for setting capital requirements. Yet international regulators have
shown a marked preference for the building block approach, while the SEC has
so far displayed an extreme aversion to updating the U.S. rulebook"'. It is also
the case that the portfolio approach tends to give the lowest measure of capital
requirements. This seems to suggest that international regulators are risk-averse
and cautious in the setting of capital requirements and in the process impair
economic welfare to the extent that capital requirements are set in excess of
what are needed for systemic stability. It also suggests that capital adequacy
requirements are dominated by issues of competitive neutrality rather than the
safety and soundness of institutions. Here seems to be an example where the
motive of competitive neutrality has in practice taken precedence over
efficiency of regulation, even though, as argued above, a set of regulatory
requirements designed for competitive neutrality may not in practice be neutral.
Apart from the question of methodology of capital requirements, which was
discussed above, there is the question whether the securities activities of banks
' In April 1995 the Basle Committee announced a new proposal to calculate the capital
that banks must set aside for market risks. The proposal gives banks a choice between
applying the building block approach or using their own financial models to calculate the
'value-at-risk'. These models should meet certain regulatory quality standards (The
Economist, April 15-21, 1995). The new approach is likely to be adopted by the European
Union as well, which would require a modification of the CAD. After finalizing the
consultative phase with the international banking community, the Basle proposal is due to
be implemented at the end of December 1997.112 C/iap/er 6
and securities firms should have the same capital requirements. In the European
Union, contrary to the United States, securities business is conducted both by
banks and specialist securities firms and the CAD seeks to apply a common
capital adequacy regime for competitive neutrality reasons. However, there are
substantial differences between banks and securities firms which have a bearing
on the way they should be regulated, most especially with respect to capital
adequacy requirements.
Most, if not all, of the special characteristics of banks which give rise to the
alleged case for regulation do not apply to securities firms: in the absence of
deposit insurance and a lender-of-last-resort, there is no moral hazard to be
protected against; the systemic risk is less evident, and may not exist at all
(Mayer 1993); contagion is less likely, and the potential disruption of the
payments system does not arise with securities firms. The main consideration,
however, relates to the nature of securities firms' assets. Being readily marketa-
ble they can be liquidated, albeit at the risk of a fall in prices, in the event of
difficulty. Ultimately, securities firms can contract the balance sheet more easily
than can banks, since they are not subject to the asymmetric asset and liabilities
contracts that are a feature of banking. This in itself justifies higher capital
requirements for banks than securities firms*.
While systemic risks are less than with banks, they might not be totally
absent. A default of a securities firm could have a /?otewfr'a//y de-stabilizing
impact on a financial system. A recent official study (OECD 1993) has opined
as follows:
"....the rising importance of securities markets in the financial systems of
OECD countries, the growing concentration in the securities industry, the
effects of new technologies, the nature of the risks now being borne by
securities market intermediaries and the links between the securities market
and the banking and payments system all suggest that the occurrence of
serious misfunctions in the securities markets would have the potential to
destabilize the entire financial system". . .. ,_.
' Benston (1989), analyzing the potential effects of a repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act's
separation of commercial and investment banking in the United States (U.S.), sees both
from a theoretical and empirical point of view no fundamental difference in terms of risk
exposure and potential strain of the safety net (including deposit insurance) between
commercial banks (U.S. model) and 'universal' banks combining commercial and in-
vestment banking (European model).113
In the European Union's 1993 Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) the choice
was made for competitive neutrality rather than systemic stability. Both banks
and securities firms have to comply with the same capital requirements to their
trading book position. In the case of banks the mechanism devised is to isolate
banks' trading books in securities from their portfolio holding of securities (i.e.,
that part of their securities business which is similar to that of specialist securi-
ties firms) and to apply the same capital requirements to the trading book posi-
tion as are applied to non-bank securities firms. The trading book of a bank
covers positions where market risk is a more accurate measure of exposure than
credit risks where the normal banking capital adequacy requirements apply. The
capital requirements in the CAD are less onerous than those applying to credit
risks of banks in two respects: less capital is required and greater use can be
made of subordinated debt capital to meet the capital requirements.
Overall, the potential danger implicit in the CAD, as far as the securities
business of banks is concerned, is that the drive for a measure of competitive
neutrality based on /w/7cf/ona/ regulation makes banks potentially more vul-
nerable (too low capital requirements from a systemic stability point of view),
and more so than specialist banks that have no securities business. This seems
to imply that, in order to achieve a common regulatory framework for banks
and securities firms, bank supervisors have acquiesced in lower standards for
banks than they would have ideally chosen. Overall, and given the unique
position of banks, the drive for alleged competitive neutrality in the CAD
results in treating as equal institutions that, at both the micro and systemic level,
are not equal.
6.4 Conclusion
Our focus has been upon the international dimension to regulation and the
interaction between systemic stability and competitive neutrality issues. Par-
ticular reference has been made to the 1988 Basle Capital Conergence (BCC)
arrangements for banks and the 1993 European Union's Capital Adequacy
Directive (CAD) with respect to the securities business of banks and specialist
securities firms. The main themes may be summarized as follows:114
* International co-operation in regulation focuses upon systemic s/aA/7/Yy and
co/wpef/f/ve new/ra/i/y issues. Although the two elements are interactive, the
dominant objective in co-operative strategies should be systemic stability,
while in practice the motivating force is predominantly competitive
neutrality. There is a danger of harmonization being pursued for its own
sake without reference to the ultimate objectives of regulation. The es-
calation of harmonization may take it beyond the point when benefits exceed
costs.
* Several specific problems arise when following competitive neutrality objec-
tives in regulation: they may be in conflict with systemic stability objectives
(e.g. securities activities of banks vs. specialist securities firms); institutions
which are not equal may be treated as if they are; different social choices
may be denied through 'escalating harmonization'; the potential benefits of
competition between regulators may be lost; and harmonization within some
areas may be insufficient to create overall competitive neutrality.
* The business of banks and securities firms is different and, because the
social cost of failure is different, this raises different systemic risks. The
objectives and nature of regulation are different in the two sectors. Applying
competitive neutrality principles to banks (with respect to their securities
business) and securities firms may compromise systemic stability objectives
of regulation.
* Notwithstanding the powerful international dimension in the design of op-
timum regulatory structures, Aarmow/za/zow in regulation is only one of
several ways of incorporating international considerations. Financial in-
tegration does not in itself create sufficient conditions for total regulatory
integration. Harmonization is a polar case along a spectrum with competition
in regulation being the other polar case. ,
* Different approaches should be applied to different aspects of regulation and
there is no presumption in favour of harmonization. The general principle of
iMAi/c/yari/y is relevant in the design of regulatory structures: regulation is
most effectively constructed at the national level, unless it is evidently more
efficiently devised at a broader level./c Sto^i/fry am/ Cb/wpe/»"/h>e Afe«fra//ry Zttwes 115
Specific examples of international co-ordination demonstrate that the ap-
proaches adopted may be inefficient in two respects: they do not achieve
their systemic stability and competitive neutrality objectives, and the two
objectives may be in conflict with the resultant compromise being sub-
optimum for both. The BCC rules (the most detailed form of international
regulatory co-operation) are seriously flawed with respect to both systemic
stability and competitive neutrality objectives.
Regulation, and international collaboration, has normally been conducted on
the basis of rules. An alternative, superior approach is to focus upon finan-
cial firms' systems of risk analysis and management, and for the regulatory
authorities to set capital requirements which reflect the efficiency of banks'
risk analysis and management systems.
The ultimate objective of harmonization is to ensure the effectiveness of
regulation. Questions of competitive neutrality raise fundamentally different
issues to those of systemic stability and the case for harmonization for com-
petitive neutrality is considerably less and, under some circumstances, can be
hazardous and welfare-reducing. The central issue is about what areas of regula-
tion require international collaboration and what form such collaboration should
take.r 7
Survey Data and the Interest Rate Sensitivity of U.S.
Bank Stock Returns
The interest rate sensitivity of U.S. bank stock returns has been the research
topic of many academic papers. Most papers start from the two-index model
developed by Stone (1974). This asset pricing model expands the standard
market model of asset returns by adding an interest-rate index. The function of
this interest rate factor is to account for the influence of wnexpec/ec/ interest rate
changes on the stock returns of banks. Empirical research by, among others,
Fama and Schwert (1977) and Folger, Kose and Tipton (1981) has shown that
the inclusion of an interest-rate factor adds substantial explanatory power to the
single-factor market model.
A group of papers co/w6/«/«g years from the 1970s and 1980s into one data
set find that U.S. bank stocks exhibit a statistically significant inverse relation-
ship between unanticipated interest rate changes and the returns on these stocks
(Flannery and James 1984, Brewer and Lee 1985, Scott and Peterson 1986,
Kane and Unal 1988, Saunders and Yourougou 1990, Yourougou 1990, Kwan
1991, Akella and Greenbaum 1992, and Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky 1992).
This result is not qualitatively influenced by the choice of a short-term or long-
term interest rate variable. Neither is it qualitatively influenced by the size of
the banks: large money-center banks, middle-sized superregional banks, or
smaller regional banks. There is also a group of papers containing (sub)sets of
data o«/y cove/-/Mg the 1970s (Chance and Lane 1980, Sweeney and Warga
1986, Kane and Unal 1988, and Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky 1992). These
papers find an insignificant interest rate sensitivity during the 1970s. This result
is not counter-intuitive given the fact that on October 6, 1979 the Federal
Reserve Board announced a switch from interest rates to unborrowed reserves
as its short-term operating target, which led to an increase in the level and
variability of interest rates. However, Saunders and Yourougou (1990) and
Yourougou (1990) still find significant interest rate sensitivity for the October
1977 - September 1979 period.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold. First, using
weekly data for the period 1974-1993 and using the forecast errors of
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) processes in order to model118 C/iapfer 7
the unexpected interest rate, we provide empirical evidence on the interest rate
sensitivity of the stock returns of the twenty largest U.S. bank holding com-
panies. As in most previous studies, we do not find statistically significant
interest rate sensitivity during the 1970s and strong evidence of negative interest
rate sensitivity during the 1980s. However, the statistically significant relation
disappears completely during the second half of the 1980s. This result is
qualitatively independent of using the three-month Treasury bill rate or the rate
on ten-year Treasury bonds as input for the ARIMA modelling of the unex-
pected interest rate variable. Interestingly, our result indicates that, contrary to
the existing literature which only covers the period until the mid-1980s, the
interest rate sensitivity of bank stock returns varies with the subperiod con-
sidered. The only other paper incorporating recent data is Robinson (1995).
Robinson employed quarterly data in contrast to the weekly data in our analysis.
His results are quite mixed in the sense that the sign of the interest rate sen-
sitivity appears to depend on the choice of the interest rate variable in his time
series models.
The second contribution of this chapter is to use swrvey Jato in order to
model the unexpected interest rate variable'. This is an alternative approach
compared to the existing literature. Flannery and James (1984) and Robinson
(1995) use the forecast errors of an autoregressive (AR) model as a proxy for
unexpected interest rate movements. Scott and Peterson (1986), Sweeney and
Warga (1986) and Kane and Unal (1988) use changes in the yield on a given
maturity of long-term government bonds to capture unanticipated changes in
interest rates. Finally, Mishkin (1982) and Brewer and Lee (1985) proxy unan-
ticipated changes in interest rates by the difference between the spot three-
month Treasury bill rate at time / and the forward three-month Treasury bill rate
imbedded in the yield curve at time /-I. In this chapter we use weekly survey
data on the U.S. federal funds rate for the period April 29, 1980 until December
22, 1993. The survey was conducted by Money Market Services (MMS) Inter-
national (part of Standard & Poor's) in Belmont, California. The weekly surveys
generate a market expectation for the federal funds rate for a certain survey
period which is then confronted with the realized value of the federal funds rate
during the same survey period. This enables us to calculate an unexpected
change in the federal funds rate for the relevant survey period which is then
used for estimating the interest rate sensitivity in the two-index model. We find
a statistically significant negative interest rate sensitity for the period April 1980
' We would like to thank Kees Koedijk for bringing this possibility to our attention.Survey Z)a/a am/ /w/eresf /to/e Seras/f z v;/y 119
through May 1985. Since then, the statistically significant relation between
unexpected federal fund rate changes and bank stock returns has broken down.
This result is consistent with our previous findings where we used the forecast
errors of ARIMA processes related to the three-month Treasury bill rate and the
ten-year Treasury bond rate as a proxy for unanticipated interest rate
movements. Also in the latter case we found a breakdown of the interest rate
sensitivities during the second half of the 1980s.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 7.1 we present our model and
data selection. Section 7.2 contains our empirical analysis for the period 1974-
1993 using the forecast errors of ARIMA processes for the U.S. three-month
Treasury bill rate and ten-year Treasury bond rate as proxies for the unexpected
interest rate variable. Section 7.3 contains our empirical findings while using
survey data for the U.S. federal funds rate. In section 7.4, concluding this chap-
ter, we interpret the breakdown of the statistical significance of the interest rate
sensitivity during the second half of the 1980s.
7.1 Model and Data Selection
We start the analysis from the two-index model developed by Stone (1974).
This asset pricing model expands the standard market model of asset returns by
adding an interest rate index. In this model 7?^, being the return on asset p, is
expressed as:
($„, and Pi are measures of the asset's systematic market and interest rate risk,
while /?„ and /?, represent a stock market return and a return on debt*.
In our sample we have chosen for the return on the S&P 500 composite index
as a proxy for the stock market return /?„. The variable ^ is the return on an
equally weighted portfolio of the common stocks of the twenty largest U.S.
bank holding companies. The data have been corrected for stock-splits. /?, serves
as the variable indicating the unexpected interest rate movement on government
* Following Kane and Unal (1988) we employ the Mnor//»ogo«a//ze</ two-index model.
This means that no orthogonalization is used between ./?„ and ^J,.120 Cfap/er 7
debt.
In the following we will elaborate on the choices of data and methodology
in our empirical analysis for both the ARIMA and the survey data modelling of
the unexpected interest rate variable.
/«feres/ rate generated asybrems/ error o/a« /4#/A£4 process
For a period of twenty years (1974-1993) we calculate weekly returns for the
S&P 500 composite index, the individual bank stocks, and the equally weighted
bank index consisting of the twenty individual bank stocks. The weekly data,
retrieved from Datastream, cover the periods from the closing value at a
Wednesday until the closing value on the next Wednesday.
For both the three-month Treasury bill rate and the ten-year Treasury bond
rate, on which we obtained data from the HI5 release of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, we estimate ARIMA processes. The cal-
culations cover the same weekly periods as those used for the calculations of
stock returns.
For each interest rate variable we selected two processes, one based upon the
Akaike lag-length selection criterion and the other based upon the Schwarz lag-
length criterion (see Priestley 1981). The residuals generated by the estimation
of the optimal ARIMA processes are considered as the best approximation of
the unexpected interest rate movement. These residuals are then used as /?, in
our model.
/wferesf rate gewera/ed as /örecasf error o/ swrvey data
For a period of about 13.5 years (April 29, 1980 until December 22, 1993) we
use weekly survey data on the U.S. federal funds rate. The weekly survey were
conducted by MMS International (part of Standard & Poor's) in Belmont,
California. The methodology of the survey was changed in November 1987
which required us to split the 1980-1993 data set into two subperiods.
• .•*.••. • .-
From April 29, 1980 until October 30, 1987 the weekly surveys were conducted
on a week/next week basis. This implies that individual market participants
were asked to formulate their expectation for the federal funds rate for the next
week, i.e. for the coming five trading days. Moreover, the survey did not askSurvey Dato a/u/ /n/ere*/ /?afó Se/w/ï» v/'fy 121
for the expected value of the federal funds rate at the end of the coming five
trading days, but required individual market participants to give their average
expected value of the federal funds rate for the next five trading days. The
average federal funds rate expectations of the individual market participants
were then combined into one market expectation for the average value of the
federal funds rate during the next five trading days by taking the median of the
individual expected values.
In our sample we confront the average value expected by the market for the
next five trading days with the realized average value of the federal funds rate
for the same five trading days. By subtracting the realized average value from
the expected average value we construct a variable indicating the ««expected
average yêaera/ /««ai ra/e during the next five trading days. This variable then
becomes the /?, in our model. For reasons of consistency we also compute
average returns on the equally weighted bank index (/?^) and the S&P 500
composite index (./?„). Moreover, these average returns are calculated in such a
way that they exactly match the periods of five trading days on which the
survey expectations are based.
Starting from April 29, 1980 the surveys were conducted on Tuesdays and
were related to the next five trading days (Wednesday through Tuesday).
However, on February 17, 1984 the survey day was changed to Friday causing
the surveys to be related to Monday through Friday as the next five trading
days. In our sample we took this change into account when we calculated ^, /?„
and /?,.
Sometimes the survey was conducted one day later than usual, e.g. during
1980-1984 not on the regular Tuesday but on the Wednesday just after this
Tuesday. In these cases the survey expectation is related to the next four (and
not five) trading days. For these particular cases we computed 7?^, 7?„ and /?, as
four-day averages for the relevant four-day periods. In some rare cases the
survey was conducted one, two or three days earlier than the regular survey day.
In these cases the survey expectations still cover a period of five days.
However, the survey periods are not the next five trading days immediately
following the earlier survey days, but still the next five trading days as if the
surveys had been conducted on the regular days and not on the earlier days.
Starting November 6, 1987 the weekly surveys were no longer on a week/next
week basis but were related to the two-week Federal Reserve Board's reserve
maintenance period beginning on a Thursday and ending on a Wednesday two
weeks later. The weekly surveys (still on Fridays) started now to ask market122 Chapter 7
participants for their expectation of the federal funds rate on the Wednesday
ending the two-week maintenance period. Market participants were no longer
asked for the average expected value of the federal funds rate during the remai-
ning trading days of the maintenance period, but they were asked to give the
expected value of the federal funds rate a/ //re en^ of the two-week maintenance
period.
Because the weekly surveys are now related to a Wednesday occurring once
every two weeks, we are confronted with survey expectations covering different
numbers of days. The surveys conducted at the first Friday of the two-week
maintenance period require market participants to give their expectations for a
period of twelve days (eight trading days) ahead, while the surveys at the
second Friday of the same maintenance period cover an expectation period of
five (three trading days) ahead. In order to deal with this phenomenon in an
adequate way we split the November 1987/December 1993 sample into two
subsamples. The first subsample uses the expectations for the federal funds rate
eight trading days ahead. By subtracting the realized value of the federal funds
rate at the end of the eight trading days (corresponding to the Wednesday
ending the maintenance period) from the expected value based on the survey,
we are able to compute the unexpected federal funds rate at the end of the next
eight trading days. This variable then becomes the /?, in our model. For reasons
of consistency we also compute the end-of-period returns on the equally
weighted bank index (/y and the S&P 500 composite index (#„,). Moreover,
these end-of-period returns are calculated in such a way that they exactly match
the periods of eight trading days on which the survey expectations are based.
For the second subsample using the expectations for the federal funds rate three
trading days ahead, we follow exactly the same methodology. Naturally, all
variables are constructed for the relevant three days.
Just as for the 1980-1987 period we corrected our data set for surveys not
conducted on the regular Fridays, but on an earlier or later day.Survey Da/a ana" /«feres/ /Ja/e 5ens;7jv;7y 123
7.2 The Period 1974-1993 Using ARIMA Processes
In this section, we present our results on the interest rate sensitivity of U.S.
bank stock returns using time series processes to generate unexpected interest
rates. ARIMA models are estimated for both three-month Treasury bills and ten-
year Treasury bonds. Model selection is performed on the basis of the Akaike
and Schwarz lag-length selection criteria. As the interest rate sensitivity results
are quite similar for the two selection criteria, we only report results obtained
using the Schwarz criterion. The estimation results for equation (7.1) are presen-
ted in Table 7.1. In order to address the serial correlation that is present in the
residuals in a number of cases, we have allowed for a first-order moving
average in the residuals where appropriate. This moving average appears to
capture the error term dynamics satisfactorily.
The empirical results in Table 7.1 are presented for the whole sample period as
well as for three subperiods. Subperiod 1 covers weekly data during 01/02/1974
- 10/03/1979, subperiod 2 covers 10/10/1979 - 10/14/1987 and subperiod 3
covers 10/21/1987 - 12/29/1993. Subdividing our total sample into these sub-
samples was motivated by two events during the sample period. On October 6,
1979 the Federal Reserve Board changed its operating procedures for monetary
policy, as was indicated above. On October 19, 1987 the stock market crash
took place. Chow-tests for structural breaks indicate that both events led to
significantly different estimation results between the pre- and post-event periods.
From Table 7.1 we can infer that our results are quite robust to the choice of
the interest rate variable. In all cases the results are qualitatively similar. For the
whole period the standard result of negative interest rate sensitivity of bank
stock returns obtains. Interestingly, analysis of the subperiod results reveals that
negative interest rate sensitivity is entirely concentrated in the second subperiod
(1979-1987), in which the sensitivity is very significantly present. In the 1974-
1979 period no significant interest rate sensitivity is present and after the stock
market crash of 1987, the significant interest rate sensitivity disappears again.
Returns on bank stocks appear to react differently to interest rate movements in
different periods.124
Table 7.1
Regression results on the interest rate sensitivity of bank stock returns, 1974 -
1993, using ARIMA models






















































































































Notes: f statistics are reported in parentheses; *(**) indicates statistical significance at the
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7.3 The Period 1980-1993 Using Survey Data
This section is devoted to the empirical results on the interest rate sensitivity of
bank stock returns when survey data are used to determine unexpected interest
rates. Because of variation in the survey methodology, as described above, in
Table 7.2 we report results for two separate survey periods: 1980-1987 and
1987-1993.
Table 7.2
Regression results on the interest rate sensitivity of bank stock returns, 1980-








































































Notes: / statistics are reported in parentheses; *(**) indicates statistical significance at the
5% (1%) level.126 C/wpfer 7
Results for the first survey period are reported in the top panel of Table 7.2.
The results for the entire 1980-1987 period indicate that no significant interest
rate sensitivity is present. When the period is subdivided, however, it becomes
apparent that interest rate sensitivity is significantly present in the subperiod
1980-1985, but not in the subperiod 1985-1987. Below, we will elaborate on
this change of interest rate sensitivity.
Our results for the second survey period, 1987-1993, are reported in the
bottom panel of Table 7.2. The results for the two subsamples based on eight-
trading-days-ahead expectations and three-trading-days-ahead expectations are
reported separately^. No significant interest rate sensitivity is present. Overall
we conclude, as in section 7.2, that returns on bank stocks appear to react
differently to interest rate movements in different periods.
7.4 Interpretation and Conclusion
Using weekly data for the period 1974-1993 and using the forecast errors of
ARIMA processes in order to model the unexpected interest rate, we provide
empirical evidence on the interest rate sensitivity of the stock returns of the
twenty largest U.S. bank holding companies. As in most previous studies, we do
not find statistically significant interest rate sensitivity during the 1970s and
strong evidence of negative interest rate sensitivity during the 1980s. However,
the statistically significant relation disappears completely during the second half
of the 1980s. The latter result is also obtained when we use survey data to
model the unexpected interest rate.
On October 6, 1979 the Federal Reserve Board announced a switch from
interest rates to unborrowed reserves as its short-term operating target, which
led to an increase in the level and variability of interest rates. In our empirical
analysis we use this event as the switch date for the significant change in the
interest rate sensitivity of the stock returns of the twenty largest U.S. bank
holding companies. The latter is consistent with Aharony, Saunders and Swary
(1986) who published a study on the October 1979 event in which they showed
that after the monetary policy switch, banks started to experience significant
interest rate sensitivity.
' The estimation results for the three-trading-days-ahead expectations were generated by
omitting one outlier. Hamilton (1996) notes that 'spectacular ouliers' are quite common
for federal funds rate data.Survey Z)a/a a/u/ /w/eresf /?a/e Se/w/z/v/'/j' 127
However, Kane and Unal (1988) have serious problems with this type of
analysis which is focused on finding so-called switch points in the data. They
argue: "Presuming a sharp causal connection between specific monetary or
regulatory events and shifts in regression parameters goes beyond the inferential
reach of the data actually examined". They apply this general argument to the
1978-1979 period by referring to numerous developments that might yoinf/y or
zW/v/£/ua//j' have supported expectations revisions large enough to induce a shift
in the return-generating processes for bank stocks. The late 1970s were charac-
terized by the many ways in which banking regulators sought to help their
regulatees to reduce burdens that deposit-rate ceilings would otherwise have
imposed. Examples include the authorization by the Federal Reserve Board of
Money Market Certificates and automatic transfer service (ATS) accounts in
May 1978.
Our empirical results for the 1980s show a breakdown of the statistically sig-
nificant interest rate sensisitivity of U.S. bank stock returns during the second
half of the 1980s. This result is qualitatively independent of the methodology
chosen for modelling the unexpected interest rate variable: both the ARIMA and
survey data generate this result. In the ARIMA case we find as statistically
significant switching point the October 1987 stock market crash while in the
case of the survey data the switching point appears to be in May 1985.
However, for the ARIMA case the date of May 1985 would still be a statistical-
ly significant switching point. Following Kane and Unal we observe that it is
very hard to identify one switching point, even more so when we realize that
the ARIMA and survey data results are related to different interest rate
variables. The ARIMA results use the market-determined three-month Treasury
bill and ten-year Treasury bond rates. The survey data employ the federal funds
rate, which is an overnight rate and is essentially not market-determined but set
by the Federal Reserve.
In our interpretation, given the previous remarks, we believe that the break-
down of interest rate sensitivity of U.S. bank stock returns should be viewed as
a process which developed gradually and became significantly visible during the
second half of the 1980s". The increase of interest rates due to the October
1979 event caused many insolvencies of savings and loan (S&L) associations.
These S&Ls found themselves locked into negative interest margins (low fixed
rates on the assets side and high floating rates on the liabilities side). The S&L
* We would like to thank George Kaufman for suggesting this interpretation.128
crisis led to an increase of interest rate risk awareness on the part of bankers
and regulators. A gradual process of an increasing professionalization of interest
rate risk management by banks started. Moreover, hedging of interest rate risk
became easier and cheaper because of the explosive growth of derivatives
markets trading interest rate futures and options. All this led to a situation in
which banks started to control the amount of interest rate risk they were willing
to accept and to reduce their sensitivity to ««expected interest rate movements.Summary and Conclusion
8.1 Summary
In the introductory chapter 1 we note that recent events of financial disorder
(international debt crisis, junk bond crisis, stock market crashes, bank failures)
have caused renewed interest in the subject of financial _/rag//zfy. Davis (1992)
defines financial fragility as a state of balance sheets offering heightened
vw//jeraè/7/'/> to default in a wide variety of circumstances. A fragile financial
system is more vulnerable to future outbreaks of financial disorder.
During the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, among others, the U.S., Nor-
way, Sweden, Finland, Japan, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom were
confronted with substantial problems at large banks.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the recent banking problems from a
theoretical (chapter 2), empirical (chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7) and institutional-
regulatory (chapter 6) point of view. The empirical chapters 3, 4, and 7 focus
on the U.S., while chapter 5 deals with Norway, Sweden, and Finland.
Chapter 2 discusses the various theories of financial fragility and disorder. We
first present theories of financial fragility characterized by a full understanding
of risk, i.e. uncertainty can be reduced to the 'correct and objective' probability
distribution. These theories, being the rational expectations and efficient markets
literature and the literature on rational bubbles and runs, contain a postive view
on periods of financial disorder. Basically, these periods of financial disruption
are not causing serious damage to financial markets and the economy since
agents are fully risk aware. In this context such periods are non-events. The
chapter continues by discussing other theories of financial fragility, comprised
of the literature on unanticipated credit rationing, irrational bubbles and eupho-
ria, and asymmetric information. The common element of these theories is that
they all analyze a financial system characterized by an incomplete understan-
ding of risk, thereby leaving room for uncertainty. However, they differ from
each other in the way they model uncertainty. The irrational bubbles and
euphoria literature is extreme in the sense that uncertainty is completely untrac-
table and invincible. The other theories take positions somewhere in between130 Cfeip/er
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The central argument of chapter 2 is that globalization of financial markets,
financial innovation and financial deregulation can work out in three ways:
* Imperfectly competitive or oligopolistic financial markets are opened to the
forces of national and international competition and are becoming more
operationally efficient, thereby generating welfare gains.
* The innovation process may increase debt ratios and volatility in asset prices
and as a result financial fragility in the sense of vulnerability of the financial
system to future outbreaks of financial disorder. If, however, the risks in-
volved are known and correctly priced by market participants, then these
periods of financial disorder are unlucky, but calculated events. Increased
financial fragility may lead to more frequent periods of financial disorder
without causing serious damage to the functioning of financial markets and
the economy.
* If increased financial innovation and financial fragility go together with a
lack of understanding of the risks involved, then underpricing and lack of
risk awareness by financial agents will aggravate the consequences of a
period of financial disorder: not fully calculated events may trigger shifts in
confidence, affecting markets more than appears warranted by their sig-
nificance and leading to a financial crisis.
Taking into account the remarks made above, the financial fragility debate boils
down to the debate on risk and uncertainty. Based upon their subjective percep-
tion of the applicability of risk, uncertainty, or something in between,
academics, regulators, and practitioners will come to different conclusions with
respect to the functioning of financial markets and the desirability of regulation.
Chapter 3 deals with extreme value theory and market assessments of the m-
yt/ness of banks in the U.S. Since the 1970s the U.S. banking system has ex-
perienced major changes in terms of new financial products, deregulation,
increasing competition, lower margins and changing risk attitudes.
In the literature a consensus exists that distributions of asset returns are fat-
tailed. We use a non-parametric tail index estimator based on extreme value
theory to shed light on the empirical distributions of stock returns for the twenty
largest U.S. bank holding companies between January 1973 and DecemberCowc/ws/'on 131
1993. Since the tail index is a good indicator of thickness of the tails, it provi-
des an accurate measure of the degree of riskiness of the underlying bank
stocks. Based on this criterion, we find that the riskiness of seven of the twenty
bank holding companies has increased significantly after the start of deregula-
tion in 1980. Moreover, for fourteen out of twenty bank holding companies we
find large increases in the probabilities that the stock prices of these banks
experience a one-week return of 20% or 30% (both positive and negative).
The 1980s witnessed the greatest crisis in U.S. commercial banking since the
Great Depression. Boyd and Gertler (1994) show that banks with the largest
total assets contributed in a significantly disproportionate way to aggregate loan
losses. The intuition is that, while deregulation and financial innovation led to
increased overa// competition for the banking industry, the existing regulatory
environment tended to subsidize risk taking by /arge banks more than that by
small banks (too-big-to-fail policy). The study by Boyd and Gertler corresponds
with our empirical findings of increased riskiness of several of the twenty
largest U.S. bank holding companies.
In chapter 4, extending the analysis of Wolfson (1990), we present an empirical
analysis of indicators of financial fragility in the U.S. banking sector
(commercial banks and S&Ls). For the commerc/'a/ 6an&mg sector our main
conclusion is that the increased variability in the assets of failed banks as a
percentage of total bank assets can be explained for a substantial part by the
increase of the net bank losses as a percentage of average bank loans. It is this
deterioration in the loan performance of the commercial banking sector (third
world loans, junk bonds, real estate loans) that led to the largest U.S. bank
failures since the banking crisis of 1929-1933. This could suggest that banks'
risk awareness and risk pricing were not taking account of the increased ris-
kiness of U.S. commercial banking. Evidence of this increased riskiness was
presented in chapter 3.
For the S<£Z, sector we can conclude that the main factors accounting for the
'instability' in the S&L sector are the decrease in the S&L interest margin and,
in particular, the decrease of the home mortgages share in total financial S&L
assets. The last variable indicates riskier investment policies of S&Ls. Starting
at the beginning of the 1980s when a lot of S&Ls found themselves locked into
negative interest margins (low fixed rates on the assets side and high floating
rates on the liabilities side because of a restrictive monetary policy), they deci-
ded to take a bet on the deposit insurance system in order to try to save their
heads. This was done by investing in riskier products like options, futures and132
junk bonds. Deregulation enabled S&Ls to do this. Especially in the second half
of the 1980s the effects of the risk taking became visible in the form of S&L
insolvencies and failures.
Chapter 5 contains an empirical analysis of the Scandinavian banking crisis at
the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. In this chapter we present
maximum likelihood estimates for pooled banking data of Norway, Sweden and
Finland during the period 1980-1992. Our empirical analysis shows strong
evidence that mown//«g credff /arras played a significant role in the banking
crises of Norway, Sweden and Finland. At the same time we observe that the
bank failures and insolvencies were not caused by a significant deterioration of
net interest margins. A logical interpretation could be that banks have not been
able to charge adequate risk premia in order to be compensated for the higher
lending risks after deregulation had taken effect. This resulted in built-up capital
reserves being too small in order to be able to bear the credit losses and, conse-
quently, in massive bank failures and insolvencies.
The focus of chapter 6 is upon the international dimension to regulation in two
areas (banking and securities business) which, while they have common con-
siderations, also raise different issues. The focus is upon two issues in inter-
nationally co-operative regulatory strategies: syste/mc sta£i/ify and com/re/i/ive
«ew/ra//7y. Two central themes emerge. Firstly, while in some areas there is a
potential case for international co-ordination to increase the effectiveness of
regulation for systemic stability reasons, issues of competitive neutrality might
be dominant and, at times, in conflict with the requirements of prudential
regulation for systemic stability.
Secondly, specific examples of international co-ordination (the examples
chosen are the 1988 Basle Capital Convergence Arrangements with respect to
banking and the 1993 European Union's Capital Adequacy Directive with
respect to securities business) demonstrate that the approaches adopted may be
inefficient in two respects: they do not achieve their systemic stability or com-
petitive neutrality objectives, and the two objectives may be in conflict with the
resultant compromise, being sub-optimum for both.
Chapter 7 presents an empirical analysis of the interest rate sensitivity of U.S.
bank stock returns. The contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold.
First, using weekly data for the period 1974-1993 and using the forecast
errors of autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) processes in orderSwwmiry anrf Cowc/us/on 133
to model the unexpected interest rate, we provide empirical evidence on the
interest rate sensitivity of the stock returns of the twenty largest U.S. bank
holding companies. As in most previous studies, we do not find statistically
significant interest rate sensitivity during the 1970s and strong evidence of
negative interest rate sensitivity during the 1980s. However, the statistically
significant relation disappears completely during the second half of the 1980s.
This result is qualitatively independent of using the three-month Treasury bill
rate or the rate on ten-year Treasury bonds as input for the ARIMA modelling
of the unexpected interest rate variable. Interestingly, our result indicates that,
contrary to the existing literature which only covers the period until the mid-
1980s, the interest rate sensitivity of bank stock returns varies with the sub-
period considered. The only other paper incorporating recent data is Robinson
(1995). Robinson employed quarterly data in contrast to the weekly data in our
analysis. His results are quite mixed in the sense that the sign of the interest rate
sensitivity appears to depend on the choice of the interest rate variable in his
time series models.
The second contribution of this chapter is to use survey cfota in order to
model the unexpected interest rate variable. This is an alternative approach
compared to the existing literature. In this chapter we use weekly survey data
on the U.S. federal funds rate for the period April 29, 1980 until December 22,
1993. The survey was conducted by Money Market Services (MMS) Inter-
national (part of Standard & Poor's) in Belmont, California. The weekly surveys
generate a market expectation for the federal funds rate for a certain survey
period which is then confronted with the realized value of the federal funds rate
during the same survey period. This enables us to calculate an unexpected
change in the federal funds rate for the relevant survey period which is then
used for estimating the interest rate sensitivity. We find a statistically significant
negative interest rate sensitity for the period April 1980 through May 1985.
Since then, the statistically significant relation between unexpected federal fund
rate changes and bank stock returns has broken down. This result is consistent
with our previous findings where we used the forecast errors of ARIMA proces-
ses related to the three-month Treasury bill rate and the ten-year Treasury bond
rate as a proxy for unanticipated interest rate movements. Also in the latter case
we found a breakdown of the interest rate sensitivities during the second half of
the 1980s.
In our interpretation we believe that the breakdown of interest rate sensitivity
of U.S. bank stock returns should be viewed as a process which developed
gradually and became significantly visible during the second half of the 1980s.134 C/iop/er <S
The increase of interest rates due to the October 1979 event caused many insol-
vencies of savings and loan (S&L) associations. These S&Ls found themselves
locked into negative interest margins (low fixed rates on the assets side and
high floating rates on the liabilities side). The S&L crisis led to an increase of
interest rate risk awareness on the part of bankers and regulators. A gradual
process of an increasing professionalization of interest rate risk management by
banks started. Moreover, hedging of interest rate risk became easier and cheaper
because of the explosive growth of derivatives markets trading interest rate
futures and options. All this led to a situation in which banks started to control
the amount of interest rate risk they were willing to accept and to reduce their
sensitivity to wwexpec/ec/ interest rate movements.
8.2 Conclusion
Apart from the country-specific conditions, the banking crises studied in this
thesis also contain a sfruc/Mra/ component which played an important role in all
banking crises. This component relates to the fact that deregulation and
increased competition structurally change the market environment in which
banks operate. Before deregulation had come into effect, regulation acted as a
protection to banks. The key elements to the underlying banking structure were:
low degrees of competition, the existence of restrictive practices, cartels and
anti-competitive mechanisms, high entry barriers into banking, and limited
growth of bank assets and size of balance sheets. Restrictive regulation almost
invariably creates economic rents which have the effect of enhancing the value
of the banking franchise. It is also the case that non-price competition created a
degree of excess capacity that would not be sustainable in a more competitive
market environment. Overall, therefore, the impact of the regulatory environ-
ment was to create excess capacity, monopolistic profits and economic rents in
the banking industry.
The immediate impact of deregulation is likely to be an initial stock ad-
justment response by banks towards new steady state sustainable balance sheet
positions. Financial institutions have a desired portfolio structure for a given set
of market and regulatory conditions, and if any of these conditions change, the
desired portfolio changes and stock adjustments are made to achieve them.
While the new portfolio equilibrium is being achieved through a finite once-for-
all stock adjustment, the volume of credit is substantially increased. The IMF
(1993a) argues: "The increase in borrowing was broadly based, suggesting thatCOWC/MJ/OH 135
the debt accumulation reflected a backlog of unsatisfied demand for credit
unleashed after financial liberalization". During such a transitional period of
adjustment from a credit-constrained to a credit-liberalized market regime
economic agents have to learn the new structural equilibrium relations. As long
as learning is still taking place expectations errors need not satisfy any of the
optimality properties usually assumed in the rational expectations literature
(Pesaran 1987). This implies that in such a transitional phase of learning sys-
tematic estimations errors by bankers can be made resulting in inadequate risk
premia, huge credit losses and substantial bank failures and insolvencies.
The movement from the regulated to the deregulated regime does not neces-
sarily imply that, once the deregulated and new competitive steady-state
equilibrium has been reached, the errors will be repeated. What remains to be
determined in each of the case study countries is whether the precarious position
of banks is transitory in nature (associated with the once-for-all shock of
deregulation and increased competition) and whether, once the impact of stock
adjustment effects has been unwound, banks will learn from past mistakes.
What can safely be concluded from the experience in the countries studied in
this thesis, is that big shocks to banking systems (such as sharp changes in
regulation) can easily produce severe reactions. However, it cannot be conclu-
ded that the aftermath of such shocks indicates the characteristics of the new
deregulated environment itself once the adjustment has been made and the
lessons learned.
Nevertheless, the deregulated banking environment may have made banking
potentially more fragile. The erosion of the economic rents induced by previous
regulation is likely to have made banking a more vulnerable industry than in the
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In het introductie-hoofdstuk 1 werd gesteld dat recente episoden van financiële
turbulentie (internationale schuldencrisis, crisis op de markt voor junk bonds,
koersval op aandelenmarkten, bankfaillissementen) hernieuwde belangstelling
hebben opgewekt voor het onderwerp financiële _/ragz7jïeif. Davis (1992)
definieert financiële fragiliteit als een staat van zodanige balansverhoudingen
dat er een toegenomen ^wetetarar/ie/d ontstaat om in een breed spectrum van
omstandigheden aan de financiële verplichtingen te kunnen voldoen. Een fragiel
financieel systeem is kwetsbaarder voor het uitbreken van toekomstige perioden
van financiële turbulentie.
Gedurende de jaren '80 en het begin van de jaren '90 werden, onder andere,
de Verenigde Staten, Noorwegen, Zweden, Finland, Japan, Frankrijk, Italië en
het Verenigd Koninkrijk geconfronteerd met substantiële problemen bij hun
grote banken.
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om de recente bankproblemen te analyseren
vanuit een theoretisch (hoofdstuk 2), empirisch (hoofdstukken 3, 4, 5 en 7) en
een institutioneel/regelgevings-gezichtspunt (hoofdstuk 6). De empirische hoofd-
stukken 3, 4 en 7 richten zich op de Verenigde Staten, terwijl hoofdstuk 5 zich
concentreert op Noorwegen, Zweden en Finland.
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op de diverse theorieën van financiële fragiliteit en tur-
bulentie. Allereerst worden er de theorieën gepresenteerd die zich kenmerken
door een volledig begrip van risico. Dat wil zeggen dat onzekerheid kan worden
gereduceerd tot de 'correcte en objectieve' kansverdeling. Deze theorieën,
zijnde de literatuur aangaande rationele verwachtingen en efficiënte markten
enerzijds en de literatuur inzake rationele 'bubbles' en 'runs' anderzijds,
impliceren een positieve visie wat betreft perioden van financiële turbulentie.
Vanwege het uitgangspunt dat economische agenten volledig risicobewust zijn,
veroorzaken zulke perioden van financiële disruptie geen serieuze schade voor
de financiële markten en de economie. In het vervolg van hoofdstuk 2 worden
andere theorieën van financiële fragiliteit aan de orde gesteld, namelijk de
literatuur inzake onverwachte kredietrantsoenering, irrationele 'bubbles' en
euforie, en de literatuur die uitgaat van asymmetrische informatie. Het gemeen-
schappelijke element van genoemde theorieën is dat zij allen een financieel
systeem analyseren dat wordt gekenmerkt door een onvolledig begrip van risico.148 Atecfer/a/wise 5a/wenva//mg
Het gevolg is dat er ruimte is voor onzekerheid die niet kan worden gekwan-
tificeerd in de vorm van kansverdelingen. Echter, bedoelde theorieën verschillen
van elkaar in de wijze waarop zij deze onzekerheid modelleren. De literatuur
aangaande irrationele 'bubbles' en euforie is extreem daar zij ervan uitgaat dat
onzekerheid geheel niet te traceren en te overwinnen valt. De overige theorieën
plaatsen zich ergens tussen de /?o/en vaw ra/co e« o«ze/fcerAe/d in.
De centrale boodschap van hoofdstuk 2 is dat de processen van globalisering
van financiële markten, financiële innovaties en financiële deregulering op drie
manieren kunnen uitwerken:
* Niet volledig concurrerende of oligopolistische markten worden geopend
voor de krachten van nationale en internationale concurrentie en worden
daardoor efficiënter in operationele zin. Het gevolg is dat er wel-
vaartswinsten worden gegenereerd.
* Het innovatieproces kan ertoe leiden dat schuldratio's en de volatiliteit van
activaprijzen toenemen met als gevolg een toename van financiële fragiliteit
in de zin van kwetsbaarheid van het financiële systeem voor het uitbreken
van toekomstige perioden van financiële turbulentie. Indien, echter, de hier-
mee gepaard gaande risico's door de economische agenten volledig worden
gekend en geprijsd, dan zijn zulke perioden van financiële turbulentie on-
gelukkige, maar volledig ingecalculeerde gebeurtenissen. Een toegenomen
financiële fragiliteit kan op deze wijze samengaan met een grotere frequentie
van perioden van turbulentie zonder dat er sprake is van serieuze schade
voor de financiële markten en de economie.
* Indien toegenomen financiële innovaties en fragiliteit samengaan met een
gebrek aan begrip van de risico's, dan kan het niet correct prijzen en het
gebrek aan risicobewustheid de gevolgen van een periode van financiële
turbulentie verergeren: niet volledig ingecalculeerde gebeurtenissen kunnen
vertrouwensschokken genereren, markten sterker beïnvloeden dan gerecht-
vaardigd lijkt door de omvang van de gebeurtenissen en daarmee tot een
financiële crisis leiden.
Het voorgaande samenvattende kan worden gesteld dat het debat inzake finan-
ciële fragiliteit nauw samenhangt met het debat aangaande risico en onzeker-
heid. Gebaseerd op de eigen subjectieve belevingswereld met betrekking tot het
spectrum van risico aan de ene kant en onzekerheid aan de andere kant, zullen149
wetenschappers, toezichthouders en professionele dienstverleners tot verschil-
lende conclusies komen aangaande de werking van financiële markten en de
wenselijkheid van regulering.
Hoofstuk 3 gaat in op de theorie van extreme waarden en de marktperceptie van
de rafcograad van banken in de Verenigde Staten (VS). Sinds de zeventiger
jaren heeft het Amerikaanse bankwezen grote veranderingen doorgemaakt in
termen van nieuwe financiële producten, deregulering, toegenomen concurrentie,
lagere marges en veranderende risicohoudingen.
In de literatuur bestaat er een consensus dat de kansverdelingen die de
rendementen van activa beschrijven een dikstaartig karakter hebben. In dit
hoofdstuk wordt gebruik gemaakt van een non-parametrische schatter van een
index die de mate van dikstaartigheid weergeeft. Deze schatter komt voort uit
de theorie van extreme waarden. Het doel van de schattingen is om inzicht te
verkrijgen in de empirische verdelingen van de aandelenrendementen van de
twintig grootste houdstermaatschappijen van bankaandelen in de VS gedurende
de periode januari 1973 tot en met december 1993. Daar de 'staart-index' een
goede indicator is van de mate van dikstaartigheid van de verdelingen, kan deze
index tevens worden beschouwd als een accurate maatstaf van de risicograad
van de onderliggende bankaandelen. Uit de schattingen blijkt dat de risicograad
van zeven van de twintig houdstermaatschappijen van bankaandelen significant
is toegenomen na de start van deregulering in 1980. Bovendien blijkt dat veer-
tien van de twintig banken een grote stijging vertonen van de kans dat hun
aandelen in één week een rendement hebben van 20% of 30% (zowel positief
als negatief).
De jaren '80 werden gekenmerkt door de grootste crisis bij de Amerikaanse
handelsbanken sinds de Grote Depressie. Boyd en Gertler (1994) laten zien dat
juist de banken met de grootste balanstotalen op significant disproportionele
wijze hebben bijgedragen aan de totale verliezen in het Amerikaanse
bankwezen. De intuïtie hierbij is dat, hoewel deregulering en financiële in-
novaties leidden tot een toename van de concurrentie in de Amerikaanse
bankensector /« zy« ge/jee/, de bestaande structuur van regelgeving neigde tot
het stimuleren van riskant gedrag bij vooral de grote banken ('too-big-to-fail
policy'). In dit opzicht correspondeert de studie van Boyd en Gertler met de in
hoofdstuk 3 gepresenteerde resultaten die een toegenomen risicograad laten zien
bij een aantal van de twintig grootste houdstermaatschappijen van bankaandelen
in de VS.150
Gebaseerd op het werk van Wolfson (1990) wordt in hoofdstuk 4 een em-
pirische analyse gepresenteerd van indicatoren van financiële fragiliteit in de
Amerikaanse bancaire sector (handelsbanken en spaarbanken). Voor de sector
van /rarafe/sAaM&e/j is de belangrijkste conclusie dat de toegenomen variabiliteit
in de ratio van de activa van banken die failliet zijn gegaan als percentage van
de activa van alle banken voor een groot deel kan worden verklaard uit de
stijging van de netto kredietverliezen als percentage van de gemiddeld
uitstaande leningen. Het was deze verslechtering in de 'performance' van de
kredietuitzettingen (leningen aan Derde Wereld-landen, junk bond-leningen,
onroerend goed-leningen) die heeft geleid tot de grootste Amerikaanse bankfail-
lissementen sinds de bankencrisis van de periode 1929-1933. Het voorgaande
zou kunnen betekenen dat het gedrag van banken inzake de risicobewustheid en
het prijzen van risico niet in voldoende mate rekening heeft gehouden met de
toegenomen risicograad van de Amerikaanse handelsbanken. Empirisch bewijs
aangaande deze toegenomen risicograad werd gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 3.
Voor de sector van ^paaréan^w kan worden geconcludeerd dat de belang-
rijkste factoren die hebben bijgedragen aan de problemen in deze sector zijn
enerzijds de daling van de rentemarge en anderzijds, en in het bijzonder, de
daling van de woninghypotheken als percentage van de totale uitzettingen van
de spaarbanken. De ontwikkeling van deze laatste variable duidt op een ris-
kanter uitzettingenbeleid van spaarbanken. Aan het begin van de jaren '80
werden vele spaarbanken geconfronteerd met een negatieve rentemarge als
gevolg van een restrictief monetair beleid in een situatie dat de spaarbanken
zich kortlopend gefinancierd hadden en de toevertrouwde middelen tegen een
lage rente voor lange tijd hadden uitgezet. Om uit deze impasse te geraken
besloten vele spaarbanken in riskante produkten zoals opties, futures en junk
bonds te beleggen. Het proces van deregulering vanaf 1980 stelde hen hiertoe in
staat. In het bijzonder gedurende de tweede helft van de jaren '80 werden de
gevolgen van de genomen risico's zichtbaar in de vorm van een groot aantal
faillissementen en insolventies van spaarbanken.
Hoofdstuk 5 bevat een empirische analyse van de Scandinavische bankencrisis
aan het einde van de jaren '80 en het begin van de jaren '90. In dit hoofdstuk
worden 'maximum likelihood' schattingen gepresenteerd voor in één dataset
gecombineerde bancaire data van Noorwegen, Zweden en Finland. Uit de em-
pirische analyse komt sterk naar voren dat /wassa/e fcra#e/ver//ezew een sig-
nificante rol hebben gespeeld in de bancaire crises van Noorwegen, Zweden en
Finland. Tegelijkertijd blijkt dat de bancaire faillissementen en insolventies niet151
zijn veroorzaakt door een significante verslechtering van de rentemarges. Een
logische interpretatie van het voorgaande zou kunnen zijn dat de banken niet in
staat zijn geweest om adequate risicopremies door te berekenen als compensatie
voor de toegenomen kredietrisico's nadat deregulering in gang was gezet. Hier-
door ontstond bij de banken een situatie waarin de opgebouwde reserves te
gering waren om de grote kredietverliezen te kunnen dragen met als consequen-
tie massale faillissementen en insolventies van banken.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt aandacht besteed aan de internationale dimensie van
regulering met betrekking tot bancaire en effecteninstellingen. De analyse richt
zich in het bijzonder op twee punten waarop internationale coördinatie van
regelgeving zich kan richten: coördinatie ten behoeve van het handhaven en
bevorderen van de stabiliteit van het financiële systeem ('systemic stability') en
coördinatie ten behoeve van het versterken van de competitieve neutraliteit
('competitive neutrality'). Twee hoofdthema's komen aan bod in dit hoofdstuk.
Ten eerste, alhoewel er deelgebieden zijn waar sprake is van een behoefte
aan internationale coördinatie teneinde de effectiviteit van regelgeving te vergro-
ten uit hoofde van 'systemic stability'-redenen, kunnen kwesties van
'competitive neutrality' dominant zijn en soms in conflict met de gewenste
regelgeving ter bevordering van 'systemic stability'.
Ten tweede, er zijn specifieke voorbeelden van internationale coördinatie te
geven, zoals het Bazelse Akkoord van 1988 met betrekking tot bancaire instel-
lingen en de Richtlijn Kapitaaltoereikendheid van de Europese Unie uit 1993
inzake effecteninstellingen, die aangeven dat de gekozen benaderingen inef-
ficiënt zijn op twee manieren: enerzijds realiseren zij niet de doelstellingen van
'systemic stability' en 'competitive neutrality' en anderzijds zijn de twee
doelstellingen vaak met elkaar in conflict met als gevolg een compromis dat
suboptimaal is vanuit het gezichtspunt van beide doelstellingen.
Hoofdstuk 7 bevat een empirische analyse van de rentegevoeligheid van de
bancaire aandelenrendementen in de VS. De bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk aan de
literatuur is tweeledig.
Ten eerste, uitgaande van wekelijkse data voor de periode 1974-1993 en
gebruik makende van de voorspelfouten van zogeheten 'autoregressive in-
tegrated moving average' (ARIMA) processen teneinde de onverwachte rente te
modelleren, wordt empirisch bewijs gepresenteerd aangaande de ren-
tegevoeligheid van de aandelenrendementen van de twintig grootste Ameri-
kaanse houdstermaatschappijen van bankaandelen. Zoals in de meeste voor-152 Afo/eWamfce Samenvatf/>ig
gaande studies is er geen statistisch significante rentegevoeligheid gedurende de
jaren '70 en is er een sterk significante negatieve rentegevoeligheid in de eerste
helft van de tachtiger jaren. Echter, deze statistisch significante ren-
tegevoeligheid verdwijnt geheel tijdens de tweede helft van de jaren '80. Dit
resultaat wordt kwalitatief niet beïnvloed door de keuze voor het driemaands
rendement op schatkistpapier of voor het tienjaars rendement op staatsobligaties
als inputvariabele ter berekening van de onverwachte rente.
Een tweede bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk is dat er gebruik wordt gemaakt van
survey cfata teneinde de onverwachte rente te modelleren. Dit is een alternatieve
benadering ten opzichte van de bestaande literatuur. In dit hoofdstuk wordt
gebruik gemaakt van survey data betreffende de Amerikaanse 'federal funds
rate' voor de periode 29 april 1980 tot en met 22 december 1993. De survey
werd georganiseerd door Money Market Services (MMS) International (deel
uitmakend van Standard & Poor's) in Belmont, Californië. De wekelijkse sur-
veys genereren een marktverwachting voor de federal funds rate gedurende een
bepaalde periode, welke wordt geconfronteerd met de feitelijk gerealiseerde
waarde van de federal funds rate gedurende dezelfde survey-periode. Dit creëert
de mogelijkheid om de onverwachte verandering in de federal funds rate te
berekenen voor de relevante survey-periode, welke vervolgens wordt gebruikt
om de rentegevoeligheid te schatten. Het resultaat van de schatting is een statis-
tisch significante negatieve rentegevoeligheid gedurende de periode april 1980
tot en met mei 1985. Sindsdien is de statistisch significante relatie tussen onver-
wachte veranderingen in de federal funds rate en bancaire aandelenrendementen
verdwenen. Dit resultaat is consistent met het resultaat dat werd gegenereerd
door middel van de ARIMA-processen ter modellering van de onverwachte
rente. Ook in dat geval was er sprake van een verdwijnen van de ren-
tegevoeligheid gedurende de tweede helft van de jaren '80.
Het voorgaande resultaat van het verdwijnen van de rentegevoeligheid is
waarschijnlijk het gevolg van een proces dat zich geleidelijk ontwikkelde en pas
significant zichtbaar werd gedurende de tweede helft van de de jaren '80. Ten
gevolge van de rentestijging samenhangende met de keuze voor een restrictief
monetair beleid in oktober 1979 zijn veel Amerikaanse spaarbanken in de
problemen geraakt. De spaarbankcrisis leidde tot een toegenomen aandacht voor
de problematiek van het renterisico bij bankiers en toezichthouders. Dit zette
een geleidelijk proces in gang van een professionalisering van het management
van renterisico door banken. Tegelijkertijd werd het afdekken van renterisico
goedkoper door de explosieve groei van derivatenmarkten waarop onder andere
rentefutures en rente-opties worden verhandeld. Dit alles leidde tot een situatie153
waarin banken in toenemende mate hun renterisico gingen beheersen en hun
gevoeligheid voor o/jverwac/rte rente-ontwikkelingen gingen reduceren.155
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